Browsing named entities in Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.). You can also browse the collection for Cluses (France) or search for Cluses (France) in all documents.

Your search returned 11 results in 4 document sections:

Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), Advertisement (search)
d Lloyd soon came to fortify me in this conviction. I found again, afterwards, the same cause in the first successes of Napoleon in Italy, which gave me the idea that by applying, through strategy, to the whole chess-table of a war (à tout l‘échiquier d'une guerre), this same principle which Frederick had applied to battles, we should have the key to all the science of war. I could not doubt this truth in reading again, subsequently, the campaigns of Turenne, of Marlborough, of Eugene of Savoy, and in comparing them with those of Frederick, which Tempelhoff had just published with details so full of interest, although somewhat heavy and by far too much repeated. I comprehended then that Marshal de Saxe had been quite right in saying that in 1750 there were no principles laid down upon the art of war, but that many of his readers had also very badly interpreted his preface in concluding therefrom that he had thought that those principles did not exist. Convinced that I had seiz
Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), Chapter 1: the policy of war. (search)
empire; against Charles, victorious over Francis First, and pressing France in his firm grasp. This movement, which transported the war to the heart of the Tyrol, arrested the great man who menaced to swallow up everything. In 1706, the Duke of Savoy, Victor Amedius, declaring against Louis XIV, changes the face of affairs in Italy, and brings back the French army upon the banks of the Adige, to the walls of Turin, where it experienced the bloody catastrophe which immortalized the Prince Eugeojects upon Spain, took, nevertheless, its origin in the preceding aggressions which had alarmed all his neighbors. He could oppose to leagued Europe only the faithful alliance of the Elector of Bavaria, and the more equivocal one of the Duke of Savoy, who himself was not slow to increase the number of the coalitionists. Frederick sustained war against the three most powerful monarchies on the continent, with the support alone of subsidies from England, and of fifty thousand auxiliaries from
Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), Chapter 3: strategy. (search)
r one chief, and departing from Mayence, from the Upper Rhine, from Savoy, or from the maritime Alps. Each country, which one or the other osk finally what geometrical figure did the army of Prince Eugene of Savoy form when it marched by Stradella and Asti to the succor of Turin, o remain firm in my belief, justified by the campaigns of Eugene of Savoy, of Marlborough, of Frederick the Great, and Napoleon. Since I hhat France has two fronts, from Dunkirk to Basle, one from Basle to Savoy, one from Savoy to Nice, besides the altogether separate line of thSavoy to Nice, besides the altogether separate line of the Pyrannees, and the maritime line of the coasts, there results that it has six fronts to cover, which would require from forty to fifty placmous affair of the lines of Turin, 1706, where the Prince Eugene of Savoy forced, with forty thousand men, a French army of seventy-eight thoome allied; the influence which the change of policy of the Duke of Savoy, in 1706, exercised upon the events of that epoch, also the declara
Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), Chapter 4: grand tactics, and battles. (search)
there was not the less merit in the execution. As for continuous intrenched lines, although they seem better connected than isolated works, they are yet more easy to carry, because constructed upon an extent of many leagues, it is almost impossible to prevent the enemy from penetrating upon some one point; the taking of those of Mayence, and Wissemburg, which we have reported in the history of the wars of the Revolution, (Chap. 21, and 52,) that of the lines of Turin, by Prince Eugene of Savoy, in 1706, are great lessons to study. This famous event of Turin, which we have already often cited, is too well known for us to recall its circumstances, but we could not dispense with observing that never was a triumph bought so cheaply, nor more difficult to conceive. In truth, the strategic plan was admirable; the march from the Adige by Placentia upon Asti by the right of the Po, leaving the French upon the Mincio, was perfectly combined; but as for the operations under Turin, it mu