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Browsing named entities in a specific section of Alfred Roman, The military operations of General Beauregard in the war between the states, 1861 to 1865. Search the whole document.

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Centreville (Virginia, United States) (search for this): chapter 15
y deprived General Johnston of his rightful claim to the command of our united forces. We quote again from General Johnston's Narrative of Military Operations, pp. 40, 41: General Beauregard pointed out, on his map, five roads converging to Centreville from different points of his front, and proposed an order of march on these roads, by which the army should be concentrated near the Federal camps. It was accepted without hesitation; and, having had no opportunity to sleep in either of the tders having failed to reach the brigade commanders to whom they were forwarded, General Beauregard says: In connection with the miscarriage of the orders sent by courier to Generals Holmes and Ewell, to attack the enemy in flank and reverse at Centreville, through which the triumph of our arms was prevented from being still more decisive, I regard it in place to say, etc. And he here recommends a divisional organization, which, he thinks, would greatly reduce the risk of such mis. haps in the f
Maryland (Maryland, United States) (search for this): chapter 15
n the cause of a congressional investigation on the deplorable condition of our army, and its inability either to advance or retreat. From New Orleans, March, 1876, in answer to the Hon. John C. Ferriss, of Tennessee, who wished to be informed upon this point, General Beauregard explained how it was that no advance was made on Washington. We commend to the serious attention of the reader the following passage from his letter: Our only proper operation was to pass the Potomac above, into Maryland, at or about Edwards's Ferry, and march upon the rear of Washington. With the hope of undertaking such a movement, I had caused a reconnoisance of the country and shore (south of the Potomac) in that quarter to be made in the month of June; but the necessary transportation even for the ammunition essential to such a movement had not been provided for my forces, notwithstanding my application for it during more than a month beforehand; nor was there twenty-four hours food at Manassas, for t
Manassas, Va. (Virginia, United States) (search for this): chapter 15
advising him that the enemy will attack in force the next morning. And the enemy did. The engagement of Bull Run was fought and won; and General McDowell, frustrated in this his attempt to carry our lines, fortunately for us, delayed his onward movement towards Richmond. Our success was announced to the War Department; what answer came back? The despatch has already been given, but it is necessary to lay it again before the reader. Richmond, July 19th, 1861. General Beauregard, Manassas, Va.: We have no intelligence from General Johnston. If the enemy in front of you has abandoned an immediate attack, and General Johnston has not moved, you had better withdraw the call upon him, so that he may be left to his full discretion. All the troops arriving at Lynchburg are ordered to join you. From this place we will send as fast as transportation permits. The enemy is advised at Washington of the projected movement of Generals Johnston and Holmes, and may vary his plans in co
Lynchburg (Virginia, United States) (search for this): chapter 15
cess was announced to the War Department; what answer came back? The despatch has already been given, but it is necessary to lay it again before the reader. Richmond, July 19th, 1861. General Beauregard, Manassas, Va.: We have no intelligence from General Johnston. If the enemy in front of you has abandoned an immediate attack, and General Johnston has not moved, you had better withdraw the call upon him, so that he may be left to his full discretion. All the troops arriving at Lynchburg are ordered to join you. From this place we will send as fast as transportation permits. The enemy is advised at Washington of the projected movement of Generals Johnston and Holmes, and may vary his plans in conformity thereto. S. Cooper, Adjutant-General. Even at this critical juncture, when no further doubt could exist of the enemy's intention to rush upon our lines in overwhelming force—the inevitable result of our defeat being the capture of Richmond—President Davis, so far from
Winchester, Va. (Virginia, United States) (search for this): chapter 15
is certainly mistaken when he asserts that General Beauregard's telegram asking—we might almost say imploring—him to move on immediately, was only received on the 18th, when his answer to it is dated July 17th, and reads as follows: Winchester, Va., July 17th, 1861. General Beauregard, Manassas: Is the enemy upon you in force? J. E. Johnston. This shows conclusively how little General Johnston had thought of leaving Winchester, and how utterly improbable it is that he hWinchester, and how utterly improbable it is that he had planned a battle to be fought at Manassas, through a junction of his forces with those of General Beauregard. Does it not show, besides, how unwilling he was to move at all, unless assured that there was no exaggeration in General Beauregard's anticipation of a powerful impending attack? It was necessary to telegraph to him again before he finally agreed to put his troops in motion. Hence their late arrival, some of them not coming up until the latter part of the battle. General Johnston
