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R. H. Anderson (search for this): chapter 4.49
was intended in a Pickwickian sense, but the account of General R. H. Anderson, who was guileless and truthful, supports the official reports. General A. A. Humphreys (of the other side), late chief of the United States Corps of Engineers, a man whose entire life and service were devoted to official accuracy, gives similar evidence in his official report. Official Records, Vol. XXVII., Part I., p. 529. All the subordinate reports on the Confederate side confirm the account by General Anderson, while the reports of subordinate officers on the Federal side conform to that of General Humphreys. It is conclusive therefore that the Confederates occupied no ground east of the Fairfield road till R. H. Anderson's division advanced on the morning of the 2d at 10 to find its position on the right of Hill's corps, after a clever fight between the 3d Maine and 1st U. S. Sharp-shooters against the 10th and 11th Alabama regiments. When it is remembered that my command was at the clos
Ulysses S. Grant (search for this): chapter 4.49
position of great natural strength, reenforced by such temporary shelter as could be collected and placed in position to cover the troops. Lee's hope in entering the campaign was that he would be in time to make a successful battle north of the Potomac, with such advantages as to draw off the army at Vicksburg as well as the Federal troops at other points. I do not think the general effect of the battle was demoralizing, but by a singular coincidence our army at Vicksburg surrendered to Grant on the 4th, while the armies of Major-General George E. Pickett, C. S. A. From a photograph. Lee and Meade were lying in front of each other, each waiting a movement on the part of the other, neither victor, neither vanquished. This surrender, taken in connection with the Gettysburg defeat, was, of course, very discouraging to our superior officers, though I do not know that it was felt as keenly by the rank and file. For myself, I felt that our last hope was gone, and that it was n
George G. Meade (search for this): chapter 4.49
force three or four times their number, General Meade's report shows that all of the Third and pe against troops attacking the Federal front. Meade knew that if the battle was renewed it would bes. As they came back I fully expected to see Meade ride to the front and lead Brigadier-General my mind was relieved of the apprehension that Meade was going to follow us. General Lee came uptch from the Union position. Finding that Meade was not going to follow us, I prepared to withl left on the 1st of July, Halleck telegraphed Meade as follows: Washington, D. C., July 1st,ay, just thirty minutes before my assault, General Meade telegraphed General Halleck at 3 P. M.: en a strong position, we should have dislodged Meade without a single blow; but even if we had been, and still hoped he would be able to dislodge Meade; but he made a mistake in sending such a smallcessful prestige as was that of the Prussians, Meade would have been obliged to attack us wherever [4 more...]
Richard B. Garnett (search for this): chapter 4.49
ocks, nicely dressed, hanging almost to his shoulders. He seemed rather a holiday soldier than a general at the head of a column which was about to make one of the grandest, most desperate assaults recorded in the annals of wars. Armistead and Garnett, two of his brigadiers, were veterans of nearly a quarter of a century's service. Their minds seemed absorbed in the men behind, and in the bloody work before them. Kemper, the other brigadier, was younger but had experienced many severe battlhey would not hold, that Pickett would strike and be crushed and the attack would be a failure. As Pickett's division concentrated in making the final assault, Kemper fell severely wounded. As the division threw itself against the Federal line Garnett fell and expired. The Confederate flag was planted in the Federal line, and immediately Armistead fell mortally wounded at the feet of the Federal soldiers. The wavering divisions then seemed appalled, broke their ranks, and retired. Immediat
William K. Bachman (search for this): chapter 4.49
icers in bringing them all together again. It was then he used the expression that has been mentioned so often: It was all my fault; get together, and let us do the best we can toward saving that which is left us. As our troops were driven back from the general assault an attack was made on my extreme right by several squadrons of cavalry, which succeeded in breaking through our line of pickets. They were met by a counter-move of the 9th Georgia and the well-directed fire of Captain Bachman's battery and driven back, the 11th and 59th Georgia joining in the counter-move. The charge of Pickett, Pettigrew, and Trimble. From a War-time sketch from the Union position. Finding that Meade was not going to follow us, I prepared to withdraw my line to a better defensive position. The batteries were withdrawn well over Seminary Ridge, and orders were sent to the right for McLaws's and Hood's divisions to be withdrawn to corresponding positions. The armies remained in po
