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Chickamauga Station (Tennessee, United States) (search for this): chapter 26
If he had been sent directly to Chattanooga as rapidly as he could march, leaving two or three divisions along the line of the railroad from Nashville forward, he could have arrived with but little fighting, and would have saved much of the loss of life which was afterwards incurred in gaining Chattanooga. Bragg would then not have had time to raise an army to contest the possession of middle and east Tennessee and Kentucky; the battles of Stone River [Stone's River or Murfreesboro] and Chickamauga would not necessarily have been fought; Burnside would not have been besieged in Knoxville without the power of helping himself or escaping; the battle of Chattanooga would not have been fought. These are the negative advantages, if the term negative is applicable, which would probably have resulted from prompt movements after Corinth fell into the possession of the National forces. The positive results might have been: a bloodless advance to Atlanta, to Vicksburg, or to any other desir
Mississippi (United States) (search for this): chapter 26
Army Separated General Halleck arrived at Pittsburg landing on the 11th of April and immediately assumed command in the field. On the 21st General Pope arrived with an army 30,000 strong, fresh from the capture of Island Number10 in the Mississippi River. He went into camp at Hamburg landing five miles above Pittsburg. Halleck had now three armies: the Army of the Ohio, Buell commanding; the Army of the Mississippi, Pope commanding; and the Army of the Tennessee [Grant]. His orders divideof the Tennessee was not engaged in any of these movements. The Confederates were now driven out of West Tennessee, and on the 6th of June, after a well-contested naval battle, the National forces took possession of Memphis and held the Mississippi river from its source to that point. The railroad from Columbus to Corinth was at once put in good condition and held by us. We had garrisons at Donelson, Clarksville and Nashville, on the Cumberland river, and held the Tennessee river from its
Farmington (Mississippi, United States) (search for this): chapter 26
and consequently got loose as it were at times. On the 3d of May he was at Seven Mile Creek with the main body of his command, but threw forward a division to Farmington, within four miles of Corinth. His troops had quite a little engagement at Farmington on that day, but carried the place with considerable loss to the enemy. Farmington on that day, but carried the place with considerable loss to the enemy. There would then have been no difficulty in advancing the centre and right so as to form a new line well up to the enemy, but Pope was ordered back to conform with the general line. On the 8th of May he moved again, taking his whole force to Farmington, and pushed out two divisions close to the rebel line. Again he was ordered bFarmington, and pushed out two divisions close to the rebel line. Again he was ordered back. By the 4th of May the centre and right wing reached Monterey, twelve miles out. Their advance was slow from there, for they intrenched with every forward movement. The left wing moved up again on the 25th of May and intrenched itself close to the enemy. The creek, with the marsh before described, separated the two lines.
John Pope (search for this): chapter 26
ately assumed command in the field. On the 21st General Pope arrived with an army 30,000 strong, fresh from tOhio, Buell commanding; the Army of the Mississippi, Pope commanding; and the Army of the Tennessee [Grant]. Huell commanded the centre, the Army of the Ohio; and Pope the left wing, the Army of the Mississippi. I was n after the battle of Shiloh. In fact the arrival of Pope should not have been awaited. There was no time froenerally, if not all the time, with the right wing. Pope being on the extreme left did not see so much of hist so as to form a new line well up to the enemy, but Pope was ordered back to conform with the general line. ht now rested west on the Mobile and Ohio railroad. Pope's left commanded the Memphis and Charleston railroad the centre and right, ready to advance at daylight, Pope would find no natural obstacle in his front and, I bhe occupation of Corinth by the National troops, General Pope was sent in pursuit of the retreating garrison a
W. T. Sherman (search for this): chapter 26
side to pass on our left, became a very slight obstacle on our right. Here the enemy occupied two positions. One of them, as much as two miles out from his main line, was on a commanding elevation and defended by an intrenched battery with infantry supports. A heavy wood intervened between this work and the National forces. In rear to the south there was a clearing extending a mile or more, and south of this clearing a log-house which had been loop-holed and was occupied by infantry. Sherman's division carried these two positions with some loss to himself, but with probably greater to the enemy, on the 28th of May [27th], and on that day the investment of Corinth was complete, or as complete as it was ever made. Thomas' right now rested west on the Mobile and Ohio railroad. Pope's left commanded the Memphis and Charleston railroad east of Corinth. Some days before I had suggested to the commanding general that I thought if he would move the Army of the Mississippi at nigh
