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paralyze the immense mass of men that was pressing steadily to his overthrow. We were standing on the flank of the advancing columns. They swept on at right angles to our line of vision. They were within easy artillery range, and I felt certain that a heavy enfilading fire poured unexpectedly into their charging column would disconcert and check it. Instead of moving to reinforce Jackson, therefore, I sent dispatches for batteries to hurry to where I was. In an exceedingly short time Captain Wiley's six-gun batteries came dashing up at full gallop, the horses covered with foam, and the men urging them forward. They were wheeled into position and directed against the moving flank of the enemy. The range was fair, and as the six guns flashed the heavy shot went ploughing through the solid flank of the Federals, doing terrible damage. The result was as anticipated. The line faltered for an instant, started again, hesitated, reformed and pressed forward, and then as a rear broad
al Anderson arrived with his division. The attack was led by Hood's brigades, closely supported by Evans. These were rapidly reinforced by Anderson's division from, the rear, Kemper's three brigades and D. R. Jones' division from the right, and Wilcox's brigade from the left. The brigades of Brigadier-Generals Featherston and Prior became detached, and operated with a portion of General Jackson's command. The attacking columns moved steadily forward, driving the enemy from his' different pose order for a general advance, now threw his whole command against the Federal centre and left. Hood's two brigades, followed by Evans, led the attack. R. H. Anderson's division came gallantly to the support of Hood, while the three brigades of Wilcox moved forward on his left, and those of Kemper on his right. D. R. Jones advanced on the extreme right, and the whole line swept steadily on, driving the enemy, with great carnage, from each successive position, until 10 P. M., when darkness put
gical. All the inferences from his telegram are that Meade would not have attacked us in our then position, unless he could do so to great advantage, and the fact is that, after a reconnoissance, he abandoned the only project of attack which he formed, to-wit: from his right against our left flank. If we had abandoned our position after the success of the first day, the moral effect upon our own men would have been that of a defeat. If we had moved to Meade's left to get between him and Washington, and he had made a corresponding movement to protect his supplies and his communications, it is impossible to conceive how that could have given us the moral effect of a victory. That he would not have followed us at once to attack us in any new position we may have taken to threaten his communications with Washington, is shown by his own declared purpose in this telegram. His policy, doubtless, would have been, after securing his depot and rendering his own supplies certain, to take and
ut which I was in doubt. When I arrived on the ground, which I did a few minutes before four o'clock in the afternoon, I found General Sickles had taken a position very much in advance of what it had been my intention that he should take. General Warren, after saying he had reconnoitred in front of their right and advised against an attack there, adds: Soon afterwards I rode out with General Meade to examine the left of our line, where General Sickles was. His troops could hardly be s He then says that he went to Round Top, by Meade's direction, and from there sent word to Meade that that point would have to be occupied very strongly. Meade then ordered a division of Sykes' corps, which was coming up, to the position, and Warren says: The troops under General Sykes arrived barely in time to save Round Top hill, and they had a very desperate fight to hold it. The assumption, under these circumstances, that, had the attack been made earlier or later, we should ha
nk that Hood's gallant men were doomed to slaughter in a desperate struggle for the heights of Round Top, against. troops that had been on the extreme right of the Federal army until 2 o'clock P. Ml Sickles rested with the Third corps upon the ground lying between General Hancock's left and Round Top, General Geary's division of the Twelfth corps occupying part of the same line. General Meade had given General Sickles orders to occupy Round Top if it were practicable; and in reply to his question as to what sort of position it was, General Sickles had answered, There is no position thereckles was. His troops could hardly be said to be in position. He then says that he went to Round Top, by Meade's direction, and from there sent word to Meade that that point would have to be occu sunrise, or at any time in the morning, when Meade apprehended no attack in that quarter, and Round Top was not occupied and he knew nothing of the character of the ground, he would have been able t
Chancellorsville (Virginia, United States) (search for this): chapter 3.25
