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Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), Chapter 1: the policy of war. (search)
ted, however, that there may be a great difference in the nature of the operations that shall be undertaken, according to the divers chances to be run. For example, two hundred thousand French wishing to subject Spain, aroused against them as one man, would not manoeuvre like two hundred thousand French wishing to march upon Vienna, or any other capital, there to dictate peace (1809); and they would not do the guerillas of Mina the honor to combat them in the same manner that they fought at Borodino. This, in reply to Major Proketsch, who, despite his well known erudition, believed himself able to sustain that the policy of war could have no influence upon its operations and that war should always be made in the same manner. Without going so far for examples, could it be said that the two hundred thousand French of whom we have just spoken, ought equally to march upon Vienna, whatever should be the moral condition of the governments, and of the population between the Rhine and the I
Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), Chapter 2: military policy, or the philosophy of war. (search)
t of the nature of arms, or the organization of troops. The means of destruction are being perfected with a frightful progression; the congreve rockets, of which the Austrians have succeeded, it is said, in regulating the effect and the direction; the schrapnell shells, which launch floods of grape to the range of the ball; steam guns of Perkins, which vomit as many balls as a battalion, are going to centuple perhaps the chances of carnage, as if the hecatombs of the species of Eylau, of Borodino, of Leipzig, and of Waterloo, were not sufficient for desolating the European populations. If sovereigns do not unite in congress to proscribe those inventions of death and destruction, there will remain no other course to take than to compose the half of armies of cuirassed cavalry, to be able to capture with the greatest rapidity all the machines; and the infantry even will be compelled to retake its iron armour of the middle ages, without which a battalion could be struck down before
Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), Chapter 4: grand tactics, and battles. (search)
and that of the extremity, having almost the whole of the assailing masses to combat,will be overwhelmed and probably destroyed. This was the manoeuvre which caused Napoleon to triumph at Wagram and at Ligny; it was what he wished to attempt at Borodino and which only succeeded imperfectly on account of the heroic defense of the troops of the left wing of the Russians, that of the division Paskevitch il the famous redoubt of the centre, then by the arrival of the corps of Baggavout upon the win, at Brienne, he presented a kind of convex order nearly like that in figure 7, at Wagram we see him adopt an order quite like that in figure 12, directing two masses upon his centre and his right, refusing his left, which he wished to repeat at Borodino, as well as at Waterloo before the arrival of the Prussians. At Eylau, although the encounter was almost unforeseen on account of the unlooked for offensive return of the Russian army, he outflanked the left almost perpendicularly, whilst upon
Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), chapter 7 (search)
rtillery, at least at a certain distance. It was seen at Waterloo how much it cost the French cavalry for having acted against this rule, and the cavalry of Frederick experienced the same fate at Kunersdorf. We may, nevertheless, find ourselves called upon to engage the cavalry alone; but, in general, a charge upon a line of infantry which should already be found engaged with the adverse infantry, is that from which we could expect the most advantages; the battles of Marengo, of Eylau, of Borodino, and ten others, have proved this. Meanwhile there is a case in which the cavalry has a decided superiority over infantry; it is when there falls a beating rain or snow, which wets the arms and deprives the infantry of its fire; the corps of Augereau had a cruel proof of it at Eylau, and the left of the Austrians experienced the same fate at Dresden. Great charges are also executed with success against infantry, when we should have already succeeded in shaking it by a fearful fire of
Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), Conclusion (search)
s. If your lines of operations have been skillfully chosen, your movements well disguised; if the enemy, on the contrary, make false movements which permit you to fall upon the yet dispersed fractions of his army, you will be able to conquer without pitched battles, by the sole ascendancy of your strategic advantages. But if the two parties find themselves in equally good condition at the moment when the rencounter shall have place, then there will result one of those great tragedies like Borodino, Wagram, Waterloo, Bautzen, and Dresden, in which the precepts of grand tactics indicated in Chapter IV, will certainly be able to exercise a notable influence. If certain obstinate military men, after having read this book, after having studied attentively the discussed history of a few campaigns of the great masters, maintain still that there are neither principles nor good maxims of war, then one could only pity them and reply to them by the famous saying of Frederick the Great: A mul
