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Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), Chapter 2: military policy, or the philosophy of war. (search)
even in our day, notwithstanding the immense progress which civilized nations have made in all the sciences, statistical, political, geographical and topographical. I will cite two examples of them of which I was a witness; in 1796, the army of Moreau, penetrating into the Black Forest, expected to find terrible mountains, defiles and forests, which the ancient Hercinius called to memory with frightful circumstances; we were surprised after having climbed the cliffs of that vast plateau, which of the great states of Europe has not been happy in his sayings and his predictions; he sees obstacles everywhere; he presents, among others, as impregnable, the frontiers of Austria upon the Inn, between the Tyrol and Passau, where we have seen Moreau and Napoleon manoeuvre, and triumph with armies of a hundred and fifty thousand men in 1800, 1805 and 1809. The greater part of those reasonings are open to the same criticism; he has seen things too materially. But if these sciences are not
Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), Chapter 3: strategy. (search)
son three lines of manoeuvre-operations. When Moreau and Jourdan entered Germany with two masses ofcovers Latour, for stealing a few marches upon Moreau, and for throwing all his forces upon the righng a strategical direction opposite to that of Moreau; Suwaroff profits skillfully from the central ese pretended mathematical rules. Did not General Moreau find himself at the gates of Vienna in 180o inevitable defeat. This is what happened to Moreau and Jourdan before the Arch-Duke Charles,in 17 Arch-Duke triumphed in 1796, over Jourdan and Moreau, by a single march, which was the application ans of arresting for a whole month the army of Moreau upon the Danube. It is known how many advanta opportuneness of this precaution. In 1800, Moreau, wishing to deceive Kray upon the true directies of the Tyrol and push its march to Linz, as Moreau did in 1800. Thus far we have considered moa in 1799, as well as those of Napoleon and of Moreau in 1800. The first is a model of operations o[6 more...]
Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), Chapter 4: grand tactics, and battles. (search)
o natural genius for war, nor the instructive coup d'oeil which experience in combats will give to a general brave and of a tried sang-froid. The simultaneous employment of the greatest possible number of forces, of all the arms combined, except a small reserve of each of them, which it is proper always to have on hand, The grand reserves should naturally also be engaged when it is necessary, but it is well always to keep two or three battalions and five or six squadrons in hand. General Moreau decided the battle of Engen with four companies of the 58th regiment, and it is known what the 9th Light and the cavalry of Kellerman did at Marengo. will be then, at the decisive moment of the battle, the problem which every skilfull general will apply himself to resolve, and which should make his rule of conduct. Now this decisive moment is very generally that when the first line of one of the parties should be broken, and when the efforts of the two adversaries should tend, either to
Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), Chapter 5: of different mixed operations, which participate at the same time of strategy and.of tactics. (search)
h embrace the whole theatre of war. The passage of the Rhine by General Moreau in 1800, of which we have already spoken, may still serve as an, to cut it off from Austria, and to drive it back upon the Maine. Moreau, who had already a tete de pont at Basle, preferred to pass more cotent of the same front of operations, as occurred to Jourdan and to Moreau in 1796. If we gain by it on one side the advantage of having in nrevent the enemy from overwhelming them separately. If Jourdan and Moreau had followed this maxim, and had united at Donanwert instead of movwell directed, but could not count among distant retreats. That of Moreau, in 1796, exalted by party spirit, was honorable, without being extic direction of his retreat that Germany owed its safety? Finally, Moreau, who had marched upon an immense development by isolated divisions,ds of the enemy, as the Arch-Duke Charles did in 1796 at Neresheim, Moreau at Biberach and Kleber at Ukerath. Such a manoeuvre almost always
Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), chapter 7 (search)
ht, and that of Augereau detached to the left, were disposable for acting upon the flanks. But from the passage of the Danube at Donauwert, all was disordered; Ney, at first reinforced to five divisions, was reduced to two; the main body was dislocated, part to the right, a part to the left, so that this fine order of battle became useless. It will ever be difficult to give an organization at all stable; meanwhile events are not always as complicated as those of 1805, and the campaign of Moreau in 1800, proves that the primitive organization can, to a certain point, be maintained, at least for the bulk of the army. To this end it seems that the organization of the army into four fractions, viz: two wings, a centre, and a reserve, is the only rational one; the composition of those fractions may vary according to the strength of the army, but in order to be able to maintain it, it will be indispensable to have a certain number of divisions out of line, to furnish the necessary detac