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Browsing named entities in a specific section of Robert Underwood Johnson, Clarence Clough Buell, Battles and Leaders of the Civil War. Volume 4.. Search the whole document.

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U. S. Grant (search for this): chapter 5.36
were: 37,652 infantry, 2812 artillery with 112 guns, and 2392 cavalry. This is the report as corrected by Major Kinloch Falconer, assistant adjutant-general, from official records in his office. See another estimate, p. 281.--editors. Sherman had assembled at that time an army of 98,797 men and 254 guns; but before the armies actually met, three divisions of cavalry under Generals Stoneman, Garrard, and McCook added 10,000 or 12,000 men to the number. The object prescribed to him by General Grant was to move against Johnston's army, to break it up, and to get into the interior of the enemy's country as far as he could, inflicting all the damage possible on their war resources. The occupation of Dalton by General Bragg had been accidental. He had encamped there for a night in his retreat from Missionary Ridge, and had remained because it was ascertained next morning that the pursuit had ceased. Dalton is in a valley so broad as to give ample room for the deployment of the lar
J. A. Gilmer (search for this): chapter 5.36
ort of 1865, he had 139,000 men, fit for duty. The country in which the two armies operated is not rugged; there is nothing in its character that gave advantage to the Confederates. Between Dalton and Atlanta the only mountain in sight of the railroad is Rocky-face, which aided the Federals. The small military value of mountains is indicated by the fact that in the Federal attack on June 27th our troops on Kenesaw suffered more than those on the plain. During the previous winter Major-General Gilmer, chief engineer, had wisely made an admirable base for our army by intrenching Atlanta. As a road leads from Chattanooga through Snake Creek Gap to the railroad bridge at Resaca, a light intrenchment to cover 3000 or 4000 men was made there; and to make quick communication between that point and Dalton, two rough country roads were so improved as to serve that purpose. For maps of the campaign see p. 251 and the paper by General Howard, to follow.--editors. On the 1st of May
Jefferson Davis (search for this): chapter 5.36
all said, written, or done on the subject of Mr. Davis's pages 548-9, before the armies were actual the broad valley a very favorable field. Mr. Davis descants on the advantages I had in mountainan our march to that point would require. Mr. Davis and General Sherman exhibit a strange ignoraf the country between. Dalton and Atlanta. Mr. Davis describes mountain ridges offering positionss depended on timing the attack properly. Mr. Davis conceals the facts to impute this failure tos the least strong, was full of confidence. Mr. Davis says ( Rise and fall, Vol. II., p. 533) tha a mere raid. In his telegram of the 17th Mr. Davis gave his reasons for removing me, but in Vol's letter [of October 12th, 1.878] quoted by Mr. Davis [ I. And F., Vol. II., p. 557] do not agreer. Hill said in the oration: I know that he (Mr. Davis) consulted General Lee fully, earnestly, andd express the opinions he ascribes to me. Mr. Davis condemned me for not fighting. General Sher[1 more...]
Charles R. Woods (search for this): chapter 5.36
rom the slight elevation they occupied, In his published Narrative General Johnston says: On riding from the right to the left, after nightfall, I learned that Lieutenant-General Polk's advanced troops had been driven from a hill in front of his left, which commanded our bridges at short range. And General J. D. Cox, in his volume Atlanta (Charles Scribner's Sons), says: Between 5 and 6 o'clock Logan [of McPherson] ordered forward the brigades of Generals Giles A. Smith and C. R. Woods, supported by Veatch's division from Dodge's corps. The height held by Polk was carried, and the position intrenched under a galling artillery and musketry fire from the enemy's principal lines. During the evening Polk made a vigorous effort to retake the position, but was repulsed, McPherson sending forward Lightburn's brigade to the support of the troops already engaged. The hill thus carried commanded the railroad and wagon bridges crossing the Oostenaula. [See also p. 282.] editor
T. C. Hindman (search for this): chapter 5.36
a mile south of the gap. Stevenson's was formed across the valley east of the ridge, his left meeting Cheatham's right; Hindman in line with Stevenson and on his right; Cleburne behind Mill Creek and in front of Dalton. Walker's division was in reund the north end of Rocky-face, to learn if a general movement of the enemy was in progress. He was to be supported by Hindman's division. In this reconnoissance General Stoneman's division of cavalry was encountered and driven back. The informan. On the 14th spirited fighting was maintained by the enemy on the whole front, a very vigorous attack being made on Hindman's division of Hood's corps, which was handsomely repulsed. In the meantime General Wheeler was directed to ascertain ther of Hood's corps to our left, Wheelers troops occupying the ground it had left. On the 22d General Hood reported that Hindman's and Stevenson's divisions of his corps, having been attacked, had driven back the Federal troops and had taken a line
