Your search returned 46 results in 12 document sections:

Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), Chapter 2: military policy, or the philosophy of war. (search)
in this category. The remedy is in strong institutions and skillful chiefs alone. The French even, whose military virtues have never been questioned when they have been well conducted, have often witnessed those alarms which it is permitted to call rediculous. Who does not recall the inconceivable panic terror with which the infantry of Marshal Villars was seized after having gained the battle of Friedlingen (1704)? The same thing had place in the infantry of Napoleon after the victory of Wagram, when the enemy was in full retreat. And, what is more extraordinary still, is the rout of the 97th demi-brigade at the seige of Genoa, where fifteen hundred men fled before a platoon of hussars, whilst that those same men took two days after the Diamond Fort by one of the most vigorous coups-de-main of modern history. It would seem, nevertheless, very easy to convince brave soldiers that death strikes more quickly and more surely men flying in disorder, than those who remian united to p
Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), Chapter 3: strategy. (search)
all the important points of the échiquier. Finally, an army could not occupy surely a strategic position, without taking the precaution to have one or two tactical positions fixed upon beforehand, with the view to uniting thereon, to receive the enemy and to combat him with all the disposable forces, when his projects should be well unmasked: it was thus that Napoleon had prepared his battle fields of Rivoli and of Austerlitz — Wellington, that of Waterloo, and the Arch-Duke Charles, that of Wagram. In the strategic positions which an army takes in the course of a campaign, whether in march, whether for remaining in observation, or for awaiting the occasion for retaking the offensive, it will occupy also compact cantonments: these kinds of positions require on the part of the general, a practised calculation, for judging all that he may have to fear from the enemy. The army ought to embrace a space sufficient for finding therein means of existence, and meanwhile it must remain as m
Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), Chapter 4: grand tactics, and battles. (search)
having almost the whole of the assailing masses to combat,will be overwhelmed and probably destroyed. This was the manoeuvre which caused Napoleon to triumph at Wagram and at Ligny; it was what he wished to attempt at Borodino and which only succeeded imperfectly on account of the heroic defense of the troops of the left wing ofhe Pyramids he formed an oblique line in echelon squares; at Essling, at Leipsic, at Brienne, he presented a kind of convex order nearly like that in figure 7, at Wagram we see him adopt an order quite like that in figure 12, directing two masses upon his centre and his right, refusing his left, which he wished to repeat at Borodi the miracles which Richepanse operated in that cut-throat place of Matenpot, where it was much more probable that he would be obliged to lay down his arms. At Wagram, the turning wing of Davoust had a great part in the success of the day; but if. the vigorous attack executed on the centre by Macdonald, Oudinot and Bernadotte h
Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), Chapter 5: of different mixed operations, which participate at the same time of strategy and.of tactics. (search)
it is worthy of remark. In our day, General Dedon has celebrated the two passages of the Rhine at Kehl, and that of the Danube at Hochstaedt in 1800: his work should be consulted as classic for details; now, precision in details is everything for these kinds of operations. Finally, three other passages of the Danube, and the ever-celebrated one of the Beresina, surpassed all that had been seen until then of this kind. The first two were those which Napoleon executed at Essling and at Wagram, in presence of an army of a hundred and twenty thousand men, provided with four hundred pieces of artillery, and upon one of the points where the bed of the river is the broadest; it is necessary to read the interesting narrative of it by General Pelet. The third is that which was executed by the Russian army at Satounovo in 1828: although it could not be compared with the preceding, it was very remarkable from the excessive difficulties which the localities presented, and from the nature
Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), Chapter 6: logistics, or the practical art of moving armies. (search)
to giving them a knowledge of the corps destined to operate in common with them, either to the right or to the left, but never tracing for them the ensemble of the operations of the whole army. I think that at the passage of the Danube before Wagram, and at the beginning of the second campaign of 1813, Napoleon deviated from his custom by sketching a general order. I have had reason to be convinced that he acted thus systematically, either for covering the ensemble of his combinations by a mthe inaction of the enemy, they were allowed to pass for a few detachments which followed corps to which they did not belong; what was more astonishing, is that after such a blunder, Berthier should have been decorated with the title of Prince of Wagram — this was the most cruel of epigrams. Doubtless the error had escaped Napoleon in the dictation of his decree; but a chief of staff dispatching twenty copies of this order, and charged with the office of superintending the formation of the tr
Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), chapter 7 (search)
