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Browsing named entities in a specific section of H. Wager Halleck , A. M. , Lieut. of Engineers, U. S. Army ., Elements of Military Art and Science; or, Course of Instruction in Strategy, Fortification, Tactis of Battles &c., Embracing the Duties of Staff, Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery and Engineers. Adapted to the Use of Volunteers and Militia.. Search the whole document.

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Cannae (Italy) (search for this): chapter 3
tersect or meet, and the centre of an are which is occupied by the enemy, are strategic points; but tactics would reject a position equally accessible on all sides, especially with its flanks exposed to attack. Sempronius at Trebbia and Varro at Cannae, so placed their armies that the Carthagenians attacked them, at the same time, in front, on the flanks, and in rear; the Roman consuls were defeated: but the central strategic position of Napoleon at Rivoli was eminently successful. At the battse several states. In the same way Venice, Rome, and Naples, in 1797, Vienna, in the campaigns of 1805 and 1809, Berlin, in 1806, Madrid, in 1808, and Paris, in 1814 and 1815. If Hannibal had captured the capital immediately after the battle of Cannae, he would thus have destroyed the Roman power. The taking of Washington, in 1814, had little or no influence on the war, for the place was then of no importance in itself, and was a mere nominal capital. It, however, greatly influenced our repu
Washington (United States) (search for this): chapter 3
gn. The possession of Genoa, Turin, Alexandria, Milan, &c., in 1796, both from their political and military importance, had a decided influence upon the results of the war in these several states. In the same way Venice, Rome, and Naples, in 1797, Vienna, in the campaigns of 1805 and 1809, Berlin, in 1806, Madrid, in 1808, and Paris, in 1814 and 1815. If Hannibal had captured the capital immediately after the battle of Cannae, he would thus have destroyed the Roman power. The taking of Washington, in 1814, had little or no influence on the war, for the place was then of no importance in itself, and was a mere nominal capital. It, however, greatly influenced our reputation abroad, and required many brilliant successes to wash the blot from our national escutcheon. Lines of defence in strategy are either permanent or temporary. The great military frontiers of a state, especially when strengthened by natural and artificial obstacles, such as chains of mountains, rivers, lines of
Canada (Canada) (search for this): chapter 3
se countries. Should the Oregon question lead to hostilities between the United States and England, the theatre of war would embrace the greater part of North America and the two oceans, but the theatre of operations would probably be limited to Canada and our northern frontier, with naval descents upon our maritime cities. The first point to be attended to in a plan of military operation is to select a good base. Many circumstances influence this selection, such as mountains, rivers, roads,ngly-fortified places; the Pyrenees, with Bayonne at one extremity and Perpignon at the other; the triple range of fortresses on the Belgian frontier — are all permanent lines of defence. The St. Lawrence river is a permanent line of defence for Canada; and the line of lake Champlain, the upper St. Lawrence, and the lakes, for the United States. Temporary lines of defence are such as are taken up merely for the campaign. Napoleon's position in Saxony, in 1813; the line of the allies in Belg
Jena (Thuringia, Germany) (search for this): chapter 3
on should require it, may again concentrate our forces by converging lines. Such was the manoeuvre of Frederick the Great, in 1757, which produced the battles of Rosbach and Leuthen; such also was the manoeuvre of Napoleon at Donawert in 1805, at Jena in 1806, and at Ratisbon in 1809. Interior lines of operations, when properly conducted, have almost invariably led to success: indeed every instance of failure may be clearly traced to great unskilfulness in their execution, or to other extran without pulling a trigger. Again, in 1805, the army of Mack was completely paralyzed, and the main body forced to surrender, at Ulm, without a single important battle. In 1806, the Prussians were essentially defeated even before the battle of Jena. The operations about Heilesberg, in 1807, the advance upon Madrid, in 1808, the manoeuvres about Ratisbon, in 1809, the operations of the French in 1814, and the first part of the campaign of 1815, against vastly superior numbers, are all famili
Milan, Sullivan County, Missouri (Missouri, United States) (search for this): chapter 3
owers. In a war between this country and England, Montreal and the points on the St. Lawrence between Montreal and Quebec, would become objects of the highest importance, and their possession would probably determine the result of the war. The capital of a state, from its political importance as well as its military influence, is almost always a decisive strategic point, and its capture is therefore frequently the object of an entire campaign. The possession of Genoa, Turin, Alexandria, Milan, &c., in 1796, both from their political and military importance, had a decided influence upon the results of the war in these several states. In the same way Venice, Rome, and Naples, in 1797, Vienna, in the campaigns of 1805 and 1809, Berlin, in 1806, Madrid, in 1808, and Paris, in 1814 and 1815. If Hannibal had captured the capital immediately after the battle of Cannae, he would thus have destroyed the Roman power. The taking of Washington, in 1814, had little or no influence on the w
