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Browsing named entities in a specific section of Southern Historical Society Papers, Volume 5. (ed. Reverend J. William Jones). Search the whole document.

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1st (search for this): chapter 3.25
as to the order. On the other side, we have General Pendleton's statement that General Lee told him, on the night of the first, that he had given the order for Longstreet to attack at sunrise next morning. General Lee also said to the gentleman reious to make the attack at once. General Longstreet, in his first article, has stated that General Lee, at 5 P. M. of the 1st, announced his purpose of attacking the enemy the next day, that he persisted in that purpose late at night against his owe would have been more prompt to attack us in position on the heights of Gettysburg, if we had gained that position on the 1st, than he showed himself to attack us in the position on Seminary Ridge, with our left extended in a curve through Gettysbu and they should equally convince those who think the taking possession of the Gettysburg heights, on the afternoon of the 1st, would in itself have been a great advantage to us, that he would not have attacked us in that position. His whole subseq
2nd (search for this): chapter 3.25
r which was suppressed, says he was of the impression, from certain circumstances, that an order was given for an attack at as early an hour as practicable on the second; and the fourth says he knows of no order to attack at sunrise, and does not think such an order was given, for reasons which he states, and which I have shown tomost particular proofs. It is very evident, beyond all reasonable doubt, that General Lee indicated to him the desire for him to attack at a very early hour on the 2d. It is possible, and in fact probable, that no peremptory order was given to make the attack at any specified time, but the purpose must have been indicated in a mly to his question as to what sort of position it was, General Sickles had answered, There is no position there. At the first signs of activity in our ranks on the 2d, General Sickles became apprehensive that we were about to attack him, and so reported to General Meade. As our move progressed his apprehensions were confirmed, a
3rd (search for this): chapter 3.25
ever constituted any part of our line; so that it was not broken by their being assigned the position they occupied. If General Longstreet found it necessary to take two of his divisions, which were intended to support the attacking column on the 3d, in order to protect his right flank against two brigades of Pleasanton's cavalry, it was certainly not unreasonable to take two brigades to protect a flank that was very much more exposed. This objection is really too insignificant to discuss. rolina and the Peninsula, with all the prestige of victory in his favor, though General Lee had not been reinforced to the extent of a solitary man, unless the cavalry brigades of Robertson and Jones, which reached the vicinity of Gettysburg on the 3d, too late to participate in the battle, be counted as reinforcements. These facts should satisfy General Longstreet and his adherents that Meade would not have been in a hurry to attack us, if we had awaited his attack on Seminary Ridge, or had
29th (search for this): chapter 3.25
on all occasions, he has now furnished very conclusive evidence of its truth, in his narrative of incidents connected with the second battle of Manassas. He says: When the head of my column reached that field it was about 12 o'clock on the 29th. As we approached the field we heard sounds of a heavy battle, which proved to be General Jackson very heavily engaged with the enemy. As soon as his troops were deployed into line, General Lee wanted him to open the attack, but Longstreet inovement had been intended to prevent, had been hurried to the front, what a different result might have taken place! Is it to be credited that, when General Lee was anxious for Longstreet to begin the attack as soon as his troops arrived on the 29th, he said nothing to him, nor gave him any orders on the 30th, until, as Longstreet says, after 3 P. M. a courier arrived in great haste with orders from General Lee for him to hurry to the assistance of Jackson; and that the only other part Genera
30th (search for this): chapter 3.25
me to reconnoitre. It was twenty-seven hours after his arrival on the field before he was ready to begin, and if the troops of McClellan, the junction of which with Pope's Army Jackson's movement had been intended to prevent, had been hurried to the front, what a different result might have taken place! Is it to be credited that, when General Lee was anxious for Longstreet to begin the attack as soon as his troops arrived on the 29th, he said nothing to him, nor gave him any orders on the 30th, until, as Longstreet says, after 3 P. M. a courier arrived in great haste with orders from General Lee for him to hurry to the assistance of Jackson; and that the only other part General Lee took in the battle that ensued, was to write him a note saying that if he had found anything better than reinforcing Jackson, to pursue it ? Let us see what General Longstreet says in his official report, intended for General Lee's own eye. In that report, after describing his riding to the front, and hi
