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s front a superb defensive position. Lee's army was practically concentrated on the night of the 1st, except his cavalry and Pickett's infantry division, Ewell and Hill in front of the enemy, and Loe rear. Meade and his Second Corps were at Taneytown, in Maryland, when the sun went down on the 1st, thirteen miles distant; the Fifth Corps, at Union Mills, twenty-three miles distant and the Sixt face to face sooner than contemplated. Meade received Hancock's report on the evening of the 1st, and determined in consequence to fight the battle at Gettysburg, and issued orders for the movemeft on picket on Marsh Creek, east of which stream Longstreet's corps bivouacked the night of the 1st, left its post after sunrise, passed through Hood's and McLaws's divisions, whose arms were stackom his cavalry; second, the omission of positive orders to Ewell to advance on the evening of the 1st, General Meade told General Ewell, after the war, had he occu-pied Culp's Hill at 4 P. M., Jul
ld bring his two fine corps, the Fifth and Sixth, on the field in time, and was solicitous about his depot of supplies at Westminster. As late as 3 P. M. on the 2d, and before he was attacked, he telegraphed in cipher to Halleck that if his enemy did not attack, and he finds it hazardous to do so, or is satisfied the enemy is It was clearly the duty of Longstreet to carry out his commander's views and not lapse into refractoriness. Lee might possibly have moved toward Frederick on the 2d, and thus forced Meade to fall back to Westminster, but he could not hope to reach Baltimore or Washington, or a point between these cities before Meade. From Westt corps and its supports was consummate daring. Longstreet, re-enforced by Pickett's three brigades, which arrived near the battlefield during the afternoon of the 2d, was ordered to attack next morning, said Lee, and General Ewell was directed to assail the enemy's right at the same time. During the night General Johnson was re
o knew the value of time, obeyed orders with promptness and without argument, Lee's movement on Meade's left could have commenced at seven or eight o'clock A. M., with all the chances for success, and there would probably have been no combat on the 3d. The Third Federal Corps was not all up at the hour the attack should have been made, or a division of the Fifth, or the reserve artillery, or the Sixth Corps. When McLaws and Hood advanced, eight or nine hours afterward, the conditions had chrom an excess of good-nature. The intelligent and impartial critic must admit the offensive dispositions of Lee skillful; the Union left on the 2d to a late hour was most vulnerable, and upon it the attack was designed; while the assault on the 3d, if not surrounded with as many chances of success as on the former day, was made at a point where, if successful, he would have secured the great roads to Baltimore and Washington. It was not unlike Napoleon's tactics at Waterloo; the artillery f
that the battle would have been gained if General Longstreet had obeyed the order given him and attacked early instead of late; that Longstreet was a brilliant soldier when once engaged, but the hardest man to move in my army. At 1 A. M. on the 4th General Imboden was sent for by Lee to get orders about the movements of the trains and ambulances which his command was to escort to the Potomac, and says that Lee, after expressing his admiration for the splendid behavior of the troops in the grflank attack there. The Southern leader knew on the night of the 3d that he could no longer resume the offensive, and there was nothing to be done except to withdraw from Meade's front. While not declining but rather inviting an attack on the 4th, he had started his long trains, his prisoners and such of his wounded as could bear transportation, back to the Potomac at Williamsport under a cavalry escort, and was busy in burying his dead and gathering up the badly wounded for treatment. At
midst of a heavy rain storm, the army was put in motion by the Fairfield road which crossed the South Mountain range seven miles south of Cashtown, being the direct road to Williamsport; but the rain and mud so impeded progress that the rear corps-Ewell's-did not leave Gettysburg until late in the forenoon of the 5th. With the exception of the loss of some wagons and ambulances by cavalry attacks, there was no interruption to the retrograde movement. Lee reached Hagerstown, Md., on the 6th, the same day his trains arrived at Williamsport, a few miles distant. On account of the swollen condition of the Potomac from recent rains, and the destruction of the pontoon bridge at Falling Waters, a short distance below, by a roving detachment sent by French at Harper's Ferry, Lee could not cross his impedimenta or his army over the river, but sent the wounded and prisoners over in boats. Calm and quiet as usual, he had a line of defense skillfully traced to cover the river from Willi
