Browsing named entities in The Daily Dispatch: November 3, 1863., [Electronic resource]. You can also browse the collection for Rosecrans or search for Rosecrans in all documents.

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Federal Government has just committed its second greatest blunder. I allude to the removal of Rosecrans and the appointment of Thomas to succeed him. McClellan is the best organizer of forces among all the Federal officers; Rosecrans the ablest campaigner and the best fighter. A great blunder was committed when the former was removed; a second blunder, almost as great, has just been made ular with the Confederates, and even Gen. Bragg does not object to it. Officers who have known Rosecrans and Thomas both well for many years say we have made a gain by the exchange equivalent to 10,000 men; in other words, that Rosecrans is the better man of the two by 10,000 men. Thomas is a good fighter when he gets warmed up to the work; but ordinarily he is a slow man, and possesses neither berland, Chattanooga, Oct. 20th, 1863. General --I regret to have to inform you that Gen. Rosecrans was relieved from duty with this army yesterday, and that I have been placed in command. Th
tting there by any route. On the face of the map there is certainly nothing in either the overland or the Peninsula line to Richmond that need much embarrass an advance. They are both good enough, and we do not know that there is much to choose between them. From the line of the Rappahannock, now held by our advance cavalry, the distance to Richmond is but sixty miles, with the advantage of a railroad and several rivers by which to supply an army — a task which, put into comparison with Rosecrans's great march from Murfreesboro' to Chattanooga, is but child's play. In the mere matter of the territorial march the Peninsula line is undoubtedly the shorter; but this route has the counterbalancing disadvantages which always attach to military operations dependent on a water line for a connection with the base of supplies. We take it that the question of an advance to Richmond is one which will be decided purely by military contingencies. If Lee ventures on the further subtraction of