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Franklin (Tennessee, United States) (search for this): chapter 11
e deciphered and sent by courier to my position near Columbia. The records do not show the hour of receipt by me; but my reply to General Thomas of 8:30 A. M., November 29, and my orders to Ruger of 8 and 8:45 A. M., and to Stanley before and after 8 A. M., and my despatch to Wilson of 8:15 A. M., fix the time of the receipt by me of this despatch from General Thomas at a few minutes after 8 A. M., November 29. The other despatch was as follows: （U. S. Military Telegraph.) Franklin, Tenn., November 28, 1864. (By telegraph from Nashville. 9:30 P. M.) To Major-General Schofield: Your despatch of 3:30 [2:30] P. M. just received. If Wilson cannot succeed in driving back the enemy, should it prove true that he has crossed the river, you will necessarily have to make preparation to take up a new position at Franklin, behind Harpeth, [while] immediately, if it become necessary to fall back. (Signed) Geo. H. Thomas, Major-General, Commanding. The records of the Depart
Edgefield (Tennessee, United States) (search for this): chapter 11
included about 8000 or 10,000 new troops at Nashville, and the same number of civil employees of treduced to the extreme necessity of holding Nashville, Chattanooga, and Decatur defensively, even perhaps even to Franklin. They were sent to Nashville, reaching there after the battle of Franklinen sent to Columbia, or at least moved up to Nashville or Franklin, where they could join the main Nashville, just as the brilliant victory at Nashville was accepted as demonstrating the wisdom of this General Thomas replied at once: Nashville, November 20, 1864. General Schofield: Yad between Franklin and Spring Hill: Nashville, November 29, 1864, 3:30 A. M. Major-Generall A. J. Smith's command has not yet reached Nashville; as soon as he arrives I will make immediateh is not needed for the immediate defense of Nashville, I think he had better march for Franklin atHood to cross the river above and strike for Nashville before I could effect a junction with the tr[22 more...]
Decatur (Tennessee, United States) (search for this): chapter 11
the possibility, at least, that Thomas might be reduced to the extreme necessity of holding Nashville, Chattanooga, and Decatur defensively, even during a long siege, and of abandoning all points of less importance than the three named, so that allt until he was strong enough to advance, unless forced to the extreme necessity of defending Nashville, Chattanooga, and Decatur, and abandoning all else, Thomas could not prudently have reduced his garrisons or guards. I knew nothing at that timg summer,—no more and no less,—and the necessity for that service had not been very much diminished, except at and about Decatur, Stevenson, and Tullahoma, which Hood's advance from Florence had rendered of no further consequence at that time. But n given in time, thus increasing the army in the field by fully 10,000 men. If R. S. Granger's force had been left at Decatur, it would have drawn off from Hood's invading army at least an equal force to guard his bridges at Florence, or else wou
Ducktown (Tennessee, United States) (search for this): chapter 11
s mud road from Huey's Mill until late in the afternoon. I had time to pass Spring Hill with my entire army before Hood's infantry advance-guard could reach that place. Hence I had ample time to consider the mathematical and physical questions involved before deciding finally that I would not let Hood drive me back from Duck River that day. But I did not at any time contemplate a retreat that day farther back than Spring Hill, as is shown by my direction to Ruger to have his regiment from Ducktown join him there that night. I am entirely willing to leave to intelligent military criticism any question in respect to the accuracy of my calculations, also the question whether I was justifiable, under the conditions then existing or understood to exist respecting Thomas's preparations in the rear to fight a decisive battle, in taking the risks, which are always more or less unavoidable, of failure in the execution of plans based upon so close an estimate of what could be done by my adv
Spring Hill (Tennessee, United States) (search for this): chapter 11
d 8 A. M., directing him to move at once to Spring Hill, he was ordered to leave one regiment to gud the river until dark and then join him at Spring Hill. It was then intended, in any event, to hold Spring Hill until the morning of November 30. At the same time Ruger was directed to order his irected to march along the railway track to Spring Hill, and thus avoid any interference from the elty execution of my orders. I arrived at Spring Hill at dusk with the head of the main column, hcted General Hammond to halt his command at Spring Hill and report to you for orders, if he cannot at Franklin, leaving a sufficient force at Spring Hill to contest the enemy's progress until you a; and, as events proved, he could not reach Spring Hill by his mud road from Huey's Mill until late in the afternoon. I had time to pass Spring Hill with my entire army before Hood's infantry advanmplate a retreat that day farther back than Spring Hill, as is shown by my direction to Ruger to ha[23 more...]
