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1864 AD (search for this): chapter 4.30
eason to believe was comparatively light. There is a branch of the art of war which can be executed with such precision as fairly to entitle it to be classed as a science. I refer to logistics, so far as that term relates to the moving of armies and the placing of troops at the proper time in the immediate vicinity of a chosen battle-field. Complete ignorance of this subject or culpable neglect ruled the logistics that brought the Army of the Potomac to the battle-field of Cold Harbor in 1864. The Union arms were robbed of the advantages of the position, and of the success gained by General Sheridan on the 31st of May, by a failure to concentrate the army against the right flank of the enemy early on the morning of the 1st of June. From the failure there resulted a concentration that left four exposed flanks The wide gap between the Eighteenth and the Fifth corps made two additional flanks.--W. F. S. in close proximity to the enemy, caused a delay of many hours in the attack
2nd (search for this): chapter 4.30
line of battle, and the two divisions which had been engaged had nearly exhausted their ammunition. At 10:30 P. M. I addressed a note to General Humphreys, chief-of-staff of the Army of the Potomac, in which I wrote: I have had the honor to report my necessities and requirements for ammunition, and, having now given the present condition of my situation, must leave it for the commanding general to determine how long I can hold this line if vigorously attacked. About 12:30 A. M. of the 2d I received the following order: 10:05 P. M., June 1st. You will make your dispositions to attack to-morrow morning on General Wright's right, and in conjunction with that officer's attack. This attack should be made with your whole force and as vigorously as possible. Geo. G. Meade, Major-General. To that I returned the following reply: Your order for an attack is received. I have endeavored to represent to you my condition. In the present condition of my line an attack by
May 31st (search for this): chapter 4.30
fairly to entitle it to be classed as a science. I refer to logistics, so far as that term relates to the moving of armies and the placing of troops at the proper time in the immediate vicinity of a chosen battle-field. Complete ignorance of this subject or culpable neglect ruled the logistics that brought the Army of the Potomac to the battle-field of Cold Harbor in 1864. The Union arms were robbed of the advantages of the position, and of the success gained by General Sheridan on the 31st of May, by a failure to concentrate the army against the right flank of the enemy early on the morning of the 1st of June. From the failure there resulted a concentration that left four exposed flanks The wide gap between the Eighteenth and the Fifth corps made two additional flanks.--W. F. S. in close proximity to the enemy, caused a delay of many hours in the attack of the 1st of June, made that attack fruitless in results, and gave to us the murderous order of parallel advance to battle o
May 30th (search for this): chapter 4.30
on the morning of the 1st of June. From the failure there resulted a concentration that left four exposed flanks The wide gap between the Eighteenth and the Fifth corps made two additional flanks.--W. F. S. in close proximity to the enemy, caused a delay of many hours in the attack of the 1st of June, made that attack fruitless in results, and gave to us the murderous order of parallel advance to battle of June 3d. In conclusion, let us review the logistics of Cold Harbor. On the 30th of May, the line held by the Army of the Potomac ran along the road from Hanover Court House to Cold Harbor, beginning at a point about six miles south of the Court House, where the right of the Sixth Corps rested. To the left came the Second, Ninth, and Fifth corps in the order named, the left of the latter corps being near Bethesda Church. On that day at White House, fifteen miles to the left, the Eighteenth Army Corps was debarking. On the 31st Sheridan, with two divisions of cavalry, had
May 28th, 1864 AD (search for this): chapter 4.30
The Eighteenth Corps at Cold Harbor. by William Farrar Smith, Brevet Major-General, U. S. A. On the 27th of May an order came from Washington to me near Bermuda Hundred to concentrate sixteen thousand men under my command ready for removal by water to a point opposite White House on the Pamunkey, there to protect a corps of bridge-builders. On the 28th I received the following order: Headquarters, in the field, May 28th, 1864. Major-General Smith, Commanding Eighteenth Corps: The transportation for your column having arrived, although not in my judgment sufficient, yet in consequence of imperative orders from General Grant your column will move to his assistance. You will use the utmost expedition in embarking and getting on. If you desire any cavalry to accompany you, please designate what regiments or battalions. I grieve much that this weakness of the Army of the Potomac has called the troops away just as we were taking the offensive, and that the attack on Peter
May 28th (search for this): chapter 4.30
overed by Captain Babcock of the U. S. Navy, in command of an old New York ferry-boat on which were mounted some bow and stern guns. The whirligig of time had brought me back to the Army of the Potomac, and that army to its campaigning grounds of 1862, it having in the interim traced a path resembling that reputed to have been made by the Israelites in the wilderness. During the night of the 30th and the morning of the 31st I received three copies of an order dated Hanovertown, 1 p. M., May 28th, and signed by General Rawlins, chief-of-staff, directing me to leave a garrison at White House and move with the remainder of tile command to New Castle, on the south side of the Pamunkey River. As none of the wagons or reserve ammunition had as yet arrived, and as some of the troops were still behind, I at once sent a confidential aide (Major P. C. F. West) to ask if the necessities were such as to make it incumbent on me to move as I then stood with reference to men, transportation, and
May 30th, 1864 AD (search for this): chapter 4.30
ce at New Castle of such a force as I could gather, and in such condition as I could move it, I decided not to await an answer to my letter but to move at once. Leaving General Adelbert Ames with 2500 men at White House, I marched at 3:30 P. m. with about 10,000 infantry and artillery, but without wagons to carry supplies or ammunition. During the march I received the following autograph letter from General Grant: headquarters, armies of the United States, near Hawes's Shop, Va., May 30th, 1864, 7:30 P. M. Major-General W. F. Smith, Commanding Eighteenth Army Corps. General: Triplicated orders have been sent to you to march up the south bank of the Pamunkey to New Castle, there to await further orders. I send with this a brigade of cavalry to accompany you on the march. As yet no further directions can be given you than is contained in your orders. The movements of the enemy this evening on our left, down the Mechanicsville road, would indicate the possibility of a d
May 27th (search for this): chapter 4.30
The Eighteenth Corps at Cold Harbor. by William Farrar Smith, Brevet Major-General, U. S. A. On the 27th of May an order came from Washington to me near Bermuda Hundred to concentrate sixteen thousand men under my command ready for removal by water to a point opposite White House on the Pamunkey, there to protect a corps of bridge-builders. On the 28th I received the following order: Headquarters, in the field, May 28th, 1864. Major-General Smith, Commanding Eighteenth Corps: The transportation for your column having arrived, although not in my judgment sufficient, yet in consequence of imperative orders from General Grant your column will move to his assistance. You will use the utmost expedition in embarking and getting on. If you desire any cavalry to accompany you, please designate what regiments or battalions. I grieve much that this weakness of the Army of the Potomac has called the troops away just as we were taking the offensive, and that the attack on Pete
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