in force is decreased, and the chances more equal, the army for the defense should pass to a vigorous offensive, either by unexpectedly attacking the enemy or by awaiting him in a well-chosen, strong, and fortified position. The campaign of 1812 is a fine example of such a defense. Napoleon entered Russia with 450,000 men. The Russian army retreated, defending only the town of Smolensk; by the many detachments Napoleon was obliged to make, and the losses already sustained, he arrived at Borodino with only 132,000 men. The Russians awaited him there, in a partly fortified position, with 117,000 men. What was impossible to do against an army of 450,000 men could be tried against one of 132,000. When the enemy has chosen two lines of operation, we may be induced to take but one line, and bring our army in a central position between his armies, so as to fall with our whole force on the first of his corps that presents itself, and then defeat the others. At the siege of Mantua, in
H. Wager Halleck , A. M. , Lieut. of Engineers, U. S. Army ., Elements of Military Art and Science; or, Course of Instruction in Strategy, Fortification, Tactis of Battles &c., Embracing the Duties of Staff, Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery and Engineers. Adapted to the Use of Volunteers and Militia., Chapter 5: Tactics.The twelve orders of battle, with examples of each.—Different Formations of infantry, cavalry, artillery, and engineers on the field of battle, with the Modes of bringing troops into action (search)
nd all may be combined towards a single object, and extended with the necessary ensemble. At the battle of the Pyramids, Napoleon formed the oblique order in echelon by squares. Portions of his forces were arranged in echelon in some of his other battles. (Figure 25.) The combined order in columns on the centre and one extremity at the same time, is better suited than either of the preceding for attacking a strong contiguous line. Napoleon employed this order at Wagram, Ligny, Bautzen, Borodino, and Waterloo. It is impossible to lay down, as a general rule, which of these orders of battle should be employed, or that either should be exclusively followed throughout the whole battle. The question must be decided by the general himself on the ground, where all the circumstances may be duly weighed. An order well suited to one position might be the worst possible in another. Tactics is in this respect the very reverse of strategy — the latter being subject to more rigid and inva
In 1812 we find him at Constantinople, whence he was sent on a secret mission to the Emperor Alexander. This mission forms the subject of the posthumous book, the title of which stands at the head of this article. Its statements with regard to well known historical facts seem to have been drawn from publications made since that time — such as the works of Labaume and Segur --and not to have been derived from his own observation. He was present at the battle of Smolensk, but not at that of Borodino. He was in most of the actions on the retreat, and went with the Russian army to Germany, where he made the campaign of 1813. He was engaged in all the battles of that gigantic campaign — Lutzen, (where he distinguished himself,) Bautzen, Wurchen, Dresden, Leipzig. He continued with the allies during the campaign of 1814 in France, and was engaged in all the battles. After the return of Napoleon from Elba, and his defeat at Waterloo, Sir Robert Wilson won the applause of all Europe,
ar more unpromising. From Smolensko Napoleon marched upon Moscow, at the head of 160,000 men. The Russians continually retired before him until they reached Borodino. At four intermediate points between Smolensko and Borodino he left strong detachments, amounting, in the aggregate, to 40,000 men. At all these points magazineBorodino he left strong detachments, amounting, in the aggregate, to 40,000 men. At all these points magazines and hospitals were established and they guarded his rear so effectually that during the whole time of his march, and of the twenty days stay in Moscow, not a sick soldier, not a convoy, not an estafette, or even a straggler, was carried off, in the long distance that lies between Moscow and Mentz.--With 120,000 men he fought the battle of Borodino, about seventy miles from Moscow. No man in the world but Rostopchin dreamed of burning Moscow — not even the Emperor Alexander, or Kutusoff, or Sir Robert Wilson. The 630,000 men that the Magazine talks about never existed. The 250,000 men it talks about as being destroyed before Napoleon left Smolensko for
ttle, murder and sudden death. On the 2d day of September, 1814, General Gaines repulsed the British army at Fort Erie On the 3d of September, 1650, Cromwell routed and destroyed the Scottish army under David Leslie at Dunbar. On the 3d of September, 1652, he did the same job at Worcester for Charles II. On the 3d of September 1659, he died. There are few coincidences in all history more singular than these. On the seventh of September, 1812, was fought the great battle of Borodino, in Russia, seventy miles from Moscow. According to some accounts, the loss on both sides was ninety-seven thousand men. One account makes it out one hundred and seventeen thousand.--It was one of the bloodiest battles of modern times. On the 8th of September, 1781. General Green defeated the British army at Eutaw Springs. On the 8th of September, 1847, General Taylor defeated the Mexicans at Monterey. On the 8th of September, 1855, the Allies stormed Sebastopol. On the 10th of September, 1
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