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all. Throughout the length of both those faces the debris formed a practicable ramp from the water to the summit of the breach. This ended all aggressive operations against the defenses of Charleston, The author doubtless refers to operations conducted by himself, for the third great bombardment of Fort Sumter took place after his assignment to another field in the spring of 1864.--editors. although a desultory fire was maintained against Fort Sumter during the months of November and December to prevent the remounting of guns, pending the completion of the naval preparations for passing into the inner harbor. It was not entirely suspended until the idea of removing the channel obstructions and running the James and Sullivan's islands batteries appeared to be indefinitely postponed. No official notification of this abandonment of plan was made by the naval authorities. On October 20th I was verbally informed by the admiral that he would probably await the arrival of more monit
armed front about 800 feet in length reaching entirely across the island, while our advance must be made over a strip of low shifting sand only about 80 feet wide, and two feet above the range of ordinary tides. Between the 16th and 18th of July, as preliminary to a second attempt to get possession of Battery Wagner by assault, 41 pieces of artillery, comprising light rifles and siege-mortars, were put in position on an oblique line across the island at distances from the fort ranging from 1300 to 1900 yards. The rifles were intended principally to dismount the enemy's guns. Early in the afternoon of the 18th all these batteries opened fire, and the navy closed in on the fort and took an active and efficient part in the engagement. In a short time the work became absolutely silent on the faces looking toward us, and practically so on the sea front, from which at the beginning of the action a severe fire had been delivered against the fleet. The work was silenced for the time at l
from the nearest point of the city. It was planned for 135 guns, but never received its full armament. The embrasures or ports of the second tier, not having been finished when the war began, were bricked up by Major Anderson's command early in 1861, and were left in that condition until destroyed by our fire from Morris Island. When this fort fell into the enemy's hands, April 14th, 1861, it contained seventy-eight pieces of serviceable ordnance, all smooth-bores, ranging from 24-pounders te work as it rapidly crumbled over their heads, was a notable one. The claim has been made, by those who like to indulge in comparisons, that this defense stands in sharp contrast to the apparently feeble effort to provision and hold the place in 1861. Many of the popular fallacies of the day with regard to harbor defenses are based upon just such operations as those developed in the conflict before Charleston; and formerly in the Battle of the earth-works on the Crimea. The defensive stren
April 14th, 1861 AD (search for this): chapter 1.8
emates and one tier en barbette. It stands on the southern edge of the channel, distant three and one-third miles from the nearest point of the city. It was planned for 135 guns, but never received its full armament. The embrasures or ports of the second tier, not having been finished when the war began, were bricked up by Major Anderson's command early in 1861, and were left in that condition until destroyed by our fire from Morris Island. When this fort fell into the enemy's hands, April 14th, 1861, it contained seventy-eight pieces of serviceable ordnance, all smooth-bores, ranging from 24-pounders to 10-inch Columbiads. (2) Fort Moultrie, a brick work located on Sullivan's Island about one mile from Fort Sumter, mounting one tier of guns en barbette. Before the outbreak of the war its armament consisted of fifty-two pieces, of which the heaviest were 10 and 8 inch Columbiads and the lightest a battery of field-guns. (3) Castle Pinckney, an old brick fort one mile east of the cit
June 16th, 1862 AD (search for this): chapter 1.8
of the defense, recently stated that he had under his control 385 pieces of artillery of all calibers, including field-batteries, and an ample force of skilled men to serve them. When the position was evacuated by the Confederates, February 18th, 1865, 246 guns were left behind in the several works. The James Island defenses were especially strong. They had repulsed a bold and spirited assault upon them from the Stono River side, made by forces under General H. W. Benham, on the 16th of June, 1862, and had been greatly strengthened since that time. A gallant and well-directed attack upon Fort Sumter on April 7th, 1863, by a squadron composed of nine iron-clad vessels, under command of Rear-Admiral Du Pont, had signally failed, after a sharp engagement lasting about one hour. [See p. 32.] The squadron carried 15-inch and 1-inch shell guns and 150-pounder Parrott rifles. Five of the iron-clads were reported by their respective commanders to be wholly or partly disabled in the
September 18th, 1862 AD (search for this): chapter 1.8