Dalton, Ga. (Georgia, United States) (search for this): chapter 11
und in the War Records, See Vols. XXXIX and XLV. fully show the earnest determination of General Thomas to send forward reinforcements as soon as possible, and even in detail, and to fight Hood at or near Columbia. Indeed, those despatches misled me somewhat as to what I might expect. Notwithstanding this earnest desire, General Thomas does not appear to have realized the existence of a force available for the purpose he had in view, The railroad guards from Atlanta to Chattanooga or Dalton, withdrawn after Sherman started on his march, and convalescents, men returning from furlough and others going to the front, but failing to reach Sherman's army in time, all assembled at Chattanooga, made a surplus force at that point of about 7000 men. See General Thomas's report: War Records, Vol. XLV, part i, p. 33. Some of these troops had been sent to East Tennessee, as well as all the mounted troops available in Kentucky, for the purpose of retrieving the disaster which had befalle
Pulaski, Tenn. (Tennessee, United States) (search for this): chapter 11
battle of Franklin the Untenable position at Pulaski available troops which were not sent to the him to give battle on equal terms to Hood at Pulaski or Columbia, a raid by Hood's cavalry would pke the initiative by moving against Hood from Pulaski or Columbia, then he might have drawn quite l General D. S. Stanley upon his being sent to Pulaski, and his subsequent orders to me, dated November 19, to fight the enemy at Pulaski if he advanced against that place, were, as shown in the follicable to the then existing situation: Pulaski, November 20, 1864. Major-General Thomas: mean that one brigade in the intrenchments at Pulaski could hold out for a week? The reason I ask If one brigade can hold the fortifications of Pulaski for a week or ten days, you are authorized toiscretion as to holding the fortifications at Pulaski or withdrawing the troops. Geo. H. Thomas, barrassing orders about fighting the enemy at Pulaski. The following correspondence, War Reco[1 more...]
Rhode Island (Rhode Island, United States) (search for this): chapter 11
had made this previous mistake a matter of past history, and hence it was lost sight of in view of the imminent danger afterward supposed to exist at Nashville, just as the brilliant victory at Nashville was accepted as demonstrating the wisdom of all that had gone before, even including Sherman's division of his army between himself and Thomas before his march to the sea. Such is the logic of contemporaneous military history! In my long conversations with General Grant on the steamer Rhode Island in January, 1865, I explained to him fully the error into which he had been led in respect to Thomas's action or non-action at Nashville in December, and he seemed to be perfectly satisfied on that point. But he did not ask me anything about what had occurred before the battle of Franklin, and hence I did not tell him anything. In connection with the action of General Thomas previous to the battle of Franklin, the following instructions from General Sherman on October 31 are important
Shelbyville, Tenn. (Tennessee, United States) (search for this): chapter 11
s of Granger's troops in Murfreesboroa to-day. Have made arrangements for Milroy to fall back to Murfreesboroa or this side of Duck River also, if the enemy advances. The cavalry on the south side of Duck River should cover the approaches to Shelbyville, and cross at that place, and hold the bridge in case of an advance in force. I have asked General Steedman how large a force he can raise to threaten the enemy's rear, should he get on the Chattanooga road, and expect an answer soon. About have succeeded in getting your cipher of the 25th translated. I believe your dispositions are wise. It appears from his despatch of November 25 that Thomas hoped we might be able to hold the line of Duck River from Columbia as far east as Shelbyville, as well as west to the Tennessee River. Although this proved to be impracticable on account of the enemy's superiority in cavalry at that time, the point (Murfreesboroa) which Thomas had selected for his concentration was far enough in the r
Florence, S. C. (South Carolina, United States) (search for this): chapter 11
ennessee military governor's troops there, under Gillem. But all sent from Chattanooga had been returned by November 21, about the time when Hood's advance from Florence had become certainly known. Yet it does not appear that General Thomas even inquired what force was available at Chattanooga until November 25, when, in reply td no less,—and the necessity for that service had not been very much diminished, except at and about Decatur, Stevenson, and Tullahoma, which Hood's advance from Florence had rendered of no further consequence at that time. But the 7000 men available at Chattanooga ought unquestionably to have been sent to Columbia, or at least m,000 men. If R. S. Granger's force had been left at Decatur, it would have drawn off from Hood's invading army at least an equal force to guard his bridges at Florence, or else would have destroyed those bridges and cut off his retreat after the battle of Nashville. This was practically what had been suggested by Sherman in hi
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