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Lexington, Va. (Virginia, United States) (search for this): chapter 45
visit and review the army this week, and, until his reply is received, the General cannot say when he can visit you. He is anxious to see you, and it will give him much pleasure to meet you and your corps once more. He hopes soon to be able to do this, and I will give you due notice when he can come. I really am beside myself, General, with joy of having you back. It is like the reunion of a family. Truly and respectfully yours, W. H. Taylor, A. A. G. To General Longstreet. Lexington, Va., March 9th, 1866. My Dear General:--Your son Garland handed me, a few days since, your letter of the 15th of January, with the copies of your reports of operations in East Tennessee, the Wilderness, etc., and of some of my official letters to you. I hope you will be able to send me a report of your operations around Suffolk and Richmond previous to the evacuation of that city, and of any of my general orders which you may be able to collect. Can you not occupy your leisure time in pr
Brandy Station (Virginia, United States) (search for this): chapter 45
broken through the advice of General Early, and that in this attack Hood's and McLaws' Divisions did the best fighting ever done on any field, and encountered and drove back virtually the whole of the Army of the Potomac. I held that the mistakes of the Gettysburg campaign were: First, the change of the original plan of the campaign, which was to so maneuvre as to force the Federals to attack us; second, that if the plan was to have been changed at all it — should have been done at Brandy Station, near Culpepper Court-House, when we could have caught Hooker in detail, and, probably, have crushed his army; third, that Stuart should never have been permitted to leave the main route of march, and thus send our army into the enemy's country without cavalry for reconnoissance or foraging purposes; fourth, that the crushing defeat inflicted on the advance of the Federal army in the casual encounter of the 1st, at Willoughby's run, should have been pushed to extremities, that occasion f
Mississippi (Mississippi, United States) (search for this): chapter 45
hat the Federal line in front of these troops was not broken so much by direct assault as by crushing in the lines on their left. General Humphreys was forced to change front, partially, two or three times to meet threatened flank movements against him, and he was in that way drawn off from immediate connection with his right. The skilful handling of these troops, commanded by General A. A. Humphreys, was noted at the time, and has been particularly noted since by General Humphries (of Mississippi). At this late day the official relations of General Lee and myself are brought into question. He is credited with having used uncomely remarks concerning me, in the presence of a number of subordinate officers, just on the eve of battle. It is hardly possible that any one acquainted with General Lee's exalted character will accept such statements as true. It is hardly possible that any general could have been so indiscreet as to have used such expressions under such circumstances. Th
Pennsylvania (Pennsylvania, United States) (search for this): chapter 45
The mistakes of Gettysburg. General James Longstreet. [Second article.] In my first article I declared that the invasion of Pennsylvania was a movement that General Lee and his council agreed should be defensive in tactics, while, of course, it was offensive in strategy: that the campaign was conducted on this plan until we had left Chambersburg, when, owing to the absence of our cavalry, and our consequent ignorance of the enemy's whereabouts, we collided with them unexpectedly, and that General Lee had lost the matchless equipoise that usually characterized him, and, through excitement and the doubt that enveloped the enemy's movements, changed the whole plan of the campaign, and delivered a battle under ominous circumstances. I declared that the battle of the 2d was not lost through the tardiness of the First Corps, but through the failure of the troops ordered to co-operate to do so; that there was no order ever issued for a sunrise attack; that no such order could have bee
Washington (United States) (search for this): chapter 45
moral effect in our favor would have been tremendous. To show that one of these results would certainly have followed, I quote a dispatch sent in cipher from General Meade to General Halleck just before my battle on the 2d. The dispatch reads: If not attacked, and I can get any positive information of the enemy which will justify me in doing so, I will attack. If I find it hazardous to do so, and am satisfied that the enemy is endeavoring to move to my rear and interpose between me and Washington, I shall fall back on my supplies at Westminster. If, however, no decisive result had followed immediately upon the flank movement that should have been made on the night of the 1st, or the morning of the 2d, the thirteen days that elapsed between our first rencontre and our recrossing of the Potomac would have surely given time and opportunity for different work and greater results than were had at Gettysburg. It is conceded by almost, if not quite, all authority on the subject, that
Virginia (Virginia, United States) (search for this): chapter 45
