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Buffalo, N. Y. (New York, United States) (search for this): chapter 9
gh drove back the enemy from the line of Lake Champlain. With these operations terminated the Northern campaign of 1814, the last which has been conducted on that frontier. Let us now turn to the system of works projected for the defence of this line. The first works are at the Falls of St. Mary, on the western extremity of the line. The second works are at Mackinaw. The third works are at the foot of Lake Huron. The fourth works are near Detroit. The fifth works are near Buffalo. The sixth works are at the mouth of the Niagara river The seventh works are at Oswego. The eighth works are at Sacketts Harbor. The ninth works are below Ogdensburg. The tenth works are at Rouse's Point. The eleventh works are near the head-waters of the Kennebec or the Penobscot. The twelfth works are at Calais, on the St. Croix. All these works are small, and simple in their character, well calculated to assist the operations of armed forces in the field, but inca
Lake Huron (Wisconsin, United States) (search for this): chapter 9
Mary, on the western extremity of the line. The second works are at Mackinaw. The third works are at the foot of Lake Huron. The fourth works are near Detroit. The fifth works are near Buffalo. The sixth works are at the mouth of the e the principal fortifications of the northern frontier established on Lake Erie, the Detroit river, the St. Clair, and Lake Huron; and the money proposed for the other frontier and coast works, expended in establishing military and naval depots at Mrg and Memphis, and collect our troops on the Ohio and Mississippi, ascend the Mississippi and Illinois, Lake Michigan, Lake Huron, and the Georgian Bay, cross over to the Ottawa by French river and Lake Nipissing, or Moon river and the Muskago, thent navigable by such craft, it has, by some of the military writers before alluded to, been deemed preferable to descend Lake Huron, St. Clair river and lake, run the gauntlet past the British forts on the Detroit, descend Lake Erie and the Niagara
France (France) (search for this): chapter 9
e colonies, and in 1710 the legislature of New York especially protested against it in an address to the crown. While the military art was stationary in England, France had produced her four great engineers-Errard, Pagan, Vauban, and Cormontaigne; and nowhere has the influence of their system of military defence been more strikinurther accessions were now made to these English forces by large reinforcements from the mother country, while the Canadians received little or no assistance from France; nevertheless they prolonged the war till 1760, forcing the English to adopt at last the slow and expensive process of reducing all their fortifications. This wi French, in this campaign, had relinquished all idea of opposing the enemy in the open field, and confined their efforts to retard the advance of the English till France could send troops to their relief; but no such relief came: and when the campaign of 1760 opened, the little French army was concentrated at Montreal. As the Eng
Mississippi (United States) (search for this): chapter 9
sons combined; and yet the place held out forty-nine days, and at last was surrendered through the want of provisions and the disaffection of the citizens. This place was soon afterwards restored to the French. We see that, thus far in these wars, the English were vastly superior in strength and numbers, yet the result of the several campaigns was decidedly in favor of the French, who not only retained their possessions in the North, but extended their jurisdiction to the mouth of the Mississippi, and laid claim to the whole country west of the Alleghany mountains. This success must be attributed, not to any superiority of the Canadians in bravery, but to the higher military character of their governors, and more especially to their fortifications, which were constructed in situations most judiciously selected, to influence the Indians and facilitate incursions into the English colonies. The French pursued interior and central lines, while the English followed exterior and diver
Lake Nipissing (Canada) (search for this): chapter 9
lower Illinois to Lake Michigan,--for the purpose of obtaining the naval control of the northern lakes. It is said that British military and steam naval forces will ascend the St. Lawrence to Lake Ontario; that to counteract these operations we must build an opposition steam-navy at Pittsburg and Memphis, and collect our troops on the Ohio and Mississippi, ascend the Mississippi and Illinois, Lake Michigan, Lake Huron, and the Georgian Bay, cross over to the Ottawa by French river and Lake Nipissing, or Moon river and the Muskago, then descend the Ottawa river to Montreal. But as there might be some difficulty in conveying their war-steamers over some twelve or fifteen portages between the Georgian Bay and the Ottawa, and as the upper waters of that river are not navigable by such craft, it has, by some of the military writers before alluded to, been deemed preferable to descend Lake Huron, St. Clair river and lake, run the gauntlet past the British forts on the Detroit, descend La
Kennebec (Maine, United States) (search for this): chapter 9
