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Browsing named entities in a specific section of Robert Underwood Johnson, Clarence Clough Buell, Battles and Leaders of the Civil War. Volume 4.. Search the whole document.

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September 29th (search for this): chapter 1.8
of the naval preparations for passing into the inner harbor. It was not entirely suspended until the idea of removing the channel obstructions and running the James and Sullivan's islands batteries appeared to be indefinitely postponed. No official notification of this abandonment of plan was made by the naval authorities. On October 20th I was verbally informed by the admiral that he would probably await the arrival of more monitors, which were expected in a few days; and as early as September 29th a couple of weeks was thought to be needed to complete the repairs to the monitors before operating against the channel obstructions. In point of fact there were no formidable obstructions in Charleston harbor. The popular ideas with regard to them which pervaded the public mind, and even influenced and directed official action in some quarters, were erroneous in a most notable degree. The belief entertained at the time by many practical men, whose official relations required them t
ground over which our men had to force their way, under such meager cover as could be made by sinking trenches to the water-level, and gaining the requisite height with sand and other material brought by hand from the rear, was seen by the enemy's batteries in front, flank, and reverse. Having its communications open with Charleston and the interior, the armament and garrison of Fort Sumter could always be maintained at the maximum state of efficiency. The first parallel was established, July 19th, on the line occupied the day before by our batteries against Battery Wagner, and the second parallel on the night of the 23d by the flying sap, about six hundred yards in advance of the first. Eleven of the breaching guns against Fort Sumter were located in these two parallels, and the other seven to the left and rear of the first parallel. Those in the second parallel were perilously near to Battery Wagner, the most advanced piece being only 820 yards distant from the guns of that work.
November 20th (search for this): chapter 1.8
Each party was organized without any expectation of aid from the other, and no reference to any expected cooperation from the army was made by the admiral, or by any of his subordinate commanders in their official reports of the assault. See papers accompanying report of Secretary of the Navy, 1863; and also official correspondence in Engineer and Artillery Operations against the Defenses of Charleston Harbor in 1863.--Q. A. G. General Elliott [Confederate] reports in his journal, November 20th, that at 3 o'clock a detachment of the enemy's barges, variously estimated at from four to nine in number, approached within three hundred yards of the fort and opened fire with musketry. Most of the troops got into position very rapidly, but in spite of all instructions commenced a random fire into the air on the part of many, at the distant boats on the part of others. And the General adds afterward that no rockets were sent up because positive attacks were not made. From this Colon
away by the encroachments of the sea to about one-third the width shown on our latest charts, and so much reduced in height that during spring-tides or heavy weather the waves swept entirely over it to — the marsh in rear. Against us the fort presented an armed front about 800 feet in length reaching entirely across the island, while our advance must be made over a strip of low shifting sand only about 80 feet wide, and two feet above the range of ordinary tides. Between the 16th and 18th of July, as preliminary to a second attempt to get possession of Battery Wagner by assault, 41 pieces of artillery, comprising light rifles and siege-mortars, were put in position on an oblique line across the island at distances from the fort ranging from 1300 to 1900 yards. The rifles were intended principally to dismount the enemy's guns. Early in the afternoon of the 18th all these batteries opened fire, and the navy closed in on the fort and took an active and efficient part in the engageme
ers held similar views. At Washington it was deemed of so much importance to present an actively aggressive front in this quarter in aid of projected operations elsewhere that orders were issued by the President himself to hold the position inside of Charleston bar, and to prevent the erection of new batteries and new defenses on Morris Island, and if such batteries had been begun by the enemy to drive him out. A keen sense of disappointment pervaded the Navy Department at the repulse of April 7th, finding expression, among the higher officials, in a determination to retrieve the fortunes of that day, and reinstate the ironclads in the confidence of the country at the earliest possible moment. The gallantry of the attack, the skill with which the fleet had been handled, the terrific fire to which it had been exposed, and the prudence that prompted its recall before a simple repulse could be converted into overwhelming disaster were measurably lost sight of in the chagrin of defeat.
