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Bonaparte (search for this): chapter 6
troops. This will account for the destitute condition of the nine forts enumerated by General Scott, as well as of all the rest. When our system of fortifications was planned and carried into execution, it was never contemplated to provide garrisons for them in time of peace. This would have required a large standing army, against which the American people have ever evinced a wise and wholesome jealousy. Every great republic, from the days of Caesar to Cromwell, and from Cromwell to Bonaparte, has been destroyed by armies composed of free citizens, who had been converted by military discipline into veteran soldiers. Our fortifications, therefore, when completed, were generally left in the custody of a sergeant and a few soldiers. No fear was entertained that they would ever be seized by the States for whose defence against a foreign enemy they had been erected. Under these circumstances it became the plain duty of the President, destitute as he was of military force, not o
Benjamin Stanton (search for this): chapter 6
e proposed service. This was because nearly the whole of our small army was on the remote frontiers, where it had been continually employed for years in protecting the inhabitants and the emigrants on their way to the far west, against the attacks of hostile Indians. At no former period had its services been more necessary than throughout the year 1860, from the great number of these Indians continually threatening or waging war on our distant settlements. To employ the language of Mr. Benjamin Stanton, of Ohio, in his report of the 18th February, 1861, from the military committee to the House of Representatives: The regular army numbers only 18,000 men, when recruited to its maximum strength; and the whole of this force is required upon an extended frontier, for the protection of the border settlements against Indian depredations. Indeed, the whole of it had proved insufficient for this purpose. This is established by the reports of General Scott himself to the War Department. I
Winfield Scott (search for this): chapter 6
Chapter 5: General Scott's views, and the encouragement they afforded to the cotton Stition of the Southern States, the Views of General Scott, addressed before that event to the Secretnce occurred], was not within the scope of General Scott's provisional remedies. As if apprehendinepot. According to this arrangement of General Scott, all that would be left for the Northeast ny. It is worthy of special remark that General Scott in his autobiography recently published, vnion. Under these circumstances, surely General Scott ought not to have informed them in advance. It is proper to inform the reader why General Scott had five companies only within reach for tse. This is established by the reports of General Scott himself to the War Department. In these h leaving not a company for Utah. Again, General Scott, in his report of November 13, 1858, says: condition of the nine forts enumerated by General Scott, as well as of all the rest. When our s
Cromwell (search for this): chapter 6
er contemplated to provide garrisons for them in time of peace. This would have required a large standing army, against which the American people have ever evinced a wise and wholesome jealousy. Every great republic, from the days of Caesar to Cromwell, and from Cromwell to Bonaparte, has been destroyed by armies composed of free citizens, who had been converted by military discipline into veteran soldiers. Our fortifications, therefore, when completed, were generally left in the custody of aCromwell to Bonaparte, has been destroyed by armies composed of free citizens, who had been converted by military discipline into veteran soldiers. Our fortifications, therefore, when completed, were generally left in the custody of a sergeant and a few soldiers. No fear was entertained that they would ever be seized by the States for whose defence against a foreign enemy they had been erected. Under these circumstances it became the plain duty of the President, destitute as he was of military force, not only to refrain from any act which might provoke or encourage the cotton States into secession, but to smooth the way for such a Congressional compromise as had in times past happily averted danger from the Union. There
October, 1860 AD (search for this): chapter 6
ny patriotic associations, would be removed to Albany. It is worthy of special remark that General Scott in his autobiography recently published, vol. II., p. 609, entirely omits to copy this part of his views on which we have been commenting; so also his supplementary views of the next day, though together they constitute but one whole. He merely copies that which relates to garrisoning the Southern forts. It is easy to imagine with what power these Views, presented so early as October, 1860, may have been employed by the disunion leaders of the cotton States to convince the people that they might depart in peace. Proceeding from the Commanding General of the army, a citizen and a soldier so eminent, and eschewing as they did the idea of invading a seceded State, as well as favoring the substitution of new Confederacies for the old Union, what danger could they apprehend in the formation of a Southern Confederacy? This portion of the Views, being purely political and pro
