Browsing named entities in Adam Badeau, Military history of Ulysses S. Grant from April 1861 to April 1865. Volume 3. You can also browse the collection for Hood or search for Hood in all documents.

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tional forces retreat of Early, whirling through Winchester pursuit by Sheridan battle of Fisher's Hill Second defeat of Early further retreat of rebels effect of success at the North Grant's orders to Sheridan Early abandons the Valley censures of Lee disappointment in Richmond. Atlanta had fallen, the Weldon road was carried, and Early's exit from the Valley had been barred, but the end was not yet. A long and tedious prospect still stretched out before the national commander. Hood's army was not destroyed, the rebels were in force in Sheridan's front, and Lee had not abandoned Richmond. Grant looked the situation full in the face, and lost no time in adapting his plans to the actual emergencies. On the 8th of September, Sherman had entered Atlanta in person, and on the 10th, he was instructed: As soon as your men are sufficiently rested, and preparations can be made, it is desirable that another campaign should be commenced. We want to keep the enemy constantly pre
on development of views of the two commanders Hood moves to rear and threatens Sherman's communicaomptly reported the new manoeuvre of the enemy: Hood is falling back from Lovejoy's, but I will not me out, if alive. On the 29th of September, Hood crossed the Chattahoochee, and on this day Gran1st of October, Sherman reported the advance of Hood, and added: If he tries to get on my road this t out into an enemy's country, ignorant whether Hood would follow or not, and to push into the inter Sherman said to him: There is no doubt some of Hood's infantry is across the Chattahoochee, but I d His hope was to interpose this corps between Hood and the detachment of five thousand rebels now ards the Savannah; but Grant then supposed that Hood would be in front, and that Sherman would be obe through Georgia, smashing things, to the sea. Hood may turn into Tennessee and Kentucky, but I belfore the march was made. Sherman declared that Hood would follow him; Grant was certain that the re[41 more...]
es audacious in design or incessant in attack, at others he was cautious, and deliberate, and restrained; and none knew better than he when to remain immovable under negative or apparently unfavorable circumstances. At present he believed the proper course in front of Petersburg to be—to steadily extend the investment towards the Southside road, while annoying and exhausting the enemy by menaces and attacks at various points, preventing the possibility of Lee's detaching in support of either Hood or Early, and himself waiting patiently till the moment should come to strike a blow like those he had dealt earlier in the war. To many this task would have been more unacceptable because, while the chief was lying comparatively inactive in front of Richmond, the subordinates were fighting important battles and winning brilliant victories elsewhere. Sherman had captured Atlanta, and Sheridan had overrun the Valley, while Thomas was entrusted with a command where the mightiest issues wer
go into Tennessee. I hope he will. Again: If Hood wants to go into Tennessee, west of Huntsville,t once. . . If it is found that the enemy under Hood or Beauregard have actually attempted an invasipatch is received. If I could hope to overhaul Hood, I would turn against him with my whole force; hich we have an interest, and he has orders, if Hood turns to follow me, to push for Selma. No singt, the siege of Richmond was declared hopeless; Hood was certain to cross the Ohio, and Sherman could him adieu, and turning his back on Thomas and Hood, Sherman set out on his march to the sea. Thth for Sherman, to intercept reinforcements for Hood, and to concentrate whatever force it was possiandon all minor points, if you expect to defeat Hood. He will not attack posts, but march around thTwenty-third corps was for a while divided; but Hood took no advantage of the opportunity, and Stanlry, Schofield's force was therefore inferior to Hood's; but when the reinforcements from all quarter[70 more...]