ly hope and refuge, will not desert us in this hour of need, and will deliver us by his almighty hand, that the whole world may recognize his power, and all hearts be lifted up in adoration and praise of his unbounded loving-kindness. We must, however, submit to his almighty will whatever that may be. May God guide and protect us all is my constant prayer. The Federal commander could not decide to attack Lee, though he had been heavily re-enforced, and called another council of war on the 13th. All his corps commanders opposed attacking except two. Later that day Halleck telegraphed him to call no council of war. It is proverbial that councils of war never fight. Don't let the enemy escape. The Washington assaults had been so continuous that the Union commander, in spite of the council's decision, advanced his army on the 14th with a view of attacking, if justified by a closer examination; but on the night of the 13th the Army of Northern Virginia recrossed the river at Willia
has created great dissatisfaction in the mind of the President, said Halleck, and it will require an energetic pursuit on your part to remove the impression that it has not been sufficiently active heretofore. To a high — minded, meritorious, conscientious officer like Meade this censure was irritating. His request to be immediately relieved was declined on the ground that the dispatch was intended as a stimulus. The river was still deep though fordable. Ewell crossed by 8 A. M. on the 14th, but the passage of Longstreet and Hill was not completed until! P. M. Had Meade made a vigorous attack in the forenoon he might have defeated and captured the portion of Lee's army which had not yet crossed. About 1 A. M. his cavalry, supported by artillery, appeared in front of Heth's division, which, acting as rear guard, was first encountered, and Brigadier-General Pettigrew, an officer of great promise and merit, was killed. As soon as the bridge was clear Hill began to cross. The a
Hanover, Pa., while Buford's cavalry guarded his left. Lee was rapidly concentrating. Longstreet and Hill were then near Cashtown, Hill's advance (Heth's division) being seven miles from Gettysburg, and Ewell at Heidelburg, nine miles away. Had Lee known of the defensive position at Gettysburg, he could have easily massed his whole army on July 1st there; but he was in no hurry to precipitate a battle, and would have preferred to fight at some point not so far from his base. On the 30th Pettigrew, commanding a brigade of Heth's division, Hill's corps, was directed to march to Gettysburg to get shoes for the barefooted men of the division, but returned the same evening without them and reported that Gettysburg was occupied by the Federal cavalry, and that drums were heard beating on the other side of the town. So Heth told Hill if he had no objection, he would take his whole division there the next day, July 1st, and get the shoes, to which Hill replied, None in the world.
from his office in Washington, urged him to Push forward and fight Lee before he can cross the Potomac. And Mr. Lincoln was cramming him with the comforting information that Vicksburg, on the Mississippi, had surrendered to Grant on July 4th, and that if Lee's army could be destroyed, the rebellion would be over. While waiting at Williamsport General Lee received the news of the capture (by raiding Federal cavalry) of his son, General W. H. F. Lee, who was wounded at Brandy Station on June 10th, and had been taken to Hickory Hill, the residence of the Wickhams, near Hanover Court House. He wrote Mrs. Lee: I have heard with great grief that Fitzhugh has been captured by the enemy. Had not expected that he would have been taken from his bed and carried off; but we must bear this additional affliction with fortitude and resignation, and not repine at the will of God. It will eventuate in some good that we know not of now. We must all bear our labors and hardships manfully. Our n
he had not much time to get any knowledge of them from Hooker, while a battle in the next few days could not be avoided. He determined to continue the move northward through Maryland into Pennsylvania, and force Lee to give battle before he could cross the Susquehanna. After two days march, he received information that Lee was concentrating and coming toward him, and he at once began to prepare the line of Pipe Creek to await his approach and fight a defensive battle. On the night of June 30th his headquarters and reserve artillery were at Taneytown; the First Corps, at Marsh Creek, six miles from Longstreet and Hill at Cashtown; the Eleventh Corps, at Emmittsburg; Third, at Bridgeport; Twelfth, at Littletown; Second, at Uniontown; Fifth, at Union Mill; Sixth, at Winchester, Md., with Gregg's cavalry, that being his extreme right. Kilpatrick's cavalry division was at Hanover, Pa., while Buford's cavalry guarded his left. Lee was rapidly concentrating. Longstreet and Hill w
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