had been worn away by the encroachments of the sea to about one-third the width shown on our latest charts, and so much reduced in height that during spring-tides or heavy weather the waves swept entirely over it to — the marsh in rear. Against us the fort presented an armed front about 800 feet in length reaching entirely across the island, while our advance must be made over a strip of low shifting sand only about 80 feet wide, and two feet above the range of ordinary tides. Between the 16th and 18th of July, as preliminary to a second attempt to get possession of Battery Wagner by assault, 41 pieces of artillery, comprising light rifles and siege-mortars, were put in position on an oblique line across the island at distances from the fort ranging from 1300 to 1900 yards. The rifles were intended principally to dismount the enemy's guns. Early in the afternoon of the 18th all these batteries opened fire, and the navy closed in on the fort and took an active and efficient part in
September 18th, 1862 AD (search for this): chapter 1.8
en exposed, and the prudence that prompted its recall before a simple repulse could be converted into overwhelming disaster were measurably lost sight of in the chagrin of defeat. The disheartening fact was that the iron-clads had conspicuously failed in the very work for which they had been supposed to be peculiarly fit, and the country had nothing whatever to take their place. Late in May I was called to Washington, General Gillmore was on leave of absence at this time. From September 18th, 1862, to April, 1863, he had held important commands in Kentucky and West Virginia.--editors. and was informed at the consultations which followed that it was the intention to make another attack with the iron-clads, provided Fort Sumter, which was regarded as the most formidable obstacle and the key of the position, could be eliminated from the conflict, so that the fleet could pass up on the south side of the channel, leaving Fort Moultrie and the other Sullivan's Island works nearly a m
September 1st (search for this): chapter 1.8
ruin, and effectually disabled for any immediate defense of the harbor of Charleston. Having accomplished the end proposed, orders were accordingly issued on the evening of the 23d for the firing to cease, having been continuously sustained for seven days. There had been thrown 5009 projectiles, of which about one-half had struck the fort. Colonel Alfred Rhett, C. S. A., commanding Fort Sumter, reports, August 24th, One 11-inch Dahlgren, east face, the only gun serviceable ; and on September 1st, We have not a gun en barbette that can be fired; only one gun and casemate. General Stephen Elliott, C. S. A., writes as follows: When I assumed command of Fort Sumter on the 4th of September, 1863, there were no guns in position except one 32-pounder in one of the north-west casemates. This gun was merely used for firing at sunset, and was not intended for any other purpose. Early in October I mounted in the north-east casemates two 10-inch Columbiads and one 7-inch rifle. In
greatly and painfully intensified when the assaulting column has to approach in small boats from a distant point, exposed to full view and constant fire, to disembark and form upon an open beach in the presence of an enemy covered by parapets, and finally to advance to the attack against the combined fire of artillery and small-arms. Yet this was the work we had set out to do, and it was believed we had the men to do it. The demonstration up the Stono River was begun in the afternoon of July 8th, by Brigadier-General Terry, who landed on James Island with about 3800 men. The effect as subsequently ascertained was to draw a portion of the enemy's forces from our front on Morris Island. It is understood that General Beauregard denies this.-Q. A. . But see p. 14.--editors. On the evening of July 9th a small brigade was silently embarked in rowboats in Folly River behind Folly Island. It was commanded by Brigadier-General George C. Strong, who had received orders to carry the s
llery and small-arms. Yet this was the work we had set out to do, and it was believed we had the men to do it. The demonstration up the Stono River was begun in the afternoon of July 8th, by Brigadier-General Terry, who landed on James Island with about 3800 men. The effect as subsequently ascertained was to draw a portion of the enemy's forces from our front on Morris Island. It is understood that General Beauregard denies this.-Q. A. . But see p. 14.--editors. On the evening of July 9th a small brigade was silently embarked in rowboats in Folly River behind Folly Island. It was commanded by Brigadier-General George C. Strong, who had received orders to carry the south end of Morris Island by storm. By break of day the leading boats had reached Light-house inlet, where the column was halted under cover of marsh grass to await orders. The point where the landing was to be made was still nearly a mile distant, and this stretch of river had to be passed in full view under f
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