en exposed, and the prudence that prompted its recall before a simple repulse could be converted into overwhelming disaster were measurably lost sight of in the chagrin of defeat. The disheartening fact was that the iron-clads had conspicuously failed in the very work for which they had been supposed to be peculiarly fit, and the country had nothing whatever to take their place. Late in May I was called to Washington, General Gillmore was on leave of absence at this time. From September 18th, 1862, to April, 1863, he had held important commands in Kentucky and West Virginia.--editors. and was informed at the consultations which followed that it was the intention to make another attack with the iron-clads, provided Fort Sumter, which was regarded as the most formidable obstacle and the key of the position, could be eliminated from the conflict, so that the fleet could pass up on the south side of the channel, leaving Fort Moultrie and the other Sullivan's Island works nearly a m
The army before Charleston in 1863. by Quincy A. Gillmore, Brevet Major-General, U. S. A. Charleston Harbor somewhat re See papers accompanying report of Secretary of the Navy, 1863; and also official correspondence in Engineer and Artillery Operations against the Defenses of Charleston Harbor in 1863.--Q. A. G. General Elliott [Confederate] reports in his joid. The credulous commander of a foreign man-of-war who in 1863 was permitted to go up to the city in a small boat, returne successfully carried on at Charleston throughout the years 1863-64, proved the existence of a wide and practicable channel ars that there were no channel obstructions or torpedoes in 1863 and 1864 that would be expected to prevent or even seriouslment, it may be conceded that the defense of Fort Sumter in 1863, when the garrison burrowed in the ruins of the work as it ison between the thin-plated and weakly armed iron-clads of 1863 and the powerful men-of-war of more recent type, look upon
April, 1863 AD (search for this): chapter 1.8
rudence that prompted its recall before a simple repulse could be converted into overwhelming disaster were measurably lost sight of in the chagrin of defeat. The disheartening fact was that the iron-clads had conspicuously failed in the very work for which they had been supposed to be peculiarly fit, and the country had nothing whatever to take their place. Late in May I was called to Washington, General Gillmore was on leave of absence at this time. From September 18th, 1862, to April, 1863, he had held important commands in Kentucky and West Virginia.--editors. and was informed at the consultations which followed that it was the intention to make another attack with the iron-clads, provided Fort Sumter, which was regarded as the most formidable obstacle and the key of the position, could be eliminated from the conflict, so that the fleet could pass up on the south side of the channel, leaving Fort Moultrie and the other Sullivan's Island works nearly a mile to the right. T
April 7th, 1863 AD (search for this): chapter 1.8
es, and an ample force of skilled men to serve them. When the position was evacuated by the Confederates, February 18th, 1865, 246 guns were left behind in the several works. The James Island defenses were especially strong. They had repulsed a bold and spirited assault upon them from the Stono River side, made by forces under General H. W. Benham, on the 16th of June, 1862, and had been greatly strengthened since that time. A gallant and well-directed attack upon Fort Sumter on April 7th, 1863, by a squadron composed of nine iron-clad vessels, under command of Rear-Admiral Du Pont, had signally failed, after a sharp engagement lasting about one hour. [See p. 32.] The squadron carried 15-inch and 1-inch shell guns and 150-pounder Parrott rifles. Five of the iron-clads were reported by their respective commanders to be wholly or partly disabled in their power of inflicting injury by their guns. They had been under the concentrated fire of some of the most destructive guns of
July 18th, 1863 AD (search for this): chapter 1.8
he neighborhood of Charleston we held all the coast line south of Morris Island, while all the other islands around the harbor, and to the northward, were either controlled or occupied by the enemy. It was found, after abolishing some of these detached posts and reducing the force at others, that the aggregate means for carrying on the contemplated operations against Charleston comprised only about 10,000 effective volunteer infantry, 600 engineer The night assault on Battery Wagner, July 18, 1863. troops, and 350 artillerists. The ordnance on hand, deemed more or less suitable for our purpose, consisted of 200-pounder, 100-pounder, and 30-pounder Parrott rifles, and some 13-inch, 10-inch, and 8-inch mortars. The projectiles for the 200-pounders, however, weighed only 150 pounds, and those for the 100-pounders only 80 pounds. With this feeble array of guns-feeble because largely wanting in the strength required for throwing, with a breaching velocity, even the light projectiles
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