South Carolina (South Carolina, United States) (search for this): chapter 15
neither the efforts of his friends, nor the insinuations in his published work, will succeed in altering the facts of the case. History, in its wonted impartiality, will never accord him the honors of the plan of campaign, or of the concentration of the troops, or of the victory won on the hardfought field of Manassas. On those points the true verdict of the country has already been rendered. In a letter to General Beauregard, dated Richmond, August 25th, 1861, Colonel Chestnut, of South Carolina, so aptly and forcibly expresses this opinion, that we feel impelled to transcribe his words. He wrote: The country owes you an immense debt of gratitude, and the world has already paid you the tribute of just and unqualified admiration. The more the consequences of the victory at Manassas are understood, the greater and the more glorious will it seem. The unbecoming pruriency of some, and the voracious appetite of many for even a fleeting notoriety, which have prompted und
Bull Run, Va. (Virginia, United States) (search for this): chapter 15
tle of the 21st. He would certainly have arrived too late, had not the result of the action of Bull Run, on the 18th, deterred General McDowell from sooner making his contemplated attack. And it muse same, and has hardly had any sleep at all since the 17th, the day preceding the engagement of Bull Run, goes on with the active preparations needed at the hour; issues and distributes the order of my. He wished it clearly understood, however, that should the enemy offer battle on the line of Bull Run, he would accept it for his command, against whatever odds he (the enemy) might array in his frhim that the enemy will attack in force the next morning. And the enemy did. The engagement of Bull Run was fought and won; and General McDowell, frustrated in this his attempt to carry our lines, fohe field after the last-armed enemy had left it, when none were within cannon-shot, or south of Bull Run, when the victory was complete as well as assured, and no opportunity left for the influence of
Tennessee (Tennessee, United States) (search for this): chapter 15
ht to his knowledge, the Federal capital could have been captured by our victorious forces as early as the 24th of July. General Beauregard stated this as his conviction, in letters to Representative Miles, and to Mr. Davis himself, when the latter called him to account for having been the cause of a congressional investigation on the deplorable condition of our army, and its inability either to advance or retreat. From New Orleans, March, 1876, in answer to the Hon. John C. Ferriss, of Tennessee, who wished to be informed upon this point, General Beauregard explained how it was that no advance was made on Washington. We commend to the serious attention of the reader the following passage from his letter: Our only proper operation was to pass the Potomac above, into Maryland, at or about Edwards's Ferry, and march upon the rear of Washington. With the hope of undertaking such a movement, I had caused a reconnoisance of the country and shore (south of the Potomac) in that quarter
Brentsville (Virginia, United States) (search for this): chapter 15
numbers between his forces and those of the enemy, and alluding to the apprehension of his left flank being turned and his communication with Richmond eventually destroyed. In view of the odds against; me—he wrote in that letter—and of the vital importance, at this juncture, of avoiding the hazard of defeat, which would open to the enemy the way to Richmond, I shall act with extreme caution. If forced to retire before an overwhelming force, . . . my line of retreat can be taken, through Brentsville, to a junction with BrigadierGen-eral Holmes, at or near Fredericksburg, whence we could operate on the line of communication of the enemy, . . . so as to retard him by the way. He wished it clearly understood, however, that should the enemy offer battle on the line of Bull Run, he would accept it for his command, against whatever odds he (the enemy) might array in his front. Hardly had this communication been forwarded to Richmond, before he despatched thither Colonel Preston, and, i
Fredericksburg, Va. (Virginia, United States) (search for this): chapter 15
apprehension of his left flank being turned and his communication with Richmond eventually destroyed. In view of the odds against; me—he wrote in that letter—and of the vital importance, at this juncture, of avoiding the hazard of defeat, which would open to the enemy the way to Richmond, I shall act with extreme caution. If forced to retire before an overwhelming force, . . . my line of retreat can be taken, through Brentsville, to a junction with BrigadierGen-eral Holmes, at or near Fredericksburg, whence we could operate on the line of communication of the enemy, . . . so as to retard him by the way. He wished it clearly understood, however, that should the enemy offer battle on the line of Bull Run, he would accept it for his command, against whatever odds he (the enemy) might array in his front. Hardly had this communication been forwarded to Richmond, before he despatched thither Colonel Preston, and, immediately afterwards, Colonel Chestnut, with another and more extensiv
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