he bulk of the army through Snake Creek Gap on Johnston's rear, the records show that for three days he assaulted precipices in front of Dalton, with Thomas' and Schofield's armies, before he allowed McPherson to make more than a diversion on Johnston's rear, so that the latter, being warned in time, withdrew safely.
At Kenesaw heteach his veterans that flanking was not the only means of attacking an enemy, and failed at a cost of two thousand men, claiming now that Thomas, McPherson, and Schofield agreed with him that the assault was necessary, when the records clearly reveal Thomas' stern dissatisfaction, and a bold extension to the right by Schofield, whSchofield, which plainly indicates that the latter looked for success in the direction from which it finally came, through their old and sure method of flanking.
He describes the battle before Atlanta, where McPherson fell, in such a manner that no reader would dream of its being a great surprise, and well nigh serious disaster; but the reco
closed with the following note from himself:
St. Louis, Mo., August 13th, 1862. Brig.-General Schofield.
dear Schofield: I inclose you a copy of a despatch (marked A) received yesterday fSchofield: I inclose you a copy of a despatch (marked A) received yesterday from Major-General Halleck, and my answer thereto, marked B.
Yours, Frank P. Blair, Jr.
Copy A. To Hon. F. P. Blair, August 12th, 1862. (By telegraph from War Dep't.) Washington, 12:50 PO'Reilley—told me, in presence of the President, that they were authorized by you to ask for Gen. Schofield's removal for inefficiency.
The Postmaster-General has to-day sent to me a letter from Mr.—, asking that you be put in Gen. Schofield's place.
There has been no action in this or on the papers presented by the above-named committee. H. W. Halleck, General-in-chief.
Copy B. St. last week.
Let the letter be submitted to you. Nobody is authorized to ask in my name for Gen'l Schofield's removal.
I think the State military organization should be abandoned as soon as practica
e President himself, in a letter to the Hon. Charles D. Drake and others, committee, dated October 5, 1863, in which he wrote: Few things have been so grateful to my anxious feelings as when, in June last, the local force in Missouri aided General Schofield to so promptly send a large general force to the relief of General Grant, then investing Vicksburg and menaced from without by General Johnston.
It would have been impossible for me to send away more than a small part of those troops if e convention—a very conservative body—might elect, while the result might be confusion worse confounded.
The governor submitted to me the following letter including conditions upon which he would consent to continue in office:
General: For the purpose of restoring order and law and maintaining the authority of the Federal and State governments in the State of Missouri, it is necessary that we have an understanding as to the most important measures to be ado
may rest assured will never fail you in any emergency.
Yours truly, Willard P. Hall. Major-Genl. Schofield, etc.
The following was written by me, November 1, 1863, to Mr. James L. Thomas of S on that question.
Mr. Lincoln promptly dismissed the subject with the words: I believe you, Schofield; those fellows have been lying to me again.
Mr. Lincoln undoubtedly referred here to a prevccessor.
Upon being asked whom he wanted for that command, Grant replied: Either McPherson or Schofield.
Among the changes then known in Washington to be in the near future was Grant's elevation ture, whether in the Senate or elsewhere.
Mr. Lincoln replied in his characteristic way: Why, Schofield, that cuts the knot, don't it?
Tell Halleck to come over here, and we will fix it right away.d Corps, and called merely to pay my respects.
The President greeted me with the words: Well, Schofield, I have n't heard anything against you for a year.
Apparently, the great trouble to him with
quests unless they were in accord with their own views; while one of these corps commanders, General Sherman says, manifested an ambition to get one of the separate armies under his command and win a victory on his own hook.
But General Sherman fails to state that he encouraged all this by his own now well-known erroneous opinion upon the question of the relative rank of army and corps commanders; that this vital question was evaded until its decision in a special case—that of Stanley and Schofield—became absolutely necessary, and was then decided erroneously, the error resulting in failure and great disappointment to Sherman.
Had this question been decided at an early day according to the plain import of the law, as was afterward done by the War Department, and orders given to corps commanders to obey instead of cooperate or support, much trouble would have been avoided.