A. A. Humphreys (search for this): chapter 4.49
nd truthful, supports the official reports. General A. A. Humphreys (of the other side), late chief of the United States Corps of Engineers, a man whose entire life and service were devoted to official accuracy, gives similar evidence in his official report. Official Records, Vol. XXVII., Part I., p. 529. All the subordinate reports on the Confederate side confirm the account by General Anderson, while the reports of subordinate officers on the Federal side conform to that of General Humphreys. It is conclusive therefore that the Confederates occupied no ground east of the Fairfield road till R. H. Anderson's division advanced on the morning of the 2d at 10 to find its position on the right of Hill's corps, after a clever fight between the 3d Maine and 1st U. S. Sharp-shooters against the 10th and 11th Alabama regiments. When it is remembered that my command was at the close of the first day's fight fifteen to twenty miles west of the field, that its attack as ordered wa
Ambrose P. Hill (search for this): chapter 4.49
ve, but left discretion with General Ewell, the latter thought it better to give his troops a little rest and wait for more definite instructions. I was following Hill's Corps as fast as possible, and as soon as I got possession of the road went rapidly forward to join General Lee. I found him on the summit of Seminary Ridge watneral Lee's orders had been that when my advance was made, the Second Corps (Ewell), on his left, should move and make a simultaneous attack; that the Third Corps (Hill) should watch closely and engage so as to prevent heavy massing in front of me. Ewell made no move at all until about 8 o'clock at night, after the heat of the battle was over, his line having been broken by a call for one of his brigades to go else-where. Hill made no move whatever, save of the brigades of his right division that were covering our left. When the battle of the 2d was over, General Lee pronounced it a success, as we were in possession of ground from which we had driven t
Thomas McMahon (search for this): chapter 4.49
hat were moved from day to day to indicate the movements of the two armies. Bazaine had been driven to shelter at Metz, McMahon had been driven back to the route leading from Paris to Metz and seemed in doubt whether he would go to Paris or to Bazaree of the French Creoles of New Orleans visited my office to ask my views of the movements then proceeding. I replied, McMahon's army will be prisoners of war in ten days. They were very indignant and stated that I was a Republican and in sympathy given them my solution of a military problem. The Prussians were on the shorter route to Paris or to Metz, so that if McMahon should attempt to move in either direction the Prussians, availing themselves of the shorter lines, would interpose and force McMahon to attack; but as he had already been so beaten and demoralized, that he could not be expected to make a successful attack and would therefore be obliged to surrender. If he had gone direct to Paris before giving up his shorter route,
Richard H. Anderson (search for this): chapter 4.49
road, McLaws to follow the movements of Hood, attacking at the Peach Orchard the Federal Third Corps, with a part of R. H. Anderson's division following the movements of McLaws to guard his left flank. As soon as the troops were in position, and weust then coming up. Soon after General Pendleton passed from about the Fairfield road to ourleft, the division of General R. H. Anderson,--of the Third Corps,--led by the brigade of General C. M. Wilcox, filed off to the right from the Chambersburg re, one might be at a loss to know which of these accounts was intended in a Pickwickian sense, but the account of General R. H. Anderson, who was guileless and truthful, supports the official reports. General A. A. Humphreys (of the other side), latneral Humphreys. It is conclusive therefore that the Confederates occupied no ground east of the Fairfield road till R. H. Anderson's division advanced on the morning of the 2d at 10 to find its position on the right of Hill's corps, after a clever
Paul Semmes (search for this): chapter 4.49
guard his left flank. As soon as the troops were in position, and we could find the points against which we should march and give the guiding points, the advance was ordered — at half-past 3 o'clock in the afternoon. The attack was made in splendid style by both divisions, and the Federal line was broken by the first impact. They retired, many of them, in the direction of Round Top behind bowlders and fences, which gave them shelter, and where they received reenforcements. Brigadier-General Paul Semmes, C. S. A., mortally wounded, July 2. from a photograph. This was an unequal battle. General Lee's orders had been that when my advance was made, the Second Corps (Ewell), on his left, should move and make a simultaneous attack; that the Third Corps (Hill) should watch closely and engage so as to prevent heavy massing in front of me. Ewell made no move at all until about 8 o'clock at night, after the heat of the battle was over, his line having been broken by a call for one
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