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Savannah, Tenn. (Tennessee, United States) (search for this): chapter 14
h as being at least equal to his own, and with all the deliberation of his nature, he insisted upon making the full preparations which he considered essential to success not only in battle, but in pursuit of a defeated enemy. From his point of view, Thomas was unquestionably right in his action. How he came to make so great an overestimate of the Confederate strength, in view of the means of information in his possession and the estimate General Sherman had given him before he started for Savannah, it is difficult to conjecture. But the fact is now beyond question that Thomas made all those elaborate preparations to attack an enemy of less than half his own strength, under the belief that his adversary was at least equal in strength to himself. That Hood then knew his own exact strength is a matter of course, and that he did not underestimate the strength of his adversary is almost equally certain. During the two weeks in which his army lay in front of Nashville, if not before, he
Kentucky (Kentucky, United States) (search for this): chapter 14
the question why Hood did not avoid intrenched positions and make a raid into Kentucky, which he could easily have done at that time, because Thomas was not yet readld afterward attend to Thomas's scattered detachments in succession, or invade Kentucky, as he might think expedient. As Hood was operating in the country of his ownstrongly guarded. It had become too late for Hood even to attempt a raid into Kentucky. Thomas would have been close upon his rear with an army at least twice as stperations against Nashville were far less possible to Hood than an invasion of Kentucky. While no commander could possibly think of destroying his own army by assaulf such a place, so bold a commander as Hood might possibly attempt a raid into Kentucky, as the only thing he could possibly do except retreat across the Tennessee Rit. Hence it was naturally apprehended that Hood would either make a raid into Kentucky or else retreat across the Tennessee River without suffering any further damag
Spring Hill (Tennessee, United States) (search for this): chapter 14
r the battle of December 16 that battle due to the spontaneous action of subordinate commanders statements in the reports of the Corps commanders explanation of the absence of orders the Phraseology of General Thomas's report. the official records, Hood's statement, and Sherman's estimate, made at the time, agree pretty closely in placing Hood's infantry force at about 30,000 men when he crossed the Tennessee and began his advance toward Nashville. He lost a considerable number at Spring Hill on November 29, and over 6000, besides thirteen general officers, at Franklin on November 30. Therefore 24,000 must be a liberal estimate of his infantry strength after the battle of Franklin. The infantry strength of the Fourth and Twenty-third corps did not exceed 22,000 present for duty equipped, of which one brigade (Cooper's) of the Twenty-third was sent by General Thomas to guard the fords of Duck River below Columbia, and did not rejoin the corps until after the battle of Frankli
Edgefield (Tennessee, United States) (search for this): chapter 14
ood's motive in attempting the impossible at Nashville diversity of opinions concerning that battliderably by the arrival of cavalry sent from Nashville by General Thomas, especially Hammond's briglin, and Thomas's concentration of troops at Nashville, completely reversed the situation. When Hoely held. But successful operations against Nashville were far less possible to Hood than an invasdelay of General Thomas in attacking Hood at Nashville. It was perfectly evident that Thomas could Hood's desperate act in waiting in front of Nashville and inviting the destruction or capture of hor two more blows from the powerful enemy at Nashville to complete his destruction. Any estimate o headquarters Fourth Army Corps, near Nashville, Tenn., December 15, 1864, 11:20 P. M. Orderhose command had moved out that morning from Nashville by the Nolensville pike, and arrange a militI have thought myself entitled in respect to Nashville was for two incidental services which Genera[7 more...]
