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Baltimore, Md. (Maryland, United States) (search for this): chapter 4.51
n view of its results, and of the indications it gave of the position of the Federal army, decided to follow up the fight. General Longstreet advised a movement across Meade's front to threaten his left and rear. Such a movement would have been difficult in the absence of Stuart; it could not have been executed in the position then occupied by the army with sufficient promptness to surprise Meade; and if successful it simply would have forced the Federal army back to some position nearer Baltimore and Washington where the issue of battle was still to be tried. General Longstreet begs the question when he assumes that Meade would then have been obliged to attack at a disadvantage. General Lee decided that this plan did not promise as good results as to follow up the partial victory already gained. More than one-fourth of the Federal army was beaten. (Of the First and Eleventh corps that had numbered 20,931 on June 30th, not 5700 were in line on July 2d.) That army was not concent
Washington (United States) (search for this): chapter 4.51
results, and of the indications it gave of the position of the Federal army, decided to follow up the fight. General Longstreet advised a movement across Meade's front to threaten his left and rear. Such a movement would have been difficult in the absence of Stuart; it could not have been executed in the position then occupied by the army with sufficient promptness to surprise Meade; and if successful it simply would have forced the Federal army back to some position nearer Baltimore and Washington where the issue of battle was still to be tried. General Longstreet begs the question when he assumes that Meade would then have been obliged to attack at a disadvantage. General Lee decided that this plan did not promise as good results as to follow up the partial victory already gained. More than one-fourth of the Federal army was beaten. (Of the First and Eleventh corps that had numbered 20,931 on June 30th, not 5700 were in line on July 2d.) That army was not concentrated, and hour
Gettysburg (Pennsylvania, United States) (search for this): chapter 4.51
to General Longstreet. by William Allan, Colonel, C. S. A. General Longstreet's account of Gettysburg [see pp. 244, 339] is notable for its mistakes as well as for its attitude toward General Lee his official report he says that McLaws's division . . . reached Marsh Creek, four miles from Gettysburg, a little after dark, and Hood's division [except Law's brigade] got within nearly the same dihe town about 12 o'clock at night. Hood says he was with his staff in front of the heights of Gettysburg shortly after daybreak on the 2d, and his troops were close behind. Kershaw (of McLaws's division) says in his official report that on the 1st of July they marched to a point on the Gettysburg road some two miles from that place, going into camp at 12 P. M. General Longstreet, to explain into battle. Meantime on the Federal side Hancock's corps, which had camped three miles from Gettysburg, reached the field by 6 or 7 A. M.; Sickles's two brigades that had been left at Emmitsburg ca
Emmitsburg (Maryland, United States) (search for this): chapter 4.51
g road some two miles from that place, going into camp at 12 P. M. General Longstreet, to explain his delay, besides the above reasons scrapes together a number of others,--such as the presence of some Federal scouts and pickets west of the Emmitsburg road, the movement of Sickles's rear-guard along that road, the presence of one of General Lee's engineers (who had been sent to give information, not to command his corps). No time need be wasted on these. The fact is that General Longstreet, four miles, over no serious obstacle, and in getting them into battle. Meantime on the Federal side Hancock's corps, which had camped three miles from Gettysburg, reached the field by 6 or 7 A. M.; Sickles's two brigades that had been left at Emmitsburg came up by 9 A. M.; the rear of the Fifth Corps by midday, and the Sixth Corps, after a march of thirty-two miles in thirty hours, by 2 P. M. Had Longstreet attacked not later than 9 or 10 A. M., as Lee certainly expected, Sickles's and Hancock
McDonogh (Maryland, United States) (search for this): chapter 4.51
oirs of Lee, p. 294. See also statements of Colonels Venable and Taylor, Four years with General Lee, p. 108.) Lee's efforts for a concerted attack were ineffectual. Pickett was overwhelmed not by troops in front but by those on his flanks, especially by those on his right flank, where Wilcox was sent forward too late to be of use, and where he was too weak to have effected much at best. Yet Longstreet did not use any part of Hood's and McLaws's divisions to support Pickett, or to make a diversion in his favor, or to occupy the troops on his flank which finally defeated him. These divisions were practically idle, except that one of Hood's brigades was occupied in driving off the Federal cavalry which made a dash on that flank. Longstreet, in a word, sent forward one-third of his corps to the attack, but the remainder of his troops did not cooperate. And yet he reproaches Lee for the result! McDonogh, Md., February 16th, 1887. Charge of Alexander's artillery. See page 360.
