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ping the dust from their eyes, hastened on. The women nursed the sick and wounded, ate mule and horse meat, and bread made of spoiled flour, with parched corn boiled for coffee; but they listened to the whistling shells undaunted, nothing fearing except for the lives of those who were fighting far and near. General Grant telegraphed to Washington, on June 8th, Vicksburg is closely invested. I have a spare force of about 30,000 men with which to repel anything from the rear; and on the 11th, General Johnston telegraphed to Richmond: I have not at my disposal half the troops necessary. It is for the Government to determine what Department, if any, can furnish the reinforcements required. I cannot know here General Bragg's wants compared with mine. The Government can make such comparisons. As already stated, General Johnston had been assigned to the command of a geographical department that included the State of Tennessee, and therefore General Bragg's command was subject to
nt of co-intelligence was, will best appear from citing the important part of the despatches which passed between them. On May 13th, General Johnston, then at Jackson, sent the following despatch to General Pemberton, which was received on the 14th: I have lately arrived, and learn that Major-General Sherman is between us with four divisions at Clinton. It is important to reestablish communications, that you may be reinforced, if practicable. I come up on his rear at once. To beat such a detachment would be of immense value. The troops here could co-operate; all the strength you can quickly assemble should be brought. Time is all-important. On the same day, the 14th, General Pemberton, then at Bovina, replied: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your communication. I moved at once with whole available force, about sixteen thousand, leaving Vaughn's brigade, about fifteen hundred, at Big Black Bridge; Tilghman's brigade, fifteen hundred, now at Baldwin's
ck me, as I do not consider my force sufficient to justify an attack on the enemy in position, or to attempt to cut my way to Jackson. At this point your nearest communication would be through Raymond. The movement commenced at I P. M. on the 15th. General Pemberton states that the force at Clinton was an army corps, numerically greater than his whole available force in the field; that the enemy had at least an equal force to the south, on my right flank, which would be nearer Vicksburg than informed by the Executive that no more could be spared. To take from Bragg a force which would make this army fit to oppose Grant, would involve yielding Tennessee. It is for the Government to decide between this State and Tennessee. On the 15th he telegraphed, I consider saving Vicksburg hopeless. To this last despatch the Secretary of War replied on the 16th: Your telegram grieves and alarms us. Vicksburg must not be lost, at least without a struggle. The interest and honor of the Con
the movement proposed. I had, moreover, positive information that he was daily increasing his strength. I also learned, on reaching Edward's Depot, that one division of the enemy (A. J. Smith's) was at or near Dillon's. On the morning of the 16th, about 6.30 o'clock, Colonel Wirt Adams, commanding the cavalry, reported to General Pemberton that his pickets were skirmishing with the enemy on the Raymond road, in our front. At the same moment a courier arrived and delivered the following deo oppose Grant, would involve yielding Tennessee. It is for the Government to decide between this State and Tennessee. On the 15th he telegraphed, I consider saving Vicksburg hopeless. To this last despatch the Secretary of War replied on the 16th: Your telegram grieves and alarms us. Vicksburg must not be lost, at least without a struggle. The interest and honor of the Confederacy forbid it. I rely on you still to avert the loss. If better resource does not offer, you must hazard attack.