Columbia, Tenn. (Tennessee, United States) (search for this): chapter 14
attle of Franklin. The infantry strength of the Fourth and Twenty-third corps did not exceed 22,000 present for duty equipped, of which one brigade (Cooper's) of the Twenty-third was sent by General Thomas to guard the fords of Duck River below Columbia, and did not rejoin the corps until after the battle of Franklin. Hence Hood's infantry force at Columbia and Franklin was nearly one half greater than mine. The disparity in cavalry was still greater at first, but was reduced very considerablColumbia and Franklin was nearly one half greater than mine. The disparity in cavalry was still greater at first, but was reduced very considerably by the arrival of cavalry sent from Nashville by General Thomas, especially Hammond's brigade, which arrived in the field on the 29th, too late to assist in holding the line of Duck River. It follows that Hood had an opportunity to conduct operations against an adversary of, at the most, only two thirds his own strength in infantry and in cavalry—an opportunity such as had never before been presented to any Confederate general. That he thought his chance a very brilliant one is not remark
Duck River (Tennessee, United States) (search for this): chapter 14
ngth after the battle of Franklin. The infantry strength of the Fourth and Twenty-third corps did not exceed 22,000 present for duty equipped, of which one brigade (Cooper's) of the Twenty-third was sent by General Thomas to guard the fords of Duck River below Columbia, and did not rejoin the corps until after the battle of Franklin. Hence Hood's infantry force at Columbia and Franklin was nearly one half greater than mine. The disparity in cavalry was still greater at first, but was reduced very considerably by the arrival of cavalry sent from Nashville by General Thomas, especially Hammond's brigade, which arrived in the field on the 29th, too late to assist in holding the line of Duck River. It follows that Hood had an opportunity to conduct operations against an adversary of, at the most, only two thirds his own strength in infantry and in cavalry—an opportunity such as had never before been presented to any Confederate general. That he thought his chance a very brilliant o
Brentwood, Tenn. (Tennessee, United States) (search for this): chapter 14
t. Hdqrs. Cavalry Corps, Mil. Div. Of the Mississippi, in the field, December 16, 1864, 10:10 A. M. Major-General Schofield, Commanding Twenty-third Army Corps. General: The regiment sent to the Granny White pike reports it strongly picketed toward us, with troops moving to our left. This is probably Chalmers's division. I have heard nothing from Johnson this morning; but, from what General Croxton reports, there is no doubt that Chalmers crossed the Hardin pike, moving toward Brentwood. The country on the left of the Hillsboroa pike, toward the enemy's left, is too difficult for cavalry operations. It seems to me if I was on the other flank of the Army I might do more to annoy the enemy, unless it is intended that I shall push out as directed last night. Very respectfully, J. H. Wilson, Brevet Major-General. (Indorsement.) Respectfully forwarded to Major-General Thomas. J. M. Schofield, Major-General. This last, while showing that General Wilson had not r
Tennessee (Tennessee, United States) (search for this): chapter 14
it was ample in quantity and efficient in quality on both sides, and need not be compared. This formidable army was now in Hood's immediate front at Nashville, while the important strategic points of Murfreesboroa and Chattanooga were strongly garrisoned and fortified, and the railroads strongly guarded. It had become too late for Hood even to attempt a raid into Kentucky. Thomas would have been close upon his rear with an army at least twice as strong, with all the important points in Tennessee still securely held. But successful operations against Nashville were far less possible to Hood than an invasion of Kentucky. While no commander could possibly think of destroying his own army by assaulting a fortified place in which the garrison was more than double his own strength, or indulge the hope of any valuable results from a less than half investment of such a place, so bold a commander as Hood might possibly attempt a raid into Kentucky, as the only thing he could possibly do
Tennessee River (United States) (search for this): chapter 14
strength, or indulge the hope of any valuable results from a less than half investment of such a place, so bold a commander as Hood might possibly attempt a raid into Kentucky, as the only thing he could possibly do except retreat across the Tennessee River, and thus abandon his cause as lost. It was this view of the situation by General Grant and the authorities in Washington that caused such intense anxiety on account of the delay of General Thomas in attacking Hood at Nashville. It was perfectly evident that Thomas could beat Hood whenever he chose to attack him, and that Hood must be fully aware of that fact. Hence it was naturally apprehended that Hood would either make a raid into Kentucky or else retreat across the Tennessee River without suffering any further damage. To those who were watching Hood closely at Nashville, and especially to those who understood his character, there seemed no ground for either apprehension. All his operations indicated a serious attempt to b
J. M. Schofield (search for this): chapter 14
g about what shall be done if he does not retreat. Hdqrs. Cavalry Corps, Mil. Div. Of the Mississippi, in the field, December 16, 1864, 10:10 A. M. Major-General Schofield, Commanding Twenty-third Army Corps. General: The regiment sent to the Granny White pike reports it strongly picketed toward us, with troops moving tohis right by assault. Major-General Thomas being present, the matter was referred to him, and I was requested to delay the movement until he could hear from General Schofield, to whom he had sent. . . . General McArthur, not receiving any reply, and fearing that if the attack should be longer delayed the enemy would use the night s our plan, and modified at the conference which was called that day upon the suggestion of Wood in that confidential letter, and, as he said, at the instance of Schofield and Smith. War Records, Vol. XLV, part II, p. 184. But the battle of the 16th appears to have been emphatically a battle of the troops themselves, acting und
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