Cemetery Hill (Pennsylvania, United States) (search for this): chapter 4.51
nd conclusive than that of General A. L. Long, then military secretary to General Lee. He says in his recently published Memoirs of R. E. Lee (page 277), that on the evening of the 1st, when General Lee had decided not to renew the attack on Cemetery Hill that day, he said (in Long's presence) to Longstreet and Hill: Gentlemen, we will attack the enemy in the morning as early as practicable. Long continues: In the conversation that succeeded he [Lee] directed them to make the necessary preparhich, as it was, the Fifth Corps barely managed to seize in time) would have fallen into Confederate possession; and even if nothing more had been done this would have given the field to the Confederates, since the Federal line all the way to Cemetery Hill was untenable with Round Top in hostile hands. Fifth. That Longstreet's attack when made was poorly seconded by the other corps may be true, and thus another chance of winning a complete victory on July 2d was lost, but this does not chang
Georgia (Georgia, United States) (search for this): chapter 4.51
plish his object. Next to these two officers I consider General A. P. Hill the best commander with me. He fights his troops well and takes good care of them. At present I do not think that more than two commanders of corps are necessary for this army. This was Lee's judgment after a campaign in which both the Hills and McLaws had served, and long before there was any question of making either of them a lieutenant-general. It would be about as just to accuse Lee of undue partiality to Georgia in making Longstreet his senior lieutenant, as it is to accuse him of partiality to Virginia in selecting A. P. Hill rather than D. H. Hill or McLaws for the command of his Third Corps. Second. In regard to the battle of Gettysburg: The first day's fight was brought on unexpectedly to Lee. In the absence of Stuart he was not aware of the proximity of the Federal army. The first day's operations were very successful. Two of the seven infantry corps of the Federal army were virtually dem
W. N. Pendleton (search for this): chapter 4.51
attack early next day from his right with Longstreet's two divisions that were within reach, this attack to be supported by Hill and Ewell. (See Ewell's and Early's reports: Early's paper in Southern Historical Society papers, Vol. IV., p. 214; and Long's Memoirs of Lee. ) Fourth. General Longstreet would have us infer that he was not ordered by General Lee to attack early on the second day; but that his memory is at fault on this point has been abundantly shown by Generals Fitz Lee, Pendleton, Early, Wilcox, and many others. No testimony on this point is more direct and conclusive than that of General A. L. Long, then military secretary to General Lee. He says in his recently published Memoirs of R. E. Lee (page 277), that on the evening of the 1st, when General Lee had decided not to renew the attack on Cemetery Hill that day, he said (in Long's presence) to Longstreet and Hill: Gentlemen, we will attack the enemy in the morning as early as practicable. Long continues: In t
William Allan (search for this): chapter 4.51
A reply to General Longstreet. by William Allan, Colonel, C. S. A. General Longstreet's account of Gettysburg [see pp. 244, 339] is notable for its mistakes as well as for its attitude toward General Lee and others. First. The statement that General Lee passed over more deserving officers from other States in order to give the command of his corps to Virginians is an unworthy attack upon a man who was as singularly free from such prejudices as he was from self-seeking, either during the war or after it. Lee said in a letter to President Davis, October 2d, 1862, at the close of the Antietam campaign: In reference to commanders of corps with the rank of lieutenant-general, of which you request my opinion, I can confidently recommend Generals Longstreet and Jackson, in this army. My opinion of the merits of General Jackson has been greatly enhanced during this expedition. He is true, honest, and brave; has a single eye to the good of the service, and spares no exertion to a
James Longstreet (search for this): chapter 4.51
my opinion, I can confidently recommend Generals Longstreet and Jackson, in this army. My opinion Lee of undue partiality to Georgia in making Longstreet his senior lieutenant, as it is to accuse hil army, decided to follow up the fight. General Longstreet advised a movement across Meade's front issue of battle was still to be tried. General Longstreet begs the question when he assumes that Me 1st (not on the forenoon of the 2d, as General Longstreet has it) he decided, after a conference whe attack early next day from his right with Longstreet's two divisions that were within reach, this and Long's Memoirs of Lee. ) Fourth. General Longstreet would have us infer that he was not ordell that day, he said (in Long's presence) to Longstreet and Hill: Gentlemen, we will attack the enemshowed next morning, as early as 9 A. M., at Longstreet's delay. General Longstreet is wrong, too, General Longstreet is wrong, too, in giving the impression that his divisions were fifteen or twenty miles away on the night of the 1s[2 more...]
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