the one behind the other, as Napoleon has often done, especially at Wagram. I believe that with the exception of the reserves, this system coy, far from the whole line, as Napoleon did with so much success at Wagram? Not being able here to enter into all the details of this arm, we The Arch-Duke Charles was fortunate at Essling, and especially at Wagram, in having adopted this last order, which I proposed in my chapter French at Waterloo. If the column of Macdonald succeeded better at Wagram, it paid dearly for it, and but for the success of the attacks of D that of the other arms. In the meanwhile we have seen Napoleon at Wagram throw a battery of a hundred pieces in the gap occasioned in his liwhen it is necessary to deviate from this maxim, and the example of Wagram, of which we have spoken, is one of the most remarkable of them. ery broken country, in a word, we do not find fields of battle like Wagram and Leipsic. As for the rest, there are useful lessons in his pa
Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), Conclusion (search)
ur lines of operations have been skillfully chosen, your movements well disguised; if the enemy, on the contrary, make false movements which permit you to fall upon the yet dispersed fractions of his army, you will be able to conquer without pitched battles, by the sole ascendancy of your strategic advantages. But if the two parties find themselves in equally good condition at the moment when the rencounter shall have place, then there will result one of those great tragedies like Borodino, Wagram, Waterloo, Bautzen, and Dresden, in which the precepts of grand tactics indicated in Chapter IV, will certainly be able to exercise a notable influence. If certain obstinate military men, after having read this book, after having studied attentively the discussed history of a few campaigns of the great masters, maintain still that there are neither principles nor good maxims of war, then one could only pity them and reply to them by the famous saying of Frederick the Great: A mule which s
H. Wager Halleck , A. M. , Lieut. of Engineers, U. S. Army ., Elements of Military Art and Science; or, Course of Instruction in Strategy, Fortification, Tactis of Battles &c., Embracing the Duties of Staff, Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery and Engineers. Adapted to the Use of Volunteers and Militia., Chapter 5: Tactics.The twelve orders of battle, with examples of each.—Different Formations of infantry, cavalry, artillery, and engineers on the field of battle, with the Modes of bringing troops into action (search)
n in some of his other battles. (Figure 25.) The combined order in columns on the centre and one extremity at the same time, is better suited than either of the preceding for attacking a strong contiguous line. Napoleon employed this order at Wagram, Ligny, Bautzen, Borodino, and Waterloo. It is impossible to lay down, as a general rule, which of these orders of battle should be employed, or that either should be exclusively followed throughout the whole battle. The question must be decintions and deceive him respecting the true point of attack, success will be more certain and decisive. A turning manoeuvre may frequently be employed with advantage at the same time with the main attack on the line. The operations of Davoust at Wagram, and Richepanse at Hohenlinden, are good examples under this head. The manoeuvre is, however, a difficult one, and unless executed with skill, may lead to disasters like the turning manoeuvres of the Austrians at Rivoli and Austerlitz, and of th
H. Wager Halleck , A. M. , Lieut. of Engineers, U. S. Army ., Elements of Military Art and Science; or, Course of Instruction in Strategy, Fortification, Tactis of Battles &c., Embracing the Duties of Staff, Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery and Engineers. Adapted to the Use of Volunteers and Militia., Chapter 11: army organization.—Artillery.—Its history and organization, with a brief Notice of the different kinds of Ordnance, the Manufacture of Projectiles, &c. (search)
the line are also favorable for the action of this arm. Sometimes artillery has been employed to form a part of the line of battle; but such instances are exceptions, and can never be comprised in general rules. Whenever this disposition has been made, it has resulted from the defective character of the other arms, or from some peculiar circumstance in the battle which enabled a bold and skilful commander to deviate from the ordinary rules of tactics. Such was the case with Napoleon at Wagram. In Saxony, in 1813, he was several times obliged to substitute his artillery to supply the — want of other arms. In the defence and attack of field-works, and in the passage of rivers, artillery plays an important and indispensable part; but it here becomes an auxiliary to the dispositions of the engineers, or at least acts in concert with that arm. The troops of artillery, in all well-regulated army organizations, should equal about two-thirds of the cavalry, or one-seventh of the i
rns, were habitually narrated in glowing newspaper reports from the first impressions of civilians who have hovered in the rear of the army, they would, I apprehend, in most cases exhibit similar scenes of panic and disorder. After the fate of Wagram was decided by the retreat of the Archduke Charles, and Napoleon had retired to rest for the night, he was roused by an alarm which seemed of the most formidable character. The rear of his victorious army was thrown into confusion. Artillery, b even was shaken; the victors for a moment doubted the fate of the day. The ranks presented the appearance of a general rout, and yet the whole was occasioned by a single squadron of the Archduke John's cavalry, which had been far advanced toward Wagram, and seeking to regain, as he retired, the road to Presburg, had cut down some French marauders in one of the villages on the east of the field. Such was the effect of panic on the veterans of Napoleon, reposing in his presence after a mighty vi