February 23rd (search for this): chapter 3.25
, and I accordingly said in my reply that the article was evidently not written by him. I mentioned this fact, not because I thought the article, though exhibiting some improvement on his style, contained any better logic than his own productions had shown, but to prevent the lucubrations of a mere newspaper writer from being taken for the criticisms of a soldier of, at least, some experience. In the last paper on The mistakes of Gettysburg, published in the Philadelphia Times of the 23d of February, General Longstreet is made to say: One of the chief elements of this tom-tom warfare is found in the fact that, owing to wounds received in the honorable service of my country, which have virtually paralyzed my right arm, and made it impossible for me. to write save under pain and constraint, I have been compelled, in the preparation of my articles, to accept the service of a professional writer generously tendered me by the editor of the Times. Upon such trifling casuals as this
April (search for this): chapter 3.25
t any one acquainted with General Lee's exalted character will accept such statements as true. It is evident that allusion is here made to the language used by General Lee, as given by me, in the conference had with Generals Ewell, Rodes, and myself, after the close of the first day's fight, when he said: Longstreet is a very good fighter when he gets in position and gets everything ready, but he is so slow. It will be seen, from a letter given by General Fitz Lee, in his article in the April number of the Papers, from a distinguished gentleman to himself, that General Lee made a similar remark to that gentleman after the war; and, if the fact was that General Longstreet was slow in his movements, there could be no possible impropriety in mentioning it under the circumstances attending General Lee's remark. It is a little curious, though, that while General Lee's exalted character is cited as being inconsistent with such a remark, General Longstreet himself wrote a letter to the
July 24th, 1863 AD (search for this): chapter 3.25
r terribly blundered. All this he claims the right to do, for the benefit of the Comte de Paris and the general historian, because he is the only living person who could explain the motif of that campaign and the true reasons of its failure. He laid the foundation for enlightening the general historian in regard to the demerits and deficiencies of General Lee, and his own superior claims to the leadership of the Army of Northern Virginia, by a letter written to his uncle, on the 24th day of July, 1863, which letter would have never seen the light of day if he had not, himself, given it to the public. In that letter he said: The battle was not made as I would have made it. My idea was to throw ourselves between the enemy and Washington, select a strong position, and force the enemy to attack us. So far as is given to man the ability to judge, we may say with confidence that we should have destroyed the Federal army, marched into Washington, and dictated our terms, or, at le
January, 1864 AD (search for this): chapter 3.25
ng out who that leader should have been — to wit: General James Longstreet. Accompanying the publication of the letter to his uncle, General Longstreet gave the following extract from a letter to him from General Lee, dated, as alleged, in January, 1864: Had I taken your advice at Gettysburg instead of pursuing the course I did, how different all things might have been. A letter from General Fitz Lee appeared in the public prints very shortly thereafter, and, in that letter, he spr all circumstances. It may be observed here, that, while General Longstreet has given a letter from General Lee to him, written since the war, to show their kindly personal relations, he has never yet given the full text of that letter of January, 1864, from which the brief extract before alluded to was taken, though the extract is repeated in the first article in the Times. Referring to the points made in the last-named article, General Longstreet says in the second article: These
1865 AD (search for this): chapter 3.25
ew days, if he had pursued his true policy, to vindicate its wisdom and put to shame the clamorers for immediate attack. French had 8,000 men at Frederick, with 4,000 more somewhere on the way between Harper's Ferry and Washington; Pennsylvania had put into the field, under a call of President Lincoln for the emergency, 32,104 well-equipped militia; and New York had sent forward 13,971 men, under the same call, as shown by the final report of the Provost-Marshal General, page 53, (Documents 1865-‘6). Other troops were on their way from North Carolina and the Virginia Peninsula. The greater part of all these troops, and probably a considerable portion of the troops still in the defenses of Washington, especially south of the Potomac, would have been added to Meade's army, before he would have attacked us, and in the meantime troops would probably have been brought from the West, over the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, to cut off our retreat across the Potomac; and then, with our army w
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