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John M. Schofield, Forty-six years in the Army, Chapter IX (search)
sion of the War Department that I, instead of General Stanley, had command of the force that in the following November, 1864, opposed Hood's advance from the Tennessee River and repulsed his fierce assault at Franklin. As I was absent from the army on business connected with my department during most of Hood's raid upon the raito move by rail to Tullahoma, and then march across to Pulaski, as Stanley was doing. But just then Forrest with his cavalry appeared at Johnsonville, on the Tennessee River west of Nashville, and destroyed a great quantity of property, General Thomas not having sufficient force available to oppose him; hence on November 3 Thomas gly favorable for the defense. The ordinary country roads were almost impassable, while the turnpikes were in good condition. As we held the crossing of the Tennessee River at Decatur, Hood was compelled to cross at the Shoals below, and to advance over those very bad roads; hence we had ample time in which to make the necessary
John M. Schofield, Forty-six years in the Army, Chapter XI (search)
l withdraw to the north bank to-night and endeavor to prevent him from crossing. Wilson is operating mainly on my left, with a portion of his command south of the river. I have no late information from him. I have succeeded in getting your cipher of the 25th translated. I believe your dispositions are wise. It appears from his despatch of November 25 that Thomas hoped we might be able to hold the line of Duck River from Columbia as far east as Shelbyville, as well as west to the Tennessee River. Although this proved to be impracticable on account of the enemy's superiority in cavalry at that time, the point (Murfreesboroa) which Thomas had selected for his concentration was far enough in the rear of that line (Duck River) to make the concentration certain if orders were given in due time. I learned in the afternoon of November 27, by General Thomas's despatch of 8 A. M., already quoted, that A. J. Smith's troops were not, as I had supposed, already in Nashville, but that s
John M. Schofield, Forty-six years in the Army, Chapter XIII (search)
The remnant of Hood's army having made its escape across the Tennessee River, the pursuit terminated, and General Thomas issued his remarkaguard of the flying and dispirited enemy was driven across the Tennessee River. . . War Records, Vol. XLV, part i, p. 50. Orders were then issued by General Thomas distributing his army along the Tennessee River in winter quarters, and he commenced planning a campaign for tplates a spring campaign into Alabama or Mississippi, with the Tennessee River as a base, and believe he considers my command a necessary parhave seen no necessity for his pressing the pursuit beyond the Tennessee River in midwinter. Some of our military operations in the Civil fine army splendidly equipped and supplied, to start from the Tennessee River to invade the Gulf States, as had been done the year before, j as yet no thought of its termination. The campaign from the Tennessee River as a base had then become, like the autumn maneuvers of a Euro
John M. Schofield, Forty-six years in the Army, Chapter XIV (search)
strength, or indulge the hope of any valuable results from a less than half investment of such a place, so bold a commander as Hood might possibly attempt a raid into Kentucky, as the only thing he could possibly do except retreat across the Tennessee River, and thus abandon his cause as lost. It was this view of the situation by General Grant and the authorities in Washington that caused such intense anxiety on account of the delay of General Thomas in attacking Hood at Nashville. It was perfectly evident that Thomas could beat Hood whenever he chose to attack him, and that Hood must be fully aware of that fact. Hence it was naturally apprehended that Hood would either make a raid into Kentucky or else retreat across the Tennessee River without suffering any further damage. To those who were watching Hood closely at Nashville, and especially to those who understood his character, there seemed no ground for either apprehension. All his operations indicated a serious attempt to b
John M. Schofield, Forty-six years in the Army, Chapter XV (search)
, my recollection is that when I met you on your way to Wilmington, N. C., subsequent to the battle of Nashville, you explained the situation at Nashville prior to General Thomas's movement against Hood, with a view of removing the feeling that I had that Thomas had been slow. I was very impatient at that time with what I thought was tardiness on the part of General Thomas, and was very much afraid that while he was lying there at Nashville and not moving his army, Hood might cross the Tennessee River either above or below the city of Nashville, and get between him and the Ohio River, and make a retrograde movement of our army at Nashville a necessity, and very much embarrass and delay future operations of the armies. Laboring under this feeling and impression, I was telegraphing General Thomas daily, and almost hourly, urging him to move out and attack Hood, and finally became so impatient that I contemplated his removal and the substitution of another officer in his place; but thi
John M. Schofield, Forty-six years in the Army, Chapter XVI (search)
ror in a matter of so vital moment—an error that might have led to disastrous consequences? Hood was already on the Tennessee River, preparing to cross and begin his march to Nashville. Thomas had ready to meet him only about two thirds Hood's stre conduct of a military campaign: that was to strike with his superior remaining force for Hood's rear, south of the Tennessee River. Such a movement could have been commenced immediately upon Hood's march in that direction. Supplies would have bethe invasion of middle Tennessee? . . . If he does this, he ought to be met and prevented from getting north of the Tennessee River. If you were to cut loose, I do not believe you would meet Hood's army. . . . Hood would probably strike for Nashvirengthened by eight or ten new regiments and all of Wilson's cavalry. You could safely invite Beauregard across the Tennessee River and prevent his ever returning. I still believe, however, that public clamor will force him to turn and follow me,
John M. Schofield, Forty-six years in the Army, Index (search)
158, 159; collects his forces at Lovejoy's Station, 159; S.'s anxiety to attack, 159; advance on Spring Hill, the battle and its strategy, 160, 172, 173, 213, 215-219, 230, 231, 258, 301; westward and northward movement, the crossing of the Tennessee River, and the invasion of and campaign in Tennessee, 160, 163, 164, 167, 191, 193, 252, 254, 258, 289, 301, 303 et seq., 313, 315, 316, 318, 319, 321, 325; advance on and battle at Columbia, 160, 168, 172, 201 et seq., 252, 254, 258, 282; battle n, 257 ; the campaign in, its results and possibilities, 260, 300, 301, 315 et seq., 329, 338, 345 ; Thomas's report of the campaign, 277, 279 et seq.; S.'s report of the campaign, 283; Forrest's operations in, 308; reconstruction in, 370 Tennessee River, general military movements on, and Hood's crossing's of, 161, 165, 167, 192, 207, 251, 253, 255-258, 260, 289, 295, 300, 301, 304, 305, 316–:322, 325; Forrest's raid on, 165; Thomas's army in winter quarters on, 251 ; Thomas proposes to cam