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Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.) 52 0 Browse Search
The Daily Dispatch: September 22, 1862., [Electronic resource] 18 0 Browse Search
H. Wager Halleck , A. M. , Lieut. of Engineers, U. S. Army ., Elements of Military Art and Science; or, Course of Instruction in Strategy, Fortification, Tactis of Battles &c., Embracing the Duties of Staff, Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery and Engineers. Adapted to the Use of Volunteers and Militia. 16 0 Browse Search
The Daily Dispatch: May 7, 1862., [Electronic resource] 10 0 Browse Search
Emil Schalk, A. O., The Art of War written expressly for and dedicated to the U.S. Volunteer Army. 10 0 Browse Search
Adam Badeau, Military history of Ulysses S. Grant from April 1861 to April 1865. Volume 1 10 0 Browse Search
Knight's Mechanical Encyclopedia (ed. Knight) 6 0 Browse Search
Elizabeth Cary Agassiz, Louis Agassiz: his life and correspondence, third edition 4 0 Browse Search
The Daily Dispatch: September 13, 1862., [Electronic resource] 4 0 Browse Search
Hon. J. L. M. Curry , LL.D., William Robertson Garrett , A. M. , Ph.D., Confederate Military History, a library of Confederate States Military History: Volume 1.1, Legal Justification of the South in secession, The South as a factor in the territorial expansion of the United States (ed. Clement Anselm Evans) 2 0 Browse Search
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Rebellion Record: a Diary of American Events: Documents and Narratives, Volume 7. (ed. Frank Moore), chapter 132 (search)
lized and exhausted condition of the insurgents. Johnston did not arrive to raise the siege, nor did success attend any of the attempts from within to break the skilfully drawn lines of General Grant. On the fourth of July, General Pemberton laid down his arms and surrendered the post, with thirty thousand men, two hundred pieces of artillery, seventy thousand small arms, and ammunition sufficient for a six years defence. This capture was as remarkable as the famous one made by Napoleon at Ulm. On the same day an insurgent attack upon General Prentiss, at Helena, situated on the west bank of the Mississippi, in the State of Arkansas, was repulsed with the loss of many prisoners on the part of the assailants. As if the anniversary so identified with the nation's hopes was appointed to be peculiarly eventful, Lee, who had again entered Maryland, and, passing through that State, had approached the Susquehanna, threatening Harrisburgh, Pittsburgh, Philadelphia, and Baltimore, fell
Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), Chapter 2: military policy, or the philosophy of war. (search)
Duke of Orleans and Marsin, at the famous battle of Turin, then with the Duke of Burgundy and Vendome, at the battle of Oudenard. I believe even that it was so at Ulm, between the Arch-Duke Ferdinand and Mack. This last mode is deplorable, for then, in fact, no person is responsible. Every one knows that at Turin, the Duke of exhibition of full secret powers from the king was necessary, to cause the battle to be lost against the advice of the prince who commanded. In the same manner at Ulm, the Arch-Duke Ferdinand displayed more courage and skill than Mack, who was to serve him as mentor. If the prince have the genius and experience of an Arch-Dukehave done in which Napoleon, in quality of counselor, should have proposed the movement of Arcola, the plan of Rivoli, the march by the St. Bernard, the movement of Ulm, and that upon Gera and Jena? The timid would have found those operations rash even to folly; others would have seen a thousand difficulties of execution; all woul
Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), Chapter 3: strategy. (search)
e army that must be aimed at. The manoeuvres at Ulm and Jena could not be advised to an army which vre. Thus, the splendid operations of Marengo, Ulm and Jena, could not have had such results upon er corps should march from the Upper Rhine upon Ulm, would not for that form a double line of operames the strategical line which should lead from Ulm upon Donanwerth and Ratisbon, sometimes that which should lead from Ulm towards the Tyrol; finally, that which should conduct from Ulm upon Nuremb his line of retreat? What were the marches to Ulm and Jena but the same manoeuvre? What was the In fact, the often cited marches of Jena and of Ulm were veritable flank manoeuvres, quite like thaample, the army of Napoleon, half'united around Ulm, to blockade Mack therein, might have need of b, comes to take an active part in the events of Ulm and Austerlitz: after those astonishing successk Germany on its weak side, after the events of Ulm, of Austerlitz and the peace of Schonbrunn, whi[6 more...]
Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), Chapter 4: grand tactics, and battles. (search)
was combined with that of Vandamme upon the line of retreat of the Allies. At Marengo, if Napoleon himself is to be trusted, the oblique order which he took in resting his right upon Castel Ceriolo, saved him from an almost inevitable defeat. Ulm and Jena were battles gained strategically, before being delivered even, and tactics had but little part in them; at Ulm there was not even a battle. I think then I can conclude that, if it be absurd to expect to draw upon the ground rectilineaUlm there was not even a battle. I think then I can conclude that, if it be absurd to expect to draw upon the ground rectilinear orders of battle such as are traced upon a plan, a skillful general can nevertheless have recourse to dispositions which would produce a distribution of the acting masses, similar very nearly to what it would have been in one or another of the orders of battle indicated. He should apply himself in those dispositions, whether foreseen or unexpected, to judge soundly of the important point of the field of battle, which he will be able to do by comprehending the relations of the hostile line wi
Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), Chapter 5: of different mixed operations, which participate at the same time of strategy and.of tactics. (search)
tself, is a tactical operation, but the determination of the point where it ought to be made, is connected with the grand operations which embrace the whole theatre of war. The passage of the Rhine by General Moreau in 1800, of which we have already spoken, may still serve as an example for causing to be appreciated this assertion. Napoleon, more skillful in strategy than his lieutenant, wished him to pass in mass at Schaffhausen to take in reverse the whole army of Kray, to anticipate it at Ulm, to cut it off from Austria, and to drive it back upon the Maine. Moreau, who had already a tete de pont at Basle, preferred to pass more commodiously upon the front of the enemy, to turning his extreme left, the tactical advantage appeared to him more sure than all the strategical; he preferred a certain half success to the chance of a victory which would have been decisive, but exposed to greater hazards. In the same campaign, the passage of the Po by Napoleon offered another example of t
Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), Chapter 6: logistics, or the practical art of moving armies. (search)
e army, all dispersed from Strasburg to Erfurt. Davoust returned from this city, Oudinot from Frankfort, Massena enroute for Spain, retrograded by Strasburg upon Ulm; the Saxons, the Bavarians and Wurtembergers quitted their respective countries. Immense distances separated thus those corps, and the Austrians, united a long timsignated as the place of rendezvous, for the corps might arrive and throw themselves separately in the midst of two hundred thousand enemies, by fixing the union at Ulm; the army would be sooner concentrated, or at least the enemy would have five or six marches more to make in order to reach it, which was a capital point in the resthe Emperor Alexander had to furnish funds from his chest to give to that staff the means of sending agents into Lusace to learn where Napoleon was. General Mack at Ulm and the Duke of Brunswick in 1806 were no better informed; and the French generals in Spain often paid dear for the impossibility of having spies and information up
Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), Note on intrenched camps. (search)
ld rarely, occur that both banks would require to be defended at the same time, the same also of the side along the Danube; now, the true defense would scarcely comprise but the distance of eight thousand yards, from the mouth of the Traun to the Danube above, so that with eighty battalions the camp would be well guarded. Denuded of troops, it would always require a garrison of five thousand men for the occupation of the towers; but those men, scattered into thirty-two small detachments, would be unable to make sorties. Definitively, if Vienna still possessed its ancient enciente, and its garrison were resolved to make good use of it, the enemy would think twice before braving two such establishments, and march without being disturbed by them upon that capital by the valley of the Danube. It could be done only by the route through Carinthia, except after having totally defeated the army as at Ulm, at Jena, and at Waterloo, or after having reduced the camp of Linz. logistics.
Emil Schalk, A. O., The Art of War written expressly for and dedicated to the U.S. Volunteer Army., Strategy. (search)
e leading from Harper's Ferry to Baltimore. The two first lines can certainly not be used for lines of retreat by the Union army; and the rebels, by gaining the third side with a superior force, would entirely cut the Army A from the Northern States, and force it, in the event of its trying to escape, to open its way with the bayonet. If this should not succeed, the Army A would be obliged to surrender. To execute this plan, which would be similar to the movements of Napoleon at Marengo, Ulm, and Jena, the rebels would have to leave a strong corps of observation opposite to Washington, and with their main force to cross the Potomac above this town, to erect some field works to cover their tete-de-pont in case of retreat, and then advance along the Potomac toward the capital. The Union army has three lines of conduct left:-- 1st. To advance against the rebels, and give open battle. 2d. To await them in Washington, by trying to defend this place. 3d. To try to escape
Emil Schalk, A. O., The Art of War written expressly for and dedicated to the U.S. Volunteer Army., Logistics. (search)
cal one; they are, in fact, strategical flank marches. I will give the dispositions for marching as used by Napoleon at Ulm in 1805, and at Jena in 1806. Each of the corps designated in the plan was of three divisions, and in the manoeuvres at UUlm that of Ney was of five. In these marches the force of each army corps, and the distance between them, are such that it can resist the enemy's army long enough, till sustained by the others nearest to it. Examples: march and Manoeuvres of Nar Ulm, 1805. The Austrian general, Mack, with from 70,000 to 80,000 men, advanced from the Austrian frontier as far as Ulm. Napoleon's army, arriving from Wurzburg, Mayence, Spire, and Kehl, numbered 180,000 men. This army was not directed against Ulm, but against the lower towns on the Danube. The arrangement of the columns is similar to that on a flank march. Ney formed the flank guard, and Soult the advanced guard; the different corps were from 5 to 10 miles distant from each oth
H. Wager Halleck , A. M. , Lieut. of Engineers, U. S. Army ., Elements of Military Art and Science; or, Course of Instruction in Strategy, Fortification, Tactis of Battles &c., Embracing the Duties of Staff, Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery and Engineers. Adapted to the Use of Volunteers and Militia., Chapter 2: Strategy.—General divisions of the Art.—Rules for planning a Campaign.—Analysis of the military operations of Napoleon (search)
he theatre of war, than to the number and bravery of the soldiers. (Maxim 17, 18.) We have a striking illustration of this in the French army of the Danube, which, from the left wing of General Kray, marched rapidly through Switzerland to the right extremity of the Austrian line, and by this movement alone conquered all the country between the Rhine and Danube without pulling a trigger. Again, in 1805, the army of Mack was completely paralyzed, and the main body forced to surrender, at Ulm, without a single important battle. In 1806, the Prussians were essentially defeated even before the battle of Jena. The operations about Heilesberg, in 1807, the advance upon Madrid, in 1808, the manoeuvres about Ratisbon, in 1809, the operations of the French in 1814, and the first part of the campaign of 1815, against vastly superior numbers, are all familiar proofs of the truth of the maxim. Strategy may therefore be regarded as the most important, though least understood, of all the
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