October 29th, 1860 AD (search for this): chapter 6
s election their true policy was to cling to the Union. Such, since the period of Mr. Lincoln's election, having been the condition of the Southern States, the Views of General Scott, addressed before that event to the Secretary of War, on the 29th and 30th October, 1860, were calculated to do much injury in misleading the South. From the strange inconsistencies they involve, it would be difficult to estimate whether they did most harm in encouraging or in provoking secession. So far as thofore, mean to stay away from the polls. My sympathies, however, are with the Bell and Everett ticket. After all these preliminaries, we now proceed to a different side of the picture presented by the General. In the same Views (the 29th October, 1860), he says that, From a knowledge of our Southern population it is my solemn conviction that there is some danger of an early act of rashness preliminary to secession, viz., the seizure of some or all of the following posts:—Forts Jackson an
January 18th, 1861 AD (search for this): chapter 6
onsists of a political disquisition on the existing dangers to the Union; on the horrors of civil war and the best means of averting so great a calamity; and also on the course which their author had resolved to pursue, as a citizen, in the approaching Presidential election. These were themes entirely foreign to a military report, and equally foreign from the official duties of the Commanding General. Furthermore, the Views were published to the world by the General himself, on the 18th January, 1861, in the National Intelligencer, and this without the consent or even previous knowledge of the President.This was done at a critical moment in our history, when the cotton States were seceding one after the other. The reason assigned by him for this strange violation of official confidence toward the President, was the necessity for the correction of misapprehensions which had got abroad, both in the public prints and in public speeches, in relation to the Views. The General commen
October 30th, 1860 AD (search for this): chapter 6
arily left without sufficient garrisons for want of troops the President's duty to refrain from any hostile act against the cotton States, and smooth the way to a compromise the rights of those States in no danger from Mr. Lincoln's election their true policy was to cling to the Union. Such, since the period of Mr. Lincoln's election, having been the condition of the Southern States, the Views of General Scott, addressed before that event to the Secretary of War, on the 29th and 30th October, 1860, were calculated to do much injury in misleading the South. From the strange inconsistencies they involve, it would be difficult to estimate whether they did most harm in encouraging or in provoking secession. So far as they recommended a military movement, this, in order to secure success, should have been kept secret until the hour had arrived for carrying it into execution. The substance of them, however, soon reached the Southern people. Neither the headquarters of the army at
1868 AD (search for this): chapter 6
p scarcely be too strongly stated; but I will only add, that as often as we have been obliged to withdraw troops from one frontier in order to reeinforce another, the weakened points have been instantly attacked or threatened with formidable invasion. The President, feeling the force of such appeals, and urged by the earnest entreaties of the suffering people on the frontiers, recommended to Congress, through the War Department, to raise five additional regiments. Senate Documents, 1857-68, vol. III, p. 4. This, like all other recommendations to place the country in a proper state of defence, was disregarded From what has been stated it is manifest that it was impossible to garrison the numerous forts of the United States with regular troops. This will account for the destitute condition of the nine forts enumerated by General Scott, as well as of all the rest. When our system of fortifications was planned and carried into execution, it was never contemplated to provide gar
1859 AD (search for this): chapter 6
miles, I respectfully suggest an augmentation of at least one regiment of horse (dragoons, cavalry, or riflemen) and at least three regiments of foot (infantry or riflemen). This augmentation would not more than furnish the reenforcements now greatly needed in Florida, Texas, New Mexico, California, Oregon, Washington Territory, Kansas, Nebraska, and Minnesota, leaving not a company for Utah. Again, General Scott, in his report of November 13, 1858, says: Senate Executive Documents, 1858-59, vol. II., part 3, p. 761. This want of troops to give reasonable security to our citizens in distant settlements, including emigrants on the plains, cap scarcely be too strongly stated; but I will only add, that as often as we have been obliged to withdraw troops from one frontier in order to reeinforce another, the weakened points have been instantly attacked or threatened with formidable invasion. The President, feeling the force of such appeals, and urged by the earnest entreaties of
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