Browsing named entities in Adam Badeau, Military history of Ulysses S. Grant from April 1861 to April 1865. Volume 1. You can also browse the collection for Savannah (Georgia, United States) or search for Savannah (Georgia, United States) in all documents.

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mand at Memphis. Have them in readiness to join your column on this front, in the spring campaign. This was with a view to the movement against Atlanta and Mobile, which, notwithstanding his promotion, Grant still intended to lead in person. This operation had now been frequently explained by him to his staff. It was his plan, at this time, to fight his way to Atlanta, and then, holding that place and the line between it and Chattanooga, to cut loose with his army, either for Mobile or Savannah, which ever events should designate as the most practicable objective point. He meant to concentrate Sherman, Thomas, and Schofield's armies for this purpose, and entertained no doubt whatever of entire success. When he started for Washington, it was his firm intention to return to Chattanooga, and, while he retained control of all the armies, to lead in person those which moved towards the sea. On the 3d of March, he said to Sherman, I am ordered to Washington; but as I am directed to ke
ossible dispatch. General Grant to General Halleck.—(letter. before Vicksburg, April 4, 1863. From information from the south by way of Corinth, I learn that the enemy in front of Rosecrans have been reenforced from Richmond, Charleston, Savannah, Mobile, and a few from Vicksburg. They have also collected a cavalry force of twenty thousand men. All the bridges eastward from Savanna, and north from Florence, are being rapidly repaired. Chalmers is put in command of north Mississippi, anvalry. Every thing not required for daily use has been removed to Atlanta, Georgia. His army can fall back to Bristol or Chattanooga at a moment's notice, which places, it is thought, he can hold, and spare twenty-five thousand men. Mobile and Savannah are now almost entirely without garrisons, further than men to manage large guns. No forces left in the interior to send to any place. All further reenforcements will have to come from one of the great armies. There is about thirty-two thousa