rch, a trifle over seventy thousand. On the 30th of June, or the 1st of July, he estimated his infantry at fifty-two thousand bayonets. If Mr. Swinton received any information from me on the subject, he received this, for it was all that I had. Since I have read the report of the Adjutant General of the Army of Northern Virginia, lately published, I am inclined to believe that General Lee included in his estimate two brigades of Pickett's Division (Jenkins' and Corse's) which were left in Virginia, or some other detachments made during the march. If this surmise is correct, it would make the total figures considerably less than I gave them. I am certain the real strength of his army cannot go above the number given in my first article. As to the strength of General Meade's army, I take his own statement for that. In his evidence taken before the Committee on the Conduct of the War (page 337 of their report), he says: My strength was a little under one hundred thousand-probably ni
Gettysburg (Pennsylvania, United States) (search for this): chapter 45
The mistakes of Gettysburg. General James Longstreet. [Second article.] In my first article I declared that the invasion of Pennsylvania was a movement that General Lee and his council agreed should be defensive in tactics, while, of course, iing of the Potomac would have surely given time and opportunity for different work and greater results than were had at Gettysburg. It is conceded by almost, if not quite, all authority on the subject, that Pickett's charge, on the 3d, was almostin the evening, when, of course, it should have been morning. I have now done, for the present, with the campaign of Gettysburg. What I have written about it has been compelled from me by a desire on the one hand to have future historians properlanswered them himself, and have set history right. But, even as the matter is, I do not fear the verdict of history on Gettysburg. Time sets all things right. Error lives but a day-truth is eternal. There is an incidental matter to which I sha
Jackson (Mississippi, United States) (search for this): chapter 45
high piece of ground, from which they had full view of the battle made against Jackson We could see the solid masses of the Federals forming for a charge against Jackson's weakening lines. They were gathered in immense force, and it seemed impossible that Jackson's thin lines could withstand the onset. The Federals moved forwardJackson's thin lines could withstand the onset. The Federals moved forward steadily, surging on in solid blocks, headed directly for Jackson's lines. Just then a courier arrived in great haste with orders from General Lee for me to hurry to the assistance of Jackson. It was in the very crisis of the battle. I had very serious. doubts about being able to reach General Jackson in time to be of any serJackson's lines. Just then a courier arrived in great haste with orders from General Lee for me to hurry to the assistance of Jackson. It was in the very crisis of the battle. I had very serious. doubts about being able to reach General Jackson in time to be of any service to him. I had no doubt, however, that I could impede or paralyze the immense mass of men that was pressing steadily to his overthrow. We were standing on the flank of the advancing columns. They swept on at right angles to our line of vision. They were within easy artillery range, and I felt certain that a heavy enfilading
Chambersburg, Pa. (Pennsylvania, United States) (search for this): chapter 45
actics, while, of course, it was offensive in strategy: that the campaign was conducted on this plan until we had left Chambersburg, when, owing to the absence of our cavalry, and our consequent ignorance of the enemy's whereabouts, we collided with thousand three hundred and fifty-two. I learn from General Longstreet that, when the three corps were concentrated at Chambersburg, the morning report showed sixty-seven thousand bayonets, or above seventy thousand of all arms. This statement is ceampaign, or even the leading points of it, must have known that the three corps of the army were never concentrated at Chambersburg at all; second, it is well known that any organization upon sixty-seven thousand bayonets would have involved an infane which need correction: The scout, upon whose information the head of our column was turned to the right, reported at Chambersburg on the night of the 28th of June. It is printed the 29th. Several orders that I issued on the 1st of July, and so da
Westminster (Maryland, United States) (search for this): chapter 45
dous. To show that one of these results would certainly have followed, I quote a dispatch sent in cipher from General Meade to General Halleck just before my battle on the 2d. The dispatch reads: If not attacked, and I can get any positive information of the enemy which will justify me in doing so, I will attack. If I find it hazardous to do so, and am satisfied that the enemy is endeavoring to move to my rear and interpose between me and Washington, I shall fall back on my supplies at Westminster. If, however, no decisive result had followed immediately upon the flank movement that should have been made on the night of the 1st, or the morning of the 2d, the thirteen days that elapsed between our first rencontre and our recrossing of the Potomac would have surely given time and opportunity for different work and greater results than were had at Gettysburg. It is conceded by almost, if not quite, all authority on the subject, that Pickett's charge, on the 3d, was almost hopeles
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