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army was depleted of a full sixth, not of its numbers, but of its effective force — a loss which it had no means of replacing. Hitherto, Thomas had resisted very considerable odds ; but, when Hood sat down Dec. 2. before Nashville, the case was bravely altered. The Rebel army had by this time been reduced, by the casualties and hardships of an offensive and unseasonable campaign, to 40,000 at most; A. J. Smith's command, transported from Missouri on steamboats, had just arrived, Nov. 30-Dec. 1. and been posted on our right; while Gen. Steedman, with 5,000 of Sherman's men and a Black brigade, had come up by rail from Chattanooga. Add tile garrison of Nashville, and a division organized from the employes of the quartermaster's, commissary's, and railroad departments, now working diligently on the defenses, and it was clear that Thomas's infantry outnumbered that which affected to besiege him, in a city which had already been extensively fortified. Still, he was so deficie
. C. Davis, hearing of his peril, had sent from the left wing to his aid. The need of assistance, however, was now over. Kilpatrick now joined the left wing, and covered its flank when it again advanced. Sherman, still with Blair, crossed Nov. 30. the Ogeechee near Barton, advancing to Millen; Dec. 2. Howard, with Wood's and Corse's divisions of the 15th corps, still moving south of the Ogeechee on the old dirt road to Savannah; while Hazen's and John E. Smith's divisions, keeping farand in behalf of Gen. Sherman, who was expected near Pocotaligo at the end of November, was enabled to spare from his various garrisons but 5,000 men for this service. At the lead of this force, he ascended Broad river on steamboats, landing Nov. 30. at Boyd's Neck; immediately pushing out Gen. J. P. Hatch to seize the Charleston and Savannah railroad near Grahamsville. Hatch, missing the way, failed to reach the railroad that day, and was confronted, next morning, by a strong Rebel force
Colonel Theodore Lyman, With Grant and Meade from the Wilderness to Appomattox (ed. George R. Agassiz), I. First months (search)
the enemy could be turned. His attack was to be a signal for attacking in other places on the line. However, despite that the rain had ceased, the bad roads delayed a good deal, and a false report of entrenchments delayed more; so that, when he got there, after driving in an outlying force, the day was too far advanced for an attack. Major Ludlow, however, came back with a fine account from General Warren of the prospects, and all things were made ready for an assault, next day. . . . November 30 Almost before daylight our waggons were loaded and away, for the Headquarters are only a few hundred yards in the rear of our heavy guns and directly on the road, so that we expected a nice lot of shells, say at 8.10 A. M. A little before that the General mounted and rode towards General Newton's quarters, and, while near there, bang! went a cannon on the right; then boom! boom! from the 32-pounders, and then, bang, boom, bang, pretty generally. In all the woods the troops were masse
Doc. 208. the manufacture of salt. Its necessity at the South. The Norfolk (Va.) Day Book of November 30, holds the following language on this subject: An opportunity is now presented to individuals or companies, whereby they may not only make money, but give an expression of patriotism which will be too plain to be misapprehended. We refer to the manufacture of salt, as it is well known this article may be manufactured all along our coast, in great plenty and at but little expense; the only process necessary, being the boiling of the water and bleaching the salt, and the only outlay, that attending the purchase of pans and the price paid for labor. Hitherto, the great difficulty in the way of the manufacture of salt, has been the lack of the pans necessary to the boiling of the water. This difficulty, we are glad to state, has been removed by the proprietors of the Atlantic Iron Works of this city, who, if we are rightly informed, are prepared to fill orders for these pa
mington in case we moved in that direction. The other was to get a force to be sent down to see if we could not effect a surprise at Wilmington, as it seemed evident that the enemy supposed the expedition gotten up early in the fall had been abandoned. This expedition up the Roanoke was to be a link in the chain of operations, and was to be made in conjunction with the navy. I sent a despatch to Admiral Porter about the Roanoke expedition. See Appendix No. 98. On the same day, the 30th of November, I received a telegram from General Grant urging the importance of Weitzel's getting off at once with the expedition. See Appendix No. 99. I had gone to Fortress Monroe and had a personal consultation with the admiral upon the Roanoke expedition after my consultation with General Grant. I answered his telegram by repairing to City Point in person to get further instructions from General Grant. They were that we should move as soon as the navy was ready. Matters remained in tha