John A. Logan (search for this): chapter 26
sippi at night, by the rear of the centre and right, ready to advance at daylight, Pope would find no natural obstacle in his front and, I believed, no serious artificial one. The ground, or works, occupied by our left could be held by a thin picket line, owing to the stream and swamp in front. To the right the troops would have a dry ridge to march over. I was silenced so quickly that I felt that possibly I had suggested an unmilitary movement. Later, probably on the 28th of May, General Logan, whose command was then on the Mobile and Ohio railroad, said to me that the enemy had been evacuating for several days and that if allowed he could go into Corinth with his brigade. Trains of cars were heard coming in and going out of Corinth constantly. Some of the men who had been engaged in various capacities on railroads before the war claimed that they could tell, by putting their ears to the rail, not only which way the trains were moving but which trains were loaded and which w
Albert Sidney Johnston (search for this): chapter 26
have left if pushed. The demoralization among the Confederates from their defeats at Henry and Donelson; their long marches from Bowling Green, Columbus, and Nashville, and their failure at Shiloh; in fact from having been driven out of Kentucky and Tennessee, was so great that a stand for the time would have been impossible. Beauregard made strenuous efforts to reinforce himself and partially succeeded. He appealed to the people of the Southwest for new regiments, and received a few. A. S. Johnston had made efforts to reinforce in the same quarter, before the battle of Shiloh, but in a different way. He had Negroes sent out to him to take the place of teamsters, company cooks and laborers in every capacity, so as to put all his white men into the ranks. The people, while willing to send their sons to the field, were not willing to part with their Negroes. It is only fair to state that they probably wanted their blacks to raise supplies for the army and for the families left at ho
Vicksburg Bragg (search for this): chapter 26
e of the Memphis and Charleston railroad. This he was ordered to repair as he advanced-only to have it destroyed by small guerilla bands or other troops as soon as he was out of the way. If he had been sent directly to Chattanooga as rapidly as he could march, leaving two or three divisions along the line of the railroad from Nashville forward, he could have arrived with but little fighting, and would have saved much of the loss of life which was afterwards incurred in gaining Chattanooga. Bragg would then not have had time to raise an army to contest the possession of middle and east Tennessee and Kentucky; the battles of Stone River [Stone's River or Murfreesboro] and Chickamauga would not necessarily have been fought; Burnside would not have been besieged in Knoxville without the power of helping himself or escaping; the battle of Chattanooga would not have been fought. These are the negative advantages, if the term negative is applicable, which would probably have resulted from
H. W. Halleck (search for this): chapter 26
ield-The Advance upon Corinth-Occupation of Corinth- The Army Separated General Halleck arrived at Pittsburg landing on the 11th of April and immediately assumed ippi River. He went into camp at Hamburg landing five miles above Pittsburg. Halleck had now three armies: the Army of the Ohio, Buell commanding; the Army of the he Ohio they were sent by General Buell without passing through my hands. General Halleck ordered me, verbally, to send in my report, but I positively declined on tfact that I made several applications during the siege to be relieved. General Halleck kept his headquarters generally, if not all the time, with the right wing.and fixed the 29th for the departure of his troops, and on the 30th of May General Halleck had his whole army drawn up prepared for battle and announced in orders th promptly on the arrival of reinforcements after the battle of Shiloh. General Halleck at once commenced erecting fortifications around Corinth on a scale to ind
A. E. Burnside (search for this): chapter 26
pidly as he could march, leaving two or three divisions along the line of the railroad from Nashville forward, he could have arrived with but little fighting, and would have saved much of the loss of life which was afterwards incurred in gaining Chattanooga. Bragg would then not have had time to raise an army to contest the possession of middle and east Tennessee and Kentucky; the battles of Stone River [Stone's River or Murfreesboro] and Chickamauga would not necessarily have been fought; Burnside would not have been besieged in Knoxville without the power of helping himself or escaping; the battle of Chattanooga would not have been fought. These are the negative advantages, if the term negative is applicable, which would probably have resulted from prompt movements after Corinth fell into the possession of the National forces. The positive results might have been: a bloodless advance to Atlanta, to Vicksburg, or to any other desired point south of Corinth in the interior of Missis
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