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ng subsequently a report, as likewise one after the battle of Chickamauga, in which engagement — whilst you led the left wing--I had the honor of commanding your corps together with three divisions of the Army of Tennessee, respectively under A. P. Stewart, Bushrod Johnson and Hindman. Thus, the gallantry of these troops, as well as the admirable conduct of my division at Gettysburg, I have left unrecorded. With this apology for seeming neglect, I will proceed to give a brief sketch, from maim that I was rejoiced to hear him so express himself, as he was the first general I had met since my arrival who talked of victory. He was assigned to the direction of the left wing, and placed me in command of five divisions: Kershaw's, A. P. Stewart's, Bushrod Johnson's, and Hindman's, together with my own. The latter formed the centre of my line, with Hindman upon my left, Johnson and Stewart on the right, and Kershaw in reserve. About 9 a. m. the firing on the right commenced; we imme
ortant matter, had he given an account of the miraculous escape of his Army at Resaca, when, under cover of darkness, we marched over bridges commanded by the enemy's guns, and were thus extricated from the pocket, or, I may say, cul de sac, in which he had placed us, with two deep and ugly streams, the Connasauga and Oostenaula, in our immediate rear. Of this historical fact there is no mention whatever in General Johnston's book; and I shall always believe the attack of Stevenson's and Stewart's Divisions, therein described (page 311), together with our return to our original position on the following day, saved us from utter destruction by creating the impression upon the Federals that the contest was to be renewed the next morning. They were thus lulled into quiet during that eventful night of our deliverance. It was upon this occasion General Polk remarked to an officer of high rank, now residing in New Orleans, that our escape seemed almost a miracle. In regard to operat
the night. Before daybreak I started for General Johnston's headquarters, a short distance from which I met Lieutenant General A. P. Stewart, one of my division commanders, who had been recommended by me, and recently promoted to the rank of corps coval be postponed, at least till the fate of Atlanta was decided. The, following extract from a letter of Lieutenant General A. P. Stewart will show that I was desirous General Johnston should remain in command: St. Louis, August 7th, 1872. e order having been issued, it would do more harm than good to recall or suspend it. * * * Very sincerely yours, Alex. P. Stewart, Late Lieutenant General C. S. Army. The President's answer to our telegram was as follows: Richmond, July 18th, I864. to Generals Hood, Hardee and Stewart. Your telegram of this date received. A change of commanders, under existing circumstances, was regarded as so objectionable that I only accepted it as the alternative of continuing a policy wh
h the demoralization. As I have already mentioned, Lee handled his troops upon a directly opposite basis. They were always taught to work out the best means to get at the enemy, in order to cripple or destroy him, in lieu of ever seeking the best means to get away from him. Therefore the Lee and. Jackson school is the opposite of the Joe Johnston school, and one will always elevate and inspirit, whilst the other will depress and paralyze. The statement of Lieutenant Generals Hardee and Stewart, to the effect that the Confederate Army, after crossing the Chattahoochee, had as much spirit and confidence as it possessed at Dalton, is erroneous. Whilst I have a proper regard for the opinions of these officers who spoke, I believe, in all sincerity, I cannot but consider that their impressions were formed from their own standpoint, without having actual knowledge of the high state of perfection obtained by the troops in the Virginia Army, under the training and mode of handling of Ge
assembled the three corps commanders, Hardee, Stewart, and Cheatham, together with Major General G. stream. My troops were disposed as follows: Stewart's Corps on the left, Hardee's in the centre, t. Thus I should be able to throw two corps, Stewart's and Hardee's, against Thomas. Specific ordto, and the line closed to the right, causing Stewart to move two or three times the proper distancals were completely taken by surprise. General Stewart carried out his instructions to the lettefter long-continued use of entrenchments, General Stewart deemed a personal appeal to his soldiers reshadowing the possibility of defeat. General Stewart and his troops nobly performed their duty carried out. Unfortunately, the corps on Stewart's right, although composed of the best troopse right, attacking as ordered, and supporting Stewart's gallant assault, the troops of Hardee — as rging down upon the foe as Sherman represents Stewart's men to have done, many of the troops, when [6 more...]
