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anding near Chattanooga, Tenn.: Dear General,—I have just been informed from Richmond that the Army of Virginia is about to take the offensive again, to prevent Meade from reinforcing Rosecrans, thus repeating, to a certain extent, the campaign of last July into Pennsylvania, which did not save Middle Tennessee and the Mississi the War Department, to see if our small available means cannot be used to a better purpose. It is evident to my mind that, admitting Lee's movement can prevent Meade from reinforcing Rosecrans and drive the former across the Potomac, Lee cannot prevent Rosecrans from being reinforced by about 40,000 or 50,000 men from Ohio, Kenyou must be reinforced from Johnston's or Lee's army, or Middle Georgia would be lost, and the Confederacy, now cut in two, would then be cut in three. Meanwhile, Meade, having been reinforced by the new levies of the enemy, and taking his time to organize and discipline them, would retake the offensive, and Lee would be driven ba
, at or near Dalton. It is evident that the enemy, having taken Chattanooga for their spring campaign, are now returning Meade's corps as fast as possible, for fear of being forestalled by Longstreet joining Lee, and the two together crushing MeadeMeade, which should have been done by this time; for Longstreet would move on interior lines, while Meade's three corps have to go around the circumference of the circle. It is probable, however, that when the roads in Virginia shall have become perfeMeade's three corps have to go around the circumference of the circle. It is probable, however, that when the roads in Virginia shall have become perfectly impracticable a part of Meade's reinforcements may be sent South for a winter campaign against Charleston, Savannah, or Wilmington; hence Johnston or Lee must be prepared to reinforce us. Halleck is just finding out what can be done with suddenMeade's reinforcements may be sent South for a winter campaign against Charleston, Savannah, or Wilmington; hence Johnston or Lee must be prepared to reinforce us. Halleck is just finding out what can be done with sudden and rapid concentration of troops. Our side, meanwhile, is still trying the reverse: see Chattanooga and Knoxville. I suppose that by the time we shall have no more troops to concentrate we will learn better. By-the-bye the President does not
he Potomac, by Swinton, p. 498. See, also, General Meade's report. Smith's corps (the 18th) was trad General Hancock, who, by instructions of General Meade, had refrained from attacking until these tion, a messenger from General Burnside to General Meade rode into our lines and was captured. He a despatch, which appeared to be an answer to Meade by Burnside, representing that two of his diviy General Beauregard, remained unchanged. General Meade, in his report of the campaign of 1864 (maWright's corps, with all its artillery. General Meade, in his report, says: During the night of troops. In a preceding part of his report General Meade also says: Early on the morning of the 16tFederals. In another part of his report General Meade says: An unsuccessful assault by Gibbon's s ordered by the Major-General Commanding (General Meade), which resulted, on the part of this corpo-operated with us in this engagement. General Meade also says that— Major-General Birney,
to the ladies of that city. Southern women. quietude of the Federal Army after June 18th. General Meade intrenches. what General Badeau says of the failure to capture Petersburg. his comments upthe late arrival of General Lee's Army. how General Beauregard saved the city. Inaction of General Meade's Army. erroneous explanation of it by General Badeau. General Beauregard's comprehension y termed by Mr. Swinton the mine fiasco. Army of the Potomac, p. 518. Being satisfied, says General Meade, in his report, that Lee's army was before me, and nothing further to be gained by direct atand the work of intrenching a line commenced, which line is part of that at present held. General Meade's report bears date November 1st, 1864. In his Military History of Ulysses S. Grant (volnt; massing and strengthening the inner works on the night of the 15th, and, afterwards, holding Meade and Smith at bay, until Lee arrived in force. Then the combined rebel army, amounting to sixty
success. suggests the order to withdraw. General Meade issues it. arrival of General Mahone withthese operations were conducted exclusively by Meade, to whom Grant now intended to allow a more ab of movement of the Federal troops. See General Meade's orders, July 29th, 1864, to be found in for the operation consisted, according to General Meade's testimony, of nearly 50,000 men, GeneGeneral Meade's testimony, in same work, p. 37. exclusive of the cavalry. The orders were to spring l conflict in the trenches, when, at 9.45, General Meade gave General Burnside a peremptory order tsted by, General Grant himself, and not by General Meade. Says General Badeau: Burnside's despurnside. It follows from this that, before Meade's order to withdraw was issued—that is to sayith the least possible sacrifice of life. General Meade at first refused, but finally gave him disted, by Mr. Swinton, at about 4000 men; by General Meade, at 4400 killed, wounded, and missing, 246[7 more...]
S. Grant, vol. III., p. 394. And General Grant is reported to have said, on the 25th of February: Deserters from the rebel lines, north of the James, say it is reported among them that Hill's corps has left, or is leaving, to join Beauregard. Ibid., vol. III., p. 395. That, late as it was, the course proposed by General Beauregard was the true strategic measure to adopt, is shown by the apprehension of the enemy. And General Badeau again quotes, as follows, General Grant's words to General Meade, on the 3d of March:For the present, it is better for us to hold the enemy where he is than to force him South. * * * To drive the enemy from Richmond now would endanger the success of these columns Ibid., vol. III., p. 405.—meaning Sherman's and Schofield's. And what was General Beauregard attempting to compass, with a view to a successful conclusion of the war? That the end had been nearly reached by both contending parties was evident at the time, and has been set forth, with
Hancock's—your sole force being Hoke's and Johnson's divisions, and the local force, with Dearing's cavalry and Jones's artillery. At the most critical time the capture of one of Burnside's aids with a despatch from Burnside asking aid from General Meade, endorsed by General Meade with directions to get support from Smith, occurring just as a message from Hoke arrived announcing the easy repulse of Smith, enabled you to reinforce Johnson from Hoke's command and make your position safe. That General Meade with directions to get support from Smith, occurring just as a message from Hoke arrived announcing the easy repulse of Smith, enabled you to reinforce Johnson from Hoke's command and make your position safe. That Friday night the lines up to the Jerusalem plank roak were finished and occupied, which never were taken. The next morning, Saturday, 18th, General Lee arrived, and his whole army were in position confronting Grant by Sunday morning. I have reason to believe that on Saturday you proposed to General Lee to turn Grant's left flank, you covering his own left flank, and attacking Grant's right as he made the new front, giving the opinion that the two forces, flushed with the confidence of rec