otest conception of the importance of celerity in preparing for and conducting an attack. According to his own admission, he received at 11 o'clock in the forenoon the positive order to make the attack, and yet it took hin until 4 o'clock in the afternoon to get ready for that attack. Imagine Stonewall Jackson taking five hours to reconnoitre the enemy's position and get his own troops in position before beginning his advance, after making the circuit to get on Hooker's right flank at Chancellorsville, thus giving the latter time to be informed of the movent and to prepare for receiving the projected blow, and what, can it be supposed, would have been the result? Is it not manifest that instead of the brilliant victory which crowned the career of that immortal hero, there would have been a disastrous repulse? General Longstreet's repugnance to making the attack, and his foreboding of failure, were very potent causes of the want of success when the attack was made. It was his dut
Harper's Ferry (West Virginia, United States) (search for this): chapter 3.25
. He would have had to wait but a very few days, if he had pursued his true policy, to vindicate its wisdom and put to shame the clamorers for immediate attack. French had 8,000 men at Frederick, with 4,000 more somewhere on the way between Harper's Ferry and Washington; Pennsylvania had put into the field, under a call of President Lincoln for the emergency, 32,104 well-equipped militia; and New York had sent forward 13,971 men, under the same call, as shown by the final report of the Provostus repulse of the day before; nor did he dare attack us, afterwards, in the vicinity of Hagerstown, when he had been reinforced by 8,000 men under French, and a considerable part of Couch's force from Harrisonburg, besides having at hand (at Harper's Ferry) a portion of the troops from North Carolina and the Peninsula, with all the prestige of victory in his favor, though General Lee had not been reinforced to the extent of a solitary man, unless the cavalry brigades of Robertson and Jones, whi
Jackson (Mississippi, United States) (search for this): chapter 3.25
t 4 o'clock of that very afternoon, to attack Jackson's right flank — the very one on which Longstras moving along the Warrenton Pike to cut off Jackson's troops, erroneously supposed to be retreati though there was skirmishing and fighting in Jackson's front all day, General Longstreet was not r of the Federals forming for a charge against Jackson's weakening lines. They were gathered in immense force, and it seemed impossible that Jackson's thin lines could withstand the onset. The Fedeellan, the junction of which with Pope's Army Jackson's movement had been intended to prevent, had re is a little room left for a suspicion that Jackson's men had something to do with the repulse ofed forward until engaged at close quarters by Jackson's troops, when its progress was checked, and epeated efforts to rally were unavailing, and Jackson's troops, being thus relieved from the pressuepeated efforts to rally were unavailing, and Jackson's troops, being thus relieved from the pressu[1 more...]
Gettysburg (Pennsylvania, United States) (search for this): chapter 3.25
at to show how much of the responsibility of Gettysburg shall rest on my shoulders. The spirit oary, 1864: Had I taken your advice at Gettysburg instead of pursuing the course I did, how dince. In the last paper on The mistakes of Gettysburg, published in the Philadelphia Times of the Meade's headquarters had been established at Gettysburg, and I was directed by him to relieve a diviceived, that it was intended to retreat from Gettysburg. I asked General Meade to go over the grouns to the propriety of the attack on Meade at Gettysburg, and hence it is given with a damnable iterat to attack us in position on the heights of Gettysburg, if we had gained that position on the 1st, son and Jones, which reached the vicinity of Gettysburg on the 3d, too late to participate in the bach really presented itself to General Lee at Gettysburg was, whether he should attack the enemy in t war record, or submit his own operations at Gettysburg to a crucial test. But when his overweening[2 more...]
Hagerstown (Maryland, United States) (search for this): chapter 3.25
nably, have ensued. There is no reason to suppose that Meade would have been more prompt to attack us in position on the heights of Gettysburg, if we had gained that position on the 1st, than he showed himself to attack us in the position on Seminary Ridge, with our left extended in a curve through Gettysburg. He did not attack us on the 4th in our then position on Seminary Ridge, after the disastrous repulse of the day before; nor did he dare attack us, afterwards, in the vicinity of Hagerstown, when he had been reinforced by 8,000 men under French, and a considerable part of Couch's force from Harrisonburg, besides having at hand (at Harper's Ferry) a portion of the troops from North Carolina and the Peninsula, with all the prestige of victory in his favor, though General Lee had not been reinforced to the extent of a solitary man, unless the cavalry brigades of Robertson and Jones, which reached the vicinity of Gettysburg on the 3d, too late to participate in the battle, be cou
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