First among the most important events of the Atlanta campaign were the operations about Dalton and Resaca.
s meaning that my corps was not in position to protect Hooker's flank, he said in substance, if not literally, and with great emphasis: That is not true.
I sent Schofield an order to be there.
I know he received the order, for his initials, in his own hand, are on the envelop which the orderly brought back, and I know he is thereuncommon in the short intervals of rest from deadly work.
General Sherman says in Vol.
II, page 60, of his Memoirs:
During the 24th and 25th of June, General Schofield extended his right as far as prudent, so as to compel the enemy to thin out his lines correspondingly, with the intention to make two strong assaults at points where success would give us the greatest advantage.
I had consulted Generals Thomas, McPherson, and Schofield, and we all agreed that we could not with prudence stretch out any more, and therefore there was no alternative but to attack fortified lines—a thing carefully avoided up to that time.
The first sentence literally m
My object in giving the preference to General Schofield lover Stanley] was merely that he should
Nashville, November 20, 1864.
General Schofield: Your despatch of 2 P. M. this day just er Hood began his advance:
Thomas to Schofield. November 24, 1864.
. . . Have the ford give me your views soon.
Thomas to Schofield. November 24, 1864.
If you cannot hold
Where is Stanley?
Is he with you?
Schofield to Thomas. Columbia, November 24, 1864, 8:3telegraph from Nashville. 9 P. M.） To Major-General Schofield:
If you are confident you can holegraph from Nashville. 9:30 P. M.) To Major-General Schofield:
Your despatch of 3:30 [2:30] P. hville, November 29, 1864, 3:30 A. M. Major-General Schofield, near Columbia:
Your despatches oA. M. to-day is received.
Please inform General Schofield that Major-General Smith's troops have j
Nashville, November 30, 1864. Major-General Schofield, Franklin:
General Smith reported[4 more...]
. My advance-guard sent back to me an Atlanta paper containing an account of the visit of President Davis, and the order relieving General Johnston and assigning General Hood to the command of the army.
General Sherman erroneously says one of General Thomas's staff officers brought him that paper.
General Thomas was then off to the right, on another road.
I stopped until Sherman came up, and handed him the paper.
After reading it he said, in nearly, if not exactly, the following words: Schofield, do you know Hood?
What sort of a fellow is he?
I answered: Yes, I know him well, and I will tell you the sort of man he is. He'll hit you like h—l, now, before you know it.
Soon afterward, as well described by Sherman, the sound of battle to our right gave indication of the heavy attack Hood's troops made upon Thomas's advancing columns that day, which failed of serious results, as I believe all now admit, mainly if not entirely because Thomas himself was near the head of the column w
relieve him. No doubt if the order had been carried out, the question would immediately have arisen as to who was entitled to the combined command, provided General Schofield was senior in rank to you, which I do not know that he was. I know that his confirmation as a major-general took place long after yours, but I do not know th I had urged him so long to move that I had come to think it a duty.
Of course in sending you to relieve General Thomas, I meant no reflection whatever upon General Schofield, who was commanding the Army of the Ohio, because I thought that he had done very excellent service in punishing the entire force under Hood a few days befored in his official report, as explained in a foot-note in the War Records, is not unimportant.
XLV, part i, p. 37. In the order-book he says: Major-General Schofield will mass the remainder of his force in front of the works and cooperate with General Wood, protecting the latter's left flank against an attack by the en
g about what shall be done if he does not retreat.
Hdqrs. Cavalry Corps, Mil. Div. Of the Mississippi, in the field, December 16, 1864, 10:10 A. M. Major-General Schofield, Commanding Twenty-third Army Corps.
General: The regiment sent to the Granny White pike reports it strongly picketed toward us, with troops moving tohis right by assault.
Major-General Thomas being present, the matter was referred to him, and I was requested to delay the movement until he could hear from General Schofield, to whom he had sent. . . . General McArthur, not receiving any reply, and fearing that if the attack should be longer delayed the enemy would use the night s our plan, and modified at the conference which was called that day upon the suggestion of Wood in that confidential letter, and, as he said, at the instance of Schofield and Smith.
War Records, Vol.
XLV, part II, p. 184. But the battle of the 16th appears to have been emphatically a battle of the troops themselves, acting und