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Browsing named entities in Southern Historical Society Papers, Volume 5. (ed. Reverend J. William Jones).

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hdraw through the mountains with our large trains. When I left General Lee on the night of the 1st, I believed he had made up his mind to attack, but was confident that he had not yet determined a5,000;--these are our highest figures and the enemy's lowest. We had learned on the night of the 1st, from some prisoners captured near Seminary Ridge, that the First, Eleventh, and Third corps had d not be expected to fail to seek it. As to Ewell's failure to prosecute the advantage won on the 1st, there is little to be said, as the Commanding-General was on the field. I merely quote from hise, which I now proceed to disprove. I have said that I left General Lee late in the night of the 1st, and that he had not then determined when the attack should be made; that I went to his headquartI quote in this connection the order that I issued to the heads of departments in my corps on the 1st. I present the order issued to Colonel Walton of the artillery, similar orders having been issue
long since refuted-but has surrounded it with a cluster of new embellishments, which had heretofore been either unwritten history or unimagined fiction. To which of these classes they belong, the reader may be better able to determine after an examination of the evidence which it is one of the objects of this paper to lay before him. The key-note to the temper, as well as the truthfulness of Gen. Wilson's narrative, may be found in its first paragraph, which I quote entire: On the first Sunday of April, 1865, while seated in St. Paul's church in Richmond, Jeffersen Davis received a telegram from Lee, announcing the fall of Petersburg, the partial destruction of his army, and the immediate necessity for flight. Although he could not have been entirely unprepared for this intelligence, it appears that he did not receive it with self-possession or dignity; but with tremulous and nervous haste, like a weak man in the hour of misfortune, he left the house of worship and hurrie
n case General Lee should make any movement of that nature on the evening of the 1st, or early on the morning of the 2d. I consider that, had a prolonged struggle . Twelfth corps,8,056 men. The Fifth corps came up during the night of the 1st, and morning of 2nd, from Hanover-see following extract from testimony of Generaons of the corps. The Sixth corps was at Manchester on the evening of the 1st, and marched all of that night and until two o'clock P. M. on the 2nd, before itas over, and he being the senior officer present, has caused his conduct on the first, in not pursuing the enemy, to be criticised; of course, after the arrival of ee's chief-of-artillery, testifies that General Lee told him on the night of the 1st, when he reported to him the result of a reconnoissance on the right flank, that the return of June 30th, was in bivouac three miles in rear on the night of the 1st, (nearly as far from the Federal as Longstreet was from the Confederate lines).
leave the main route of march, and thus send our army into the enemy's country without cavalry for reconnoissance or foraging purposes; fourth, that the crushing defeat inflicted on the advance of the Federal army in the casual encounter of the 1st at Willoughby's Run, should have been pushed to extremities, that occasion furnishing one of the few opportunities ever furnished for pursuit pell-mell ; fifth, the army should have beer norried around to Meade's right and rear on the night of the 1st, and placed between him and his capital, and thus forced him to attack us, as he certainly intended doing; sixth, when I attacked the enemy's left, on the 2d, Ewell should have moved at once against his right and Hill should have threatened his centre, and thus prevented a concentration of the whole Federal army at the point I was assaulting; seventh, on the morning of the 3d we should still have moved to the right, and manceuvred the Federals into attacking us; eighth, the assault by Pickett
as to the order. On the other side, we have General Pendleton's statement that General Lee told him, on the night of the first, that he had given the order for Longstreet to attack at sunrise next morning. General Lee also said to the gentleman reious to make the attack at once. General Longstreet, in his first article, has stated that General Lee, at 5 P. M. of the 1st, announced his purpose of attacking the enemy the next day, that he persisted in that purpose late at night against his owe would have been more prompt to attack us in position on the heights of Gettysburg, if we had gained that position on the 1st, than he showed himself to attack us in the position on Seminary Ridge, with our left extended in a curve through Gettysbu and they should equally convince those who think the taking possession of the Gettysburg heights, on the afternoon of the 1st, would in itself have been a great advantage to us, that he would not have attacked us in that position. His whole subseq
f my corps occupied the same positions as on the 2d. I was directed to hold my line with Anderson'sginning Our artillery, etc., should read: On the 2d, Colonel Alexander's battalion being at the heade corps was not together, as was the case on the 2d. On the 3rd, Colonel Alexander's special serv co-operation of Generals Ewell and Iill, on the 2d, by vigorous assault at the moment my battle wasordered me to attack the enemy at sunrise on the 2d. General J. A. Early has, in positive terms, ind order for attack on the enemy at sunrise on the 2d, nor can I belive any such order was issued by Ge continued in position until the morning of the 2d, when I received orders to take up a new line ofinforced General Johnson during the night of the 2d, ordered him forward early the next morning. Ineral Lee to attack until about 11 o'clock on the 2d; that I immediately began my dispositions for atl Halleck in cipher just before my battle on the 2d: If not attacked, and I can get any positive inf[1 more...]
