I told him I had met and fought the advance of Beauregard's army, that he was advancing on us. General Sherman said it could not be possible, Beauregard was not such a fool as to leave his base of operations and attack us in ours — mere reconnaissance in force.
General Buell says that, so far as preparation for battle is concerned, no army could well have been taken more by surprise than was the Army, of the Tennessee on the 6th of April.
Buell's letter, dated January 19, 1865, to United States service Magazine, republished in the New York World, February 29, 1865.
Van Horne's Army of the Cumberland, to which General Sherman's special advocate, Mr. Moulton, refers the reader, for a fair and full history of this battle, has the following (page 105):
While the national army was unprepared for battle, and unexpectant of such an event, and was passing the night of the 5th in fancied security, Johnston's army of 40,000 men was in close proximity, and ready for the bloody r
to the attack.
These movements were construed by General Lew Wallace as a reconnaissance in force against his own division at Crump's Landing, and held him in check during the 5th and the 6th, the first day of the battle.
Breckinridge's three brigades — a division, in fact, but by courtesy a reserve corps-having received their orders on the afternoon of April 3d,
E. P. Thompson's History of the first Kentucky brigade, p. 87. moved from Burnsville on April 4th, at 3 A. M., by way of Farmington, toward Monterey, fourteen miles distant. Some Enfield rifles, with accoutrements and ammunition, just received, were distributed about nightfall to supply deficiencies, and rations were prepared during the night.
The road was even worse than those from Corinth.
The corps struggled painfully on, with poor progress.
After a hard day's march, it bivouacked on the road.
Part of the artillery was late at night reaching its position, owing to the difficulty of the road.