Yours of 4 P. M. yesterday just received. Hood's entire army is in front of Columbia, and so gs 800—in all, about 4,300 men.—Wilson's Report. Hood's force was at least thirty thousand infantry aver, to me. In my opinion Thomas far outnumbers Hood in infantry. In cavalry Hood has the advantage nothing to show that any force was included in Hood's army, outside of this return, except Forrest't four P. M. on the 6th, he telegraphed: Attack Hood at once, and wait no longer for a remount of yo his line of battle on the morning of the 16th, Hood was first able to collect some of his scattered In the meantime, the main column came up with Hood's rear-guard, four miles north of Franklin, ansuers, which was not regained. From Pulaski, Hood moved by the most direct roads to Bainbridge, o: It has been hard work to get Thomas to attack Hood. I gave him the most peremptory order, and hadght have been saved: the proof of which is that Hood, instead of striking Thomas, remained to receiv[157 more...]<
the 13th of December, he reopened it with Foster and the fleet. In these thirty-one days he had utterly destroyed two hundred miles of railroad, breaking up every connection between the rebel forces east and west of Georgia. No report from General Hood since the 20th ult.—Beauregard to Richmond, December 13. He had consumed the corn and fodder, as well as the cattle, hogs, sheep, and poultry, in a region sixty miles wide, carried away more than ten thousand horses and mules, and liberated countless numbers of slaves. Many of the stores and provisions were essential to the armies of Hood and Lee. The damage done to the state of Georgia he estimated at one hundred millions of dollars, of which twenty millions inured to the national advantage; the remainder was simple waste and destruction. Sixty-five thousand men and thirty-five thousand animals had obtained abundant food for forty days, and the troops reached the coast, needing no provisions but bread. They started with five thou
had reached the sea, and Thomas had annihilated Hood; when the supplies from foreign sympathizers ansame sad story. Hardee and Early and Bragg and Hood were unanimous. The injuries done to crops andn attempt was made to collect the fragments of Hood's disorganized army and transport them to the Eion of new armies from their broken fragments. Hood is now retreating, with his army broken and demmas, if he is assured of the departure south of Hood from Corinth, to send Schofield here with his cwo, rebel armies; for not only the fragments of Hood's command, and the garrison of Savannah, and al our cavalry should not have taken advantage of Hood's and Forrest's forces being on furlough. Theyousand, exclusive of Cheatham and Stewart [from Hood's army], not likely to reach in time. If Lee ain that direction, where Cheatham's corps, from Hood's army, was now expected to make a junction wit command, with a reinforcement from the army of Hood, was in front of Schofield, and before the nat[10 more...]
is bitter and personal enemy; and the chagrin of the general who was relieved by Hood was avenged by the anguish of the fallen chief, deserted and disobeyed by the sucommand. In September, Sherman captured Atlanta, but he still had the army of Hood to contend with; and although he had won a victory, as yet reaped none of its results. On the contrary, by the advance of Hood he was speedily placed in a more precarious position than before Atlanta fell. But his brilliant strategical genius,r sent to the Valley dealt him blow after blow. These two northward advances of Hood and Early gave an appearance of boldness to the rebel strategy, and were calculated to impose on unwary or impatient opponents. Hood and Early both conceived audacious plans, but failed utterly in their accomplishment. They were typical of the nent and then marched northward, driving Johnston; Thomas destroyed or scattered Hood; Sheridan had beaten and battered Early's army, literally, into pieces. Only th
ops of this year are being collected at Demopolis, Selma, Montgomery, and other points for the use of the rebel army. By moving on that line they will be converted to our use or be destroyed; by moving on Augusta they will be left for the use of Hood's forces. I do not write this for the purpose of influencing your adoption of a particular plan of campaign, or of changing your decision, if you have adopted any plan, but simply to urge on you an early decision, if you have not already made omber of officers and men for battle, November 20, 1864, was59,584 The total number of officers and men for battle, November 30, 1864, was71,452 The total number of officers and men for battle, December 10, 1864, was70,272 The strength of General Hood's army, as per returns on file in the Archive office, on the 6th of November and 10th of December, 1864: November 6th. Effective total present 30,600 Total present40,740 Aggregate present 45,719 Total present and absent88,793 Aggregate
general command at West, III., 169; approves of Hood's advance into Tennessee, 203; summoned from thckade, efficiency of, III., 224, Blue Mountain, Hood at, III., 56 Bowen, General, defeat of at Po., 41; ordered to act against communications of Hood and Beauregard, 175; ordered to destroy factorirant at, i., 127; capture of by rebels, 138. Hood, General J. B., supersedes J. E. Johnston, II.,7; crosses the Chattahoochee, 538 superseded by Hood, 539; recalled from retirement, III., 356; supeober, 1864 III., 79, at Fort Fisher, 312; under Hood, November 1864, 188; battle of Franklin, 212, bo Thomas's command, 186; in command in front of Hood, 187; defence of Columbia, 207; battle of Spriniver, 539; in front of Atlanta, 543; repulse of Hood, 544; besieges Atlanta, 542-546; situation in G169-173. Taylor, General Richard, supersedes Hood, III.; 270; calls for more troops, 287; surrend at battle of Nashville, 253-258; in pursuit of Hood, 259; campaign into Alabama, 637, 638. Wood,[6 more...]