scale, found himself so much endangered that he was obliged to fight an offensive battle on the ground where Meade chose to wait for him. He ought to have manoeuvered in Virginia so as to bring on a battle before crossing the Potomac. 3rd. The way in which the fights of the 2nd of July were directed does not show the same co-ordination which ensured the success of the Southern arms at Gaines' Mill and Chancellorsville. 4th. 1 do not understand why Lee, having gained some success on the 2nd, but found the Federal position very strong, did not attempt to turn it by the south, which was its weak place, by extending his right so as to endanger Meade's communications with Washington. 5th. The heroic but foolish attack of Pickett, on the 3rd, should never have been attempted. Longstreet seems to think that it was imposed upon him against his will by Lee. General Early says distinctly, in a paper published by the Southern Historical Society, that Longstreet deferred it so long th
Ewell's and Hill's corps, on the morning of the 2nd, at 26,000 men. Upon the Federal side there hadf that night and until two o'clock P. M. on the 2nd, before it reached the field. It has been stss formidable antagonist than we found it on the 2d, from Culps' Hill to Round Top. The Confederatespeaking of the operations of the morning of the 2nd, General Longstreet was to attack the left flanten his march; and, that, on the morning of the 2nd, General Lee was chafed by the non-appearance osion during the day and joined about noon on the 2d. Previous to his joining [the italics are mine] urg shortly after daybreak on the morning of the 2d, and that his troops soon filed into an open fieeral Meade arrived, in person, at 1 A. M. on the 2d, and was engaged in getting his army up until af together about 28,000 men on the morning of the 2d, and Longstreet says he had, without Pickett, som to attack from his right on the morning of the 2d, what hour would he have attacked Meade's key-po[1 more...]
sixth, when I attacked the enemy's left, on the 2d, Ewell should have moved at once against his rig my troops fought an extraordinary battle on the 2d. I asserted that my 13,000 men virtually chargeplain the relations of our tactical moves on the 2d, and force a confession from even their reluctan the first signs of activity in our ranks on the 2d General Sickles became apprehensive that we wereor, in referring to the hour of my battle on the 2d, says: Round Top, the key of their position, whito General Halleck, just before my battle on the 2d. The dispatch reads: If not attacked, and I cande on the night of the 1st or the morning of the 2d, the thirteen days that elapsed between our firsn was much stronger on the 3d than it was on the 2d. The troops that had fought with me the day beft for the correct position of his brigade on the 2d. I much prefer the evidence that I used in my frsburg, reaching that point at early dawn on the 2d. I at once went to General Lee's headquarters.
r which was suppressed, says he was of the impression, from certain circumstances, that an order was given for an attack at as early an hour as practicable on the second; and the fourth says he knows of no order to attack at sunrise, and does not think such an order was given, for reasons which he states, and which I have shown tomost particular proofs. It is very evident, beyond all reasonable doubt, that General Lee indicated to him the desire for him to attack at a very early hour on the 2d. It is possible, and in fact probable, that no peremptory order was given to make the attack at any specified time, but the purpose must have been indicated in a mly to his question as to what sort of position it was, General Sickles had answered, There is no position there. At the first signs of activity in our ranks on the 2d, General Sickles became apprehensive that we were about to attack him, and so reported to General Meade. As our move progressed his apprehensions were confirmed, a
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