expense in the carriage, and it will also be a means of securing a retreat if we should be put to the rout again. But this advice of Washington was unheeded, and the campaign of 1756 was based upon the same erroneous principles as the preceding one. The first division, of three thousand men, was to operate against Fort Du Quesne; the second, of six thousand men, against Niagara; the third, of ten thousand men, against Crown Point; and a fourth, of two thousand men, was to ascend the Kennebec river, destroy the settlements on the Chaudiere, and, by alarming the country about Quebec, produce a diversion in favor of the third division, which was regarded as the main army, and was directed along the principal line of operations. The entire French forces at this time consisted of only three thousand regulars and a body of Canadian militia. Nevertheless, the English, with forces nearly six times as numerous, closed the campaign without gaining a single advantage. We here see that t
Fort Niagara (New York, United States) (search for this): chapter 9
nct armies. The first, consisting of near two thousand men, marched to the attack of Fort Du Quesne, but was met and totally defeated by one-half that number of French and Indians. The second division, of fifteen hundred, proceeded to attack Fort Niagara by way of Oswego, but returned without success. The third, of three thousand seven hundred men, met and defeated Dieskau's army of twelve hundred regulars and six hundred Canadians and Indians, in the open field, but did not attempt to drive sion acted, as has just been stated, in concert with the naval force against Louisburg. In 1759, the western division of the English army, consisting of a strong body of Indians, and five thousand troops, wasted the whole season in reducing Fort Niagara, which was garrisoned by only six hundred men. The central column of thirteen thousand men was sufficiently successful to enable it to winter at Crown Point. The eastern division of eight thousand men under Wolfe ascended the St. Lawrence wit
Plattsburg (New York, United States) (search for this): chapter 9
y Frederick, and practised and improved by Napoleon, the central and interior line, under all ordinary circumstances, will furnish the greatest probabilities of success. If the line of Lake Champlain is, as we have endeavored to show, the most important line in the north, its security by fortifications is a matter of the greatest interest. The works recommended by the Board, consist of a single fort, costing $600,000, at Rouse's Point, on the extreme frontier, and unfortified depots at Plattsburg and Albany. But is this sufficient to accomplish the object? If the hostile army should pass the extreme frontier barrier, what is to retard his advance,--what defensive works are to protect the debouche of the Northern canal, or even to save the great central depot? We know of no foreign engineer who has recommended less than three lines of fortifications for the security of a land frontier; and Napoleon, the Archduke Charles, and General Jomini, agree in recommending at least this num
Hudson River (United States) (search for this): chapter 9
communication of our northern and eastern states, and the great central rallying-point where troops are to be collected for the defence of our northern frontier, or for offensive operations against Canada. Such a place should never be exposed to the coup-de-main of an enemy. The chance operations of a defensive army are never sufficient for the security of so important a position. We do not here pretend to say what its defences should be. Perhaps strong tetes-de-pont on the Mohawk and Hudson rivers, and detached works on the several lines of communication, may accomplish the desired object; perhaps more central and compact works may be found necessary. But we insist on the importance of securing this position by some efficient means. The remarks of Napoleon, (which have already been given,) on the advantages to be derived from fortifying such a central place, where the military wealth of a nation can be secured, are strikingly applicable to this case. But let us look for a mom
Fort Ticonderoga (New York, United States) (search for this): chapter 9
advantage. We here see that the French, with very inferior forces, still continued successful in every campaign, uniformly gaining advantage over their enemy, and gaining ground upon his colonies. By the possession of Forts William Henry, Ticonderoga, and Crown Point, they completely commanded Lake George and Lake Champlain, which afforded the shortest and easiest line of communication between the British colonies and Canada. By means of their forts at Montreal, Frontenac, Detroit, &c., tne of maximum importance both to us and to the enemy, we know of no reason for violating the positive rules of the art,--rules which have been established for ages, and sanctioned by the best engineers and greatest generals of modern times. Ticonderoga has more than once stayed the waves of northern invasion; and we know of no change in the art of war, or in the condition of the country, that renders less important than formerly the advantages of an intermediate point of support between Alba
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