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Southern Historical Society Papers, Volume 4. (ed. Reverend J. William Jones), Gen. Lee's strength and losses at Gettysburg. (search)
e number of Federal troops engaged the first day, that Dr. Bates gives a widely different strength to Buford's cavalry division from that assigned to it by Gen, Pleasanton, who, as Commander-in-Chief of the Federal cavalry, should, next to Buford himself, have known the truth. Dr. Bates says that the cavalry engaged the first day (Buford's) amounted to 2,200 men. Pleasanton puts Buford's strength at 4,000. (See Pleasanton's report to Hon. Ben. Wade, Oct. 15, 1865.) In regard to the Confederate strength, Dr. Bates' conclusions are scarcely worthy of criticism. Were we at this late day seriously to attempt to determine Meade's force by giving the estiPleasanton's report to Hon. Ben. Wade, Oct. 15, 1865.) In regard to the Confederate strength, Dr. Bates' conclusions are scarcely worthy of criticism. Were we at this late day seriously to attempt to determine Meade's force by giving the estimates made of it at the time of the battle, by Lee, or Longstreet, or Ewell, or by citizens, we would expose ourselves to the ridicule of., and of every other intelligent man. Yet this is what Dr. Bates has done in regard to Lee's force. The only scrap of respectable evidence he offers in support of his estimate as to the Confede
Southern Historical Society Papers, Volume 4. (ed. Reverend J. William Jones), Causes of the defeat of Gen. Lee's Army at the battle of Gettysburg-opinions of leading Confederate soldiers. (search)
; but in order to judge of the propriety of making the attacks on the 2d and 3d, we should consider the circumstances and conditions under which those attacks were ordered, and not merely their failure from other circumstances and conditions beyond the control of the Commander-in-Chief. Gen. Longstreet's long delay on the 3d seems to have been based mainly on the idea that his right flank was in danger from a body of troops on the enemy's extreme left. By examining the testimony of Gen. Pleasanton before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, pages 359-60, same volume of the report already referred to, you will find that the troops threatening Longstreet's right were really only two brigades of cavalry, which were posted there to prevent Meade's left from being turned. Two divisions of infantry were used to keep off that force, when one brigade ought to have been amply sufficient. From some communications made to Mr. Swinton by Gen. Longstreet after. the war, and contain