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Chancellorsville (Virginia, United States) (search for this): chapter 9
at the close of April, 1863, just before Chancellorsville, for the enemy had then begun his movemento Pennsylvania, by reason of the loss at Chancellorsville and at Fredericksburg at the same time. difficult task, and its recent success at Chancellorsville had inspired the whole of that army with recruited to supply the loss incurred at Chancellorsville, and the diminution from the expiration o of the Southern arms at Gaines' Mill and Chancellorsville --in which I understand you to mean by co of the Southern arms at Gaines' Mill and Chancellorsville. 4th. I do not understand why Lee, h position in this (Stafford) county after Chancellorsville. 2d. The desire to manoeuvre it to a sadversary severely checked, it is true, at Chancellorsville, but with ample means of quickly repairine the results of the advantages gained at Chancellorsville. It was to yield a large part of the bes Confederates success at Gaines' Mill and Chancellorsville. This is entirely true. For some reason
J. William Jones (search for this): chapter 9
ur own deductions. Very respectfully, &c., (Signed) A. L. L. Long. Letter from General Fitz. Lee. Richland, Stafford co., Va., March 5th, 1877. Rev. J. Wm. Jones, Secretary Southern Historical Society: My dear Sir: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter enclosing a copy of a communication from -tice to Stuart, it may be said that he had calculated upon the brigade of Jenkins and White's batallion of cavalry, which accompanied Generals Ewell and Early, and Jones' and Robertson's brigades, which were left to guard the passes of the Blue Ridge, and were to rejoin General Lee as soon as the enemy crossed the river, to do all Fitzhugh Lee. Letter from Colonel William Allan, of Ewell's staff. McDoNOUGH School, Owings' Mill, Baltimore county, Md., April 26th, 1877. Rev. J. W. Jones, D. D. My dear Sir: The questions asked in the letter ofof January 21st, 1877, in regard to Gettysburg, are more or less fully discussed in my article on Get
A. Lincoln (search for this): chapter 9
ve required us to defend a line extending entirely around the States east of the Mississippi, with very inadequate resources. If we had had troops and resources in money, provisions, and munitions of war enough to defend this entire line, we might have accomplished the pecuniary exhaustion of the North, which you think should have been our policy; but our men, our resources, and, above all, our faith would have been exhausted long before we could have accomplished the desired result. Mr. Lincoln had announced his purpose to keep a-pegging until the rebellion was suppressed, and Gen. Grant subsequently announced the same policy in rather different language, to-wit: To hammer continuously again st the armed force of the enemy and his resources, until, by mere attrition, if by nothing else, there should be nothing left to him but an equal submission with the loyal section of our common country to the constitution and laws of the land. Under this pegging-hammer process, we must ine
James Longstreet (search for this): chapter 9
o, you will find that the troops threatening Longstreet's right were really only two brigades of cav controversy that arose last year between Gen. Longstreet and myself, which was produced by an artibut as this ground was to be.the position of Longstreet's corps, and as the withdrawal of troops forroceeded in person to hasten the movement of Longstreet. He was, however, met on the way with the welcome tidings that Longstreet's troops were in motion. Finding a convenient point, General Lee waing at the point of action, it was found that Longstreet was still absent. While waiting a Federal simpatience again urged him to go in quest of Longstreet. After proceeding about a mile, we discoverwrong direction. It was four o'clock before Longstreet was in position to attack. I here conclukett on the 3d should never have been made. Longstreet seems to think that it was imposed upon him hed by the Southern Historical Society, that Longstreet deferred it so long that the Second corps co[39 more...]