Joseph A. Dalton (search for this): chapter 5.36
uggested that the enemy could defeat the plan, either by attacking one of our two bodies of troops on the march, with their united forces, or by advancing against Dalton before our forces there should be equipped for the field; for it was certain that they would be able to take the field before we could be ready. I proposed, therel to Rocky-face — the right a mile south of the gap, and the left near the Cleveland road. Until that day I had regarded a battle in the broad valley in which Dalton stands as inevitable. The greatly superior strength of the Federal army made the chances of battle altogether in its favor. It had also places of refuge in caseeir right flank near Mill Creek Gap and the outlet of Snake Creek Gap; and the shortness of the time in which 43,000 men could march by two good roads direct from Dalton to Resaca; and. the further fact that our post at Resaca could hold out a longer time than our march to that point would require. Mr. Davis and General Sherman
Oliver O. Howard (search for this): chapter 5.36
t intrenchment to cover 3000 or 4000 men was made there; and to make quick communication between that point and Dalton, two rough country roads were so improved as to serve that purpose. For maps of the campaign see p. 251 and the paper by General Howard, to follow.--editors. On the 1st of May I reported to the Administration that the enemy was about to advance, suggesting the transfer of at least a part of General Polk's troops to my command. Then the cavalry with convalescent horses wa, but in vain, owing to greatly inferior numbers and an insignificant supply of intrenching tools. On the 27th, however, the fighting rose above the grade of skirmishing, especially in the afternoon, when at half-past 5 o'clock the Fourth Corps (Howard) and a division of the Fourteenth (Palmer) attempted to turn our right, but the movement, after being impeded by the cavalry, was met by two regiments of our right division (Cleburne's), and the two brigades of his second line brought up on the r
J. A. Seddon (search for this): chapter 5.36
e testimony is above question — for in Southern estimation he has no superior as gentleman, soldier, and civilian--General Hampton. General Lee had a conversation with him on the subject, of which he wrote to me: On that occasion he expressed great regret that you had been removed, and said that he had done all in his power to prevent it. The Secretary of War had recently been at his Headquarters near Petersburg to consult as to this matter, and General Lee assured me that he had urged Mr. Seddon not to remove you from command, and had said to him that if you could not command the army we had no one who could. He was earnest in expressing not only his regret at your removal, but his entire confidence in yourself. Everything seen about Atlanta proved that it was to be defended. We had been strengthening it a month, and had made it, under the circumstances, impregnable. We had defended Marietta, which had not a tenth of its strength, twenty-six days. General Sherman appreciate
Edwin M. Stanton (search for this): chapter 5.36
d General Sherman claims that those features of the country were equal to the numerical difference between our forces. I would gladly have given all the mountains, ravines, rivers, and woods of Georgia for such a supply of artillery ammunition, proportionally, as he had. Thinking as he did, it is strange that he did not give himself a decided superiority of actual strength, by drawing troops from his three departments of the Cumberland, the Tennessee, and the Ohio, where, according to Secretary Stanton's report of 1865, he had 139,000 men, fit for duty. The country in which the two armies operated is not rugged; there is nothing in its character that gave advantage to the Confederates. Between Dalton and Atlanta the only mountain in sight of the railroad is Rocky-face, which aided the Federals. The small military value of mountains is indicated by the fact that in the Federal attack on June 27th our troops on Kenesaw suffered more than those on the plain. During the previous wi
J. B. Hood (search for this): chapter 5.36
exultation. After going some three miles, General Hood marched back about two, and formed his corpopposite direction every day for two weeks. General Hood did not report his extraordinary disobedienys ( Rise and fall, Vol. II., p. 533) that General Hood asserts, in his report and in a book, that ilesboro' to Atlanta, south-east of Dallas, and Hood's four miles from New Hope Church, on the road e Federal army was a little east of Dallas, and Hood's corps was placed with its center at New Hope many. In the afternoon of the 28th Lieutenant-General Hood was instructed to draw his corps to tfterward that after marching eight or ten hours Hood's corps was then at least six miles from the Feend, the other division being on its right, and Hood's corps on the right of it, Hardee's extending capture of the advanced line of breastworks General Hood directed his two divisions against the enemrtment of Tennessee has been transferred to General Hood. As to the alleged cause of my removal, I [12 more...]
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