William Tecumseh Sherman, Memoirs of General William T. Sherman ., volume 2, chapter 22 (search)
s, to cover the movement of his trains. During the night of November 29th General Schofield passed Spring Hill with his trains and army, and took post at Franklin, on the south side of Harpeth River. General Hood now attaches serious blame to General Cheatham for not attacking General Schofield in flank while in motion at Spring Hill, for he was bivouacked within eight hundred yards of the road at the time of the passage of our army. General Schofield reached Franklin on the morning of November 30th, and posted his army in front of the town, where some rifle-intrenchments had been constructed in advance. He had the two corps of Stanley and Cox (Fourth and Twenty-third), with Wilson's cavalry on his flanks, and sent his trains behind the Harpeth. General Hood closed upon him the same day, and assaulted his position with vehemence, at one time breaking the line and wounding General Stanley seriously; but our men were veterans, cool and determined, and fought magnificently. The re
the rebel commander, having discovered our intentions, opened upon our lines with artillery, at the same time changing his troops from the left of his line to protect and strengthen his right, which General Warren threatened. During this movement, General Warren lost fifty men, killed and wounded. It was now dark, and General Warren at once reported to army headquarters in person. Upon arriving there, he learned that it was determined to make a general assault at daylight next day, November thirtieth. General French, commanding Third corps, had regarded an assault in his front not practicable. General Wright thought he could force the rebel line and hold a position on our right, and he soon reported his force in line of battle, ready for the aggressive movement. The weakness of the enemy on our left was fully admitted by General Warren, and in his official report of the late campaign, to the War Department, he states this fact in the plainest terms. General Meade, after hol
and a soldier, an untarnished name. In memory of the honored dead, the fort, in front of which he received his fatal wound, will be known hereafter as Fort Sanders. By command of Major-General Burnside. Lewis Richmond, A. A. G. Monday, November 30.--The long, tedious, and painful suspense is over. We no longer doubt the intentions of Longstreet. After thirteen days of menace and siege, he gathered his forces, and struck the mighty blow that was to have broken our lines, demolishede that. As Longstreet has now tried the siege plan and the assault, and failed in both, we can conceive no further necessity for his longer residence in East-Tennessee, and if he be not gone to-morrow, we shall be unable to account for it. November 30--A. M.--It has been comparatively quiet this morning. A few shots have been exchanged between the batteries and an occasional one along the skirmish line. The enemy exhibits no indication of a renewal of the attack. The total number of
The courage of most of the officers and men under our immediate notice was good, used with coolness and good judgment in the thickest torrents of leaden rain and iron hail. The rebels having been compelled to return to their own side of the house, seemed perfectly willing to stay there. About this time orders were given to cease hostilities until the dead and wounded could be removed. The remainder of the evening was silent. Both sides were tired from their hard day's work. November thirtieth, we still remained in the ditches; an occasional fire. The rebels make no advances. December first, still in the rifle-pits. Some firing all around the lines. Second and third, no fighting of any consequence; now and then a shot. December fourth, about three o'clock in the morning Sherman's advance came up. We kept in readiness all day to move out. No advances on either side. December fifth, after having been closely besieged twenty days, early in the morning, we prepared t
oon commenced, and destroyed bridges made the pursuit difficult and slow. We followed them until night, a distance of three miles, and found what appeared to be a division in a well-selected position, and in accordance with orders, I returned to Ringgold. We recaptured two of our wounded men, took two more prisoners, found broken caissons, wagons, ambulances, dead and dying men of the enemy strewn along the way to a horrible extent. We remained at Ringgold until the evening of the thirtieth November, when I received orders to return to Whiteside via the Chickamauga battle-field. We marched to Reed's farm, on west Chickamauga, six miles, and camped for the night. On the first day of December, we crossed the creek, proceeded two miles to the memorable battle-field of the nineteenth and twentieth of September, 1863. We buried the remains of about four hundred of our brave fallen comrades that had been the prey of animals for two and a half months. On the left of our line, the dead
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