Grant (search for this): chapter 9
to the relative strength of the armies of Generals Lee and Grant, in which is embodied, on pafe 16, a table of returns of tho keep a-pegging until the rebellion was suppressed, and Gen. Grant subsequently announced the same policy in rather differance when the blockade was evaded. The large army under Grant, besieging Vicksburg and Port Hudson, could very readily haending me on it was to induce the withdrawal of troops from Grant's army, and eventually the abandonment of the siege of Richfantry and two divisions of cavalry that had been sent from Grant's army. My observation did not lead me to the conclusiothern Virginia was able to meet and cope with an army under Grant, originally of nearly if not quite thrice its numbers, whicthe James or York rivers within a few miles of Richmond, as Grant did subsequently, and by the operations of a siege, slowly,e Federals for a time and threw them back one year. General Grant found the Army of the Potomac in May, 1864, pretty much
Charles S. Venable (search for this): chapter 9
ettysburg, based upon conversations with other officers, including the Commanding-General himself, and the perusal of official reports and histories of both sides. Among the soldiers now living, and who are accessible, and who know most about that campaign on our side, are Lieutenant-Generals Longstreet, Hood, Anderson and Early, and Major-Generals McLaws, Heth, Wilcox and Trimble; General Pendleton, chief of artillery; Generals Kemper, Lane and Scales; and Colonels Taylor, Marshall and Venable, of General Lee's staff Were I writing history, I should like to have the opinions of these officers upon this subject, from which, with the official reports in my possession, I would of course draw and write my own conclusions. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, Fitzhugh Lee. Letter from Colonel William Allan, of Ewell's staff. McDoNOUGH School, Owings' Mill, Baltimore county, Md., April 26th, 1877. Rev. J. W. Jones, D. D. My dear Sir: The questions asked in the
Rosecrantz (search for this): chapter 9
atroled by war vessels, that it was a mere chance when the blockade was evaded. The large army under Grant, besieging Vicksburg and Port Hudson, could very readily have been brought against one or the other of our armies in the field on the fall of the beleaguered towns, which was a mere question of time, as Gen. Johnston was unable to concentrate a force large enough to relieve them. Our main Western army, under Bragg, was confronted in southern Tennessee by a much larger army under Rosecrantz,. while the Army of Northern Virginia was confronted on the Rappahannock by one of nearly, if not quite double its numbers, under Hooker. In this condition of things, it was very apparent that unless we could break through the cordon that was gradually closing and tightening around us, we must infallibly be crushed as a victim in the coils of a boaconstrictor. To set down and content ourselves with a mere defensive policy, would be to await an inevitable collapse of our cause, sooner or
A. B. Howard (search for this): chapter 9
in going into Pennsylvania. He repeatedly stated that in consequence of the absence of Stuart with the cavalry he was unaware of the near proximity of the Federal army, and when Hill reported a large force of infantry in his front on July 1st, did not believe it. It was only the fight of that afternoon that convinced him that Meade was near at hand, and he then deemed it injudicious to decline battle. The Confederates would probably have been successful: 1st.-Had Ewell and Hill pushed Howard's broken troops over the top of Cemetery Hill on the first day. 2d. Had Longstreet reached the field earlier on the second day and secured and held Round Top. 3d.--Had Ewell made his attack in the afternoon of the second at same time as Longstreet, instead of later, and then not piecemeal, so that Early was beaten back before Rodes was ready to support him. 4th. Had Longstreet and Hill attacked early on the third, as was first designed, while Ewell was engaged. 5th. Had Ewe
McLaws (search for this): chapter 9
who know most about that campaign on our side, are Lieutenant-Generals Longstreet, Hood, Anderson and Early, and Major-Generals McLaws, Heth, Wilcox and Trimble; General Pendleton, chief of artillery; Generals Kemper, Lane and Scales; and Colonels was not made as designed. Pickett's division, Heth's division, and two brigades of Pender's division advanced. Hood and McLaws were not moved forward. There were nine divisions in the army; seven were quiet, while two assailed the fortified line oe his dispositions to advance, but General Longstreet told him it was of no use — the attack had failed. Had Hood and McLaws followed or supported Picket, and Pettigrew and Anderson have been advanced, the design of the Commanding-General would hthe First, under Longstreet; Second, under Ewell; and Third, under A. P. Hill. The First corps embraced the divisions of McLaws, Pickett and Hood; the Second those of Early, Rodes and Johnson; and the Third those of Anderson, Heth and Pender. Th
Jenkins (search for this): chapter 9
ing no longer in ignorance of, could then have made his plans accordingly. In that event the battle would not in all probability have taken place at Gettysburg. In justice to Stuart, it may be said that he had calculated upon the brigade of Jenkins and White's batallion of cavalry, which accompanied Generals Ewell and Early, and Jones' and Robertson's brigades, which were left to guard the passes of the Blue Ridge, and were to rejoin General Lee as soon as the enemy crossed the river, to do all that was necessary. The brigade of General Jenkins, Stuart estimated at 3,800 troopers when leaving Virginia, and, referring to the complaint of the Commanding-General of a want of cavalry upon that occasion, says: Properly handled such a command should have done every thing requisite; In reference to the second point I have taken, there is evidence that a staff officer of General Lee carried an order to General Ewell on the afternoon of the 1st of July, that from where he, General Lee,
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