eneral Johnston to notify him of the retrograde movement. Just as the reverse movement commenced, the enemy opened fire with artillery and attacked Pemberton at Big Black, defeated, and forced him to retire to Vicksburg. On the morning of the 18th, the troops were, from right to left, on the defence, and 102 pieces of artillery, mostly field pieces, were placed in position. Grant's army appeared before the city on the 18th. Pemberton relied upon the co-operation of a relieving army bef18th. Pemberton relied upon the co-operation of a relieving army before any investment could be made, and had endeavored to secure supplies for the duration of an ordinary siege. On May 25th, General Grant telegraphed General Halleck at Washington: I can manage the force in Vicksburg and an attacking force of 30,000. My effective force is 50,000 ; and General Johnston telegraphed to Richmond that the troops he had at his disposal against Grant amounted to 24,000, not including Jackson's cavalry command. On May 18th, General Pemberton received by courie
aphed, I consider saving Vicksburg hopeless. To this last despatch the Secretary of War replied on the 16th: Your telegram grieves and alarms us. Vicksburg must not be lost, at least without a struggle. The interest and honor of the Confederacy forbid it. I rely on you still to avert the loss. If better resource does not offer, you must hazard attack. It may be made in concert with the garrison, if practicable, but otherwise without. By day or night, as you think best. And again, on the 21st: Only my convictions of almost imperative necessity for action induces the official despatch I have just sent you. On every ground I have great deference to your judgment and military genius, but I feel it right to share, if need be to take, the responsibility and leave you free to follow the most desperate course the occasion may demand. Rely upon it, the eyes and hopes of the whole Confederacy are upon you, with the full confidence that you will act, and with the sentiment that it were be
cuate Vicksburg and its dependences, and march to the northeast. Relying upon his Government and General Johnston to raise the siege, General Pemberton called a council of war, laid Johnston's communication before them, and requested their opinion. It was unanimous that it was impossible to withdraw the army from this position with such morale and materiel as to be of further service to the Confederacy. He then announced his decision to hold Vicksburg as long as possible. On May 19th two assaults were made, on the left and centre. Both were repulsed and heavy loss inflicted; the enemy then confined himself to gradual approaches and mining. Our loss was small. How to dispose of the women and children during the siege was a problem which could be solved in only one way, viz., they must stay at home. Their fathers, husbands, brothers, or sons were many of them in the army of Northern Virginia, or in the West. The money left with their families was all exhausted; all ind
between that place and the position occupied by General Pemberton's forces, about thirty miles distant, he halted there and opened correspondence with Pemberton, from which a confusion with consequent disaster resulted, which might have been avoided had he, with or without reinforcements, proceeded to Pemberton's headquarters in the field. What the confusion or want of co-intelligence was, will best appear from citing the important part of the despatches which passed between them. On May 13th, General Johnston, then at Jackson, sent the following despatch to General Pemberton, which was received on the 14th: I have lately arrived, and learn that Major-General Sherman is between us with four divisions at Clinton. It is important to reestablish communications, that you may be reinforced, if practicable. I come up on his rear at once. To beat such a detachment would be of immense value. The troops here could co-operate; all the strength you can quickly assemble should be
n the co-operation of a relieving army before any investment could be made, and had endeavored to secure supplies for the duration of an ordinary siege. On May 25th, General Grant telegraphed General Halleck at Washington: I can manage the force in Vicksburg and an attacking force of 30,000. My effective force is 50,000 ; and General Johnston telegraphed to Richmond that the troops he had at his disposal against Grant amounted to 24,000, not including Jackson's cavalry command. On May 18th, General Pemberton received by courier a communication from General Johnston containing these words: If Hayne's Bluff is untenable, Vicksburg is of no value and cannot be held. If you are invested in Vicksburg you must ultimately surrender. Under these circumstances, instead of losing both troops and place, we must if possible save the troops. If it is not too late, evacuate Vicksburg and its dependences, and march to the northeast. Relying upon his Government and General Johnston to
te, evacuate Vicksburg and its dependences, and march to the northeast. Relying upon his Government and General Johnston to raise the siege, General Pemberton called a council of war, laid Johnston's communication before them, and requested their opinion. It was unanimous that it was impossible to withdraw the army from this position with such morale and materiel as to be of further service to the Confederacy. He then announced his decision to hold Vicksburg as long as possible. On May 19th two assaults were made, on the left and centre. Both were repulsed and heavy loss inflicted; the enemy then confined himself to gradual approaches and mining. Our loss was small. How to dispose of the women and children during the siege was a problem which could be solved in only one way, viz., they must stay at home. Their fathers, husbands, brothers, or sons were many of them in the army of Northern Virginia, or in the West. The money left with their families was all exhausted; a
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