Browsing named entities in Adam Badeau, Military history of Ulysses S. Grant from April 1861 to April 1865. Volume 1. You can also browse the collection for Walker or search for Walker in all documents.

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this time approached within fifty or sixty yards. Grape and canister were poured into them with good effect, mowing the men down in swaths. After nearly all the troops had reembarked, and were about ready to start, a sudden attack was made upon the transport vessels by an apparently large reinforcement of rebels. Our boats being in good position, we opened fire with our grape and canister, and five-second shells, and completely routed them, we learn, with great slaughter. Report of Lieutenant Walker, commanding naval force. The enemy fortunately fired too high, and a storm of shot passed over the hurricane deck, but wounded only three men, and killed none. By five o'clock, the last transport was out of range, officers and men equally elated with the idea of having gained a victory. The next day, under a flag of truce, Grant met an old West Point comrade, who had become a rebel, and was serving on Polk's staff. Grant mentioned having ridden out and met the rebel line. Was tha
nformation Brigadier-General Gregg was ordered not to attack the enemy until he was engaged at Edward's or the bridge, but to be ready to fall on his rear or flank at any moment. Pemberton's Report. Pemberton also sent telegrams, on the 12th, to Johnston and Mr. Jefferson Davis, announcing: The enemy is apparently moving his heavy force towards Edward's depot on Southern railroad. With my limited force I will do all I can to meet him. That will be the battle-place. Reenforcements under Walker were also ordered up from Jackson to the support of Gregg. But Grant, instead of assaulting the main rebel force concentrate ing to meet him on his left, pushed out with his right under McPherson, and destroyed the opposition at Raymond, where he met only a detachment of the enemy. He thus completely opened the road to Jackson, avoided a battle where he did not care to fight, in order to fight where the enemy was unprepared, and, for the second time since the campaign had begun, divided t
ed an attack, and he must make his election, in case the attack occurred. If he decided to hold Chickamauga, he must yield the mountain, and throw his whole force between the encroaching wing of Grant's army and the southern railroad. If he gave the preference to Lookout, then the railroad in his rear, and the depot of his supplies, must be abandoned. In this emergency, he acted with indecision, and weakened his left, without sufficiently strengthening the right; withdrawing one division (Walker's) from Lookout, on the night of the 23d, but leaving still six brigades on the mountain; enough to make a struggle on the left that could only end in failure, while he did not add enough to his right to make that flank secure. He probably could not bring himself to admit that Lookout mountain must really be abandoned; he could not acknowledge to himself and his army, that he was now really on the defensive, before the antagonist whom he had threatened so long. But the great drama went o