Browsing named entities in Adam Badeau, Military history of Ulysses S. Grant from April 1861 to April 1865. Volume 1. You can also browse the collection for Gulf of Mexico or search for Gulf of Mexico in all documents.

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Introduction. the original thirteen states that composed the American Union had grown in the course of eighty years to thirty-four; the territory, which had at first been limited to a narrow strip along the Atlantic coast, had spread to the Pacific ocean, and embraced a region as wide as the mightiest empires of the Old World; from the chain of great lakes on the north, to the Gulf of Mexico on the south, the republic stretched out a thousand miles across. This land abounded in untold agricultural and mineral wealth; commerce enriched the portions bordering on the sea, manufactures thrived; the taxes were inconsiderable, and a national debt almost unknown, and a degree of material prosperity was attained entirely without precedent. Education was more widely diffused than in any country since the invention of letters, the influence of religion was universally acknowledged, the rich and the poor were equal before the law, and every male citizen had a share in the government. The
bout nine miles lower down than Pittsburg Landing, and on the opposite side of the river; he, however, selected the spot where the battle of Shiloh afterwards occurred. The object of the concentration of troops at these places, was to secure positions which would command the navigation of the Tennessee, and, at the same time, form bases for operations in northern Alabama and Mississippi; Corinth, especially, where the two great railroads meet, that traverse the South, and connect the Gulf of Mexico and the Mississippi with the eastern part of the region then in rebellion, was a position of the first strategic importance, sure to be obstinately defended by the rebels, and the objective point of any operations of the national commanders. It was the key to the whole railroad system of communication between the great states of Tennessee and Mississippi, and, consequently, to the possession of Tennessee itself, covering Memphis and the Mississippi river from the national armies. Pitts
shed last. He seemed unable to appreciate the fact, that if the main objects of the war were gained, the lesser ones were sure to follow; or even the purely military maxim, that strategic points of the highest consequence should be first secured. Had Grant's suggestion been acted on, and a campaign against Mobile promptly authorized, before the rebels had time to recover from the stunning effects of the blow dealt them at Vicksburg, the only port then closed to national vessels in the Gulf of Mexico would undoubtedly have fallen at once, and a base have been secured for important operations towards the north. It is not improbable that the capture of Mobile, at that time, would have shortened the war by a year. But this was not allowed. On the 24th of July, Grant renewed his suggestion: It seems to me that Mobile is the point deserving the most immediate attention. And, on the 1st of August, he telegraphed to Halleck: Mobile can be taken from the Gulf Department, with only one
was an immense bastion at the centre of Grant's line, flanked on one side by the Tennessee valley, and on the other by the mountains of northern Georgia and Alabama. In its front, but a hundred and fifty miles south, lay Atlanta, at the junction of as many important railroads as Chattanooga; and, covered by Atlanta, were Selma, with its arsenals, Montgomery, with its great stores of cotton, Macon, Mobile, and all the rich central valley that extends from the Cumberland mountains to the Gulf of Mexico. On the 23d of September, immediately after the defeat of Rosecrans, Halleck detached the Eleventh and Twelfth corps from the Army of the Potomac, and sent them by rail, under command of Major-General Hooker, to protect Rosecrans's railroad line of communication between Bridgeport and Nashville. These troops, however, were not ordered further than Bridgeport, as their presence at Chattanooga would only have increased the embarrassment of those who could not themselves be fully suppli