o united action. Accordingly, Hardee's and Stewart's Corps resumed their former positions. Colo in regard to their fitness to be occupied by Stewart's and Cheatham's Corps, together with the Geot little experience as a corps commander, and Stewart had been heavily engaged the day previous. ad been detailed in advance from the corps of Stewart and Cheatham, and from the Georgia State troodquarters the three corps commanders, Hardee, Stewart, and Cheatham, together with Major General Wh from his neighbor, in the hour of battle. Stewart, Cheatham, and G. W. Smith, were ordered to oth would, thereupon, join in the attack. General Stewart, posted on the left, was instructed not o At dawn on the morning of the 22d Cheatham, Stewart, and G. W. Smith, had, by alternating workingy, it would fail in action the following day. Stewart's gallant attack on the 20th was neutralized ation his ability as a corps commander. Lee, Stewart, and G. W. Smith were very open in the expres[1 more...]
sired to occupy, and the struggle grew to such dimensions that I sent Lieutenant General Stewart to his support. The contest lasted till near sunset without any mate Although the actual loss was small in proportion to the numbers engaged, Generals Stewart, Brown, Loring, and Johnson, were slightly wounded. I desired of Lieutena discovered to be abandoned, were occupied at a later hour by the corps of Generals Stewart and Lee. This movement of the Federals gave rise to many idle rumors in, Lee and his command were to be withdrawn that night back to Rough and Ready; Stewart's Corps, together with Major General G. W. Smith's State troops were to form lorder to protect our retreat to Lovejoy Station. I remained in Atlanta with Stewart and G. W. Smith, anxiously awaiting tidings from Jonesboroa. At an early hourfrom special anxiety in regard to the safety of himself and command. Lieutenant General Stewart, nevertheless, was instructed to hasten forward to his support, and G
ennessee (Army of Mississippi being merged into it) in the series of engagements around Atlanta, Georgia, commencing July 4th, and ending July 31st, 1864: Corps. Killed. Wounded. Total. Hardee's 523 2,774 3,297 Lee's 351 2,408 2,759 Stewart's 436 2,141 2,577 Wheeler's Cavalry 29 156 185 Engineers 2 21 23   1,341 7,500 8,841 Consolidated summary of casualties in Army of Tennessee in engagements around Atlanta and Fonesboro, from August 1st to September 1st, 1864: Corps. Killed. Wounded. Total. Hardee's 141 1,018 1,159 Lee's 248 1,631 1,879 Stewart's 93 574 667   482 3,223 3,705 Consolidation of which two Reports is as follows:   Killed. Wounded. Total. Around Atlanta, July 4th to July 31st, 1864 1,341 7,500 8,841 Atlanta and Jonesboroa, Aug. 1st to Sept. 1st, 1864 482 3,223 3,705   1,823 10,723 12,546 I certify that the above reports are from the returns made to my office, and are in my opinion correct. (Signed)
issents from the opinion expressed above, viz: Sherman would have been beaten, had your orders been obeyed on the 20th July, 22d July, and 31st August. General A. P. Stewart, in his official report of the operations around Atlanta, states in regard to the battle of the 20th July : Appendix, page 350. I cannot but think hral Lee expressed to me the opinion that but for the delay before the attack on the 31st August, the result might have been different. This officer, Lieutenant General A. P. Stewart, and Major General G. W. Smith were, at the time, unanimous in the conviction that had General Hardee faithfully and earnestly carried out my instrucl Beauregard reached the same point; I at once unfolded to him my plan, and requested that he confer apart with the corps commanders, Lieutenant Generals Lee and Stewart, and Major General Cheatham. If after calm deliberation, he deemed it expedient we should remain upon the Alabama line and attack Sherman, or take position, entr
iver, and bivouacked in advance of Florence. Stewart's and Cheatham's Corps were instructed also te's Corps already in advance of Florence, and Stewart's and Cheatham's Corps under orders to cross regard, General. On the 20th of November, Stewart's Corps having crossed the Tennessee and bivopoint selected for a crossing — together with Stewart's Corps and Johnston's Division, of Lee's Corthe pike, and to inform him of the arrival of Stewart, whose Corps I intended to throw on his left,eatham rode up in person. I at once directed Stewart to halt, and, turning to Cheatham, I exclaimene looked a little too long for him, and that Stewart should first form on his right. I could hard I then asked General Cheatham whether or not Stewart's Corps, if formed on the right, would extendurnished to point out Cheatham's right to General Stewart, who was ordered to form thereon, with hiroad; and thus have made it an easy matter to Stewart's Corps, Johnston's Division, and Lee's two D[7 more...]
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