Marengo, Iowa (Iowa, United States) (search for this): chapter 3
t enough merely to gain the extremity and rear of the enemy, for in that case it may be possible for him to throw himself on our communications and place us in the very dilemma in which we had hoped to involve him. To avoid this danger it is necessary to give such a direction to the line of operations that our army shall preserve its communications and be able to reach its base. Thus, if Napoleon, in 1800, after crossing the Alps, had marched by Turin on Alexandria and received battle at Marengo, without having first secured Lombardy and the left of the Po, his own line of retreat would have been completely cut off by Melas; whereas, by the direction which he gave to his line of operations he had, in case of reverse, every means for reaching either the Var or the Valois. (Fig. 6.) Again, in 1806, if he had marched directly from Gera to Leipsic, he would have been cut off from his base on the Rhine; whereas, by turning from Gera towards Weimar, he not only cut off the Prussians fro
Vienna (Wien, Austria) (search for this): chapter 3
position equally accessible on all sides, especially with its flanks exposed to attack. Sempronius at Trebbia and Varro at Cannae, so placed their armies that the Carthagenians attacked them, at the same time, in front, on the flanks, and in rear; the Roman consuls were defeated: but the central strategic position of Napoleon at Rivoli was eminently successful. At the battle of Austerlitz the allies had projected a strategic movement to their left, in order to cut off Napoleon's right from Vienna; Weyrother afterwards changed his plans, and executed a corresponding tactical movement. By the former there had been some chance of success, but the latter exposed him to inevitable destruction. The little fort of Koenigsten, from its advantageous position, was more useful to the French, in 1813, than the vast works of Dresden. The little fort of Bard, with its handful of men, was near defeating the operations of Napoleon in 1800, by holding in check his entire army; whereas, on the othe
Napoleon (Ohio, United States) (search for this): chapter 3
c movement to their left, in order to cut off Napoleon's right from Vienna; Weyrother afterwards chaachments, or by movements of your main body. Napoleon's operations in Italy, in 1796-7, furnish exa, and in accordance with correct principles. Napoleon's position in Spain will serve as an illustrauch as are taken up merely for the campaign. Napoleon's position in Saxony, in 1813; the line of thtered Germany in 1796, were double lines; but Napoleon's advance by Bamberg and Gera, in 1806, althon be brought to its assistance. For example, Napoleon's line of operations in 1814, between the Marate forces, will lead to decisive results. Napoleon's Italian campaigns in 1796 and 1797, the campaign of the Archduke Charles in 1796, Napoleon's campaigns of 1805 and 1809 against Austria, and oftended with important results. It was one of Napoleon's maxims, that a line of operations, when oncotally fatal: thus demonstrating the truth of Napoleon's maxim, that success is oftener due to the g[1 more...]
Princeton, Mass. (Massachusetts, United States) (search for this): chapter 3
ntirely abandon the line, and save as many as possible of the troops for some new plan of operations. (Maxim 20.) If, however, the undisciplined army be sustained by fortifications, it can take up the accidental line of operations in the same manner, and with the same probability of success, as is done by a regular force. We have examples of accidental lines in the operations of the king of Prussia, after the battle of Hohenkirchen, and of Washington, in New-Jersey, after the action of Princeton. This is one of the finest in military history. Napoleon had projected a change in his line of operations, in case he lost the battle of Austerlitz; but victory rendered its execution unnecessary. Again in 1814 he had planned an entire change of operations; but the want of co-operation of the forces under Mortier and Marmont forced him to abandon a plan which, if properly executed, had probably defeated the allies. Jomini pronounced it one of the most brilliant of his military career.
Mexico (Mexico, Mexico) (search for this): chapter 3
ans in Circassia. National wars, in which the great body of the people of a state engage, like those of the Swiss against Austria and the Duke of Burgundy, of the Catalans in 1712, of the Americans against England, of the Dutch against Phillip II., and of the Poles and Circassians against Russia. Civil wars, where one portion of the state fights against the other, as the war of the Roses in England, of the league in France, of the Guelphs and Ghibelines in Italy, and of the factions in Mexico and South America. It is not the present intention to enter into any discussion of these different kinds of war, but rather to consider the general subject, and to discuss such general principles and rules as may be applicable to all wars. War in its most extensive sense may be regarded both as a science and an art. It is a science so far as it investigates general principles and institutes an analysis of military operations; and an art when considered with reference to the practical r
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