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John B. Hood (search for this): chapter 5.37
on the 8th. At night on the 9th General Cantey reported that he had been engaged with those troops until dark. Lieutenant-General Hood was dispatched to Resaca with three divisions immediately. It so happened that the brigade of Kentucky cavalwhen McPherson felt the lines, the response was resolute and spirited. As Hardee came to reinforce us at Dug Gap, so here Hood joined us. He and part of his staff came to share our fate. Calmly we waited for the inevitable assault. We did not doubirmishers advance. As the puffs of smoke arose in the distance, as the sharp-shooters paid compliments to this group, General Hood rode up, and after a few moments' gaze turned the head of his horse and rode a few feet, and by motion called Colonel Grigsby to him; in another moment Grigsby called me, and General Hood said in a cheery yet grave tone, We must hold until night. Just at dusk the enemy began to fall back, and to our surprise the retrograde movement ended near to the point at whic
Donelson (search for this): chapter 5.37
s way from Rome to Dalton. General Sherman had in hand for attack nearly 100,000 men and 254 guns, divided into three armies — the Army of the Cumberland, commanded by General Thomas, numbering 60,773; the Army of the Tennessee, General McPherson, 24,465; the Army of the Ohio, General Schofield, 13,559. It was a superb army, admirably equipped, abundantly supplied, excellently led. It was veteran, and had known victory. It had pushed its antagonist out of Kentucky with the surrender of Donelson; had captured Tennessee; captured Vicksburg; repossessed the Mississippi River; driven its foe over Missionary Ridge in flight. It knew how to fight, and was willing to fight. On May 7th our cavalry was driven through Mill Creek Gap. On that night, after we had gone into camp, Colonel Grigsby, who commanded the Kentucky cavalry brigade, was ordered to send a regiment to the front of Dug Gap, to guard the approaches to it. In obedience to that order the 9th Kentucky Cavalry passed over
Joseph Hooker (search for this): chapter 5.37
out 4 o'clock p. M. of the 8th, Geary's division of Hooker's corps attacked two regiments of Reynolds's Arkanstination was uncertain. His march was concealed by Hooker's corps of the Army of the Cumberland, which corps, the flank movement of McPherson. The plan was for Hooker to seize Dug Gap and push forward sufficiently to pributary to Johnston. The possession of Dug Gap by Hooker not only would render Dalton untenable, but would mtect McPherson from attack on his left flank . With Hooker descending from Rocky-face on our left flank and re have been in a perilous situation. The march of Hooker and McPherson was discovered early on the morning o none too soon. All possible delay to the march of Hooker's corps was made, but about 2 P. M. Geary's divisioxas brigade relieved us, but the assault was over. Hooker had failed in his part of the mission. That flank e been captured. Fortunately McPherson knew that Hooker had failed in his attempt to seize Dug Gap, and tha
John W. Geary (search for this): chapter 5.37
gap. Grigsby's brigade was placed near Dug Gap,--the remainder in front of our right. About 4 o'clock p. M. of the 8th, Geary's division of Hooker's corps attacked two regiments of Reynolds's Arkansas brigade who were guarding Dug Gap, and who wer Dug Gap, and reached there none too soon. All possible delay to the march of Hooker's corps was made, but about 2 P. M. Geary's division of that corps drove the 9th Kentucky across the creek and slowly up the mountain-side, until the regiment fell officers and men knew that they were holding one of the doors to Dalton. I hold in my hand the official report of General Geary, by whom that attack was made, and on the whole it is a fair and soldierly report. But he is mistaken in his belief to us, for without them our ammunition would have given out; indeed it was about exhausted when the attack ceased. General Geary reports an aggregate loss of 357 officers and men, of whom some 50 were the adventurous advance, who actually reached
John R. Polk (search for this): chapter 5.37
; and it may not be improper to put on record an account of those affairs, and thereby correct the unintentional mistakes in the meager statements given above. The winter having ended, and all possible preparations having been made, the operations known as the Dalton-Atlanta campaign opened on May 5th, 1864, by the advance of General Thomas on Tunnel Hill, and on May 7th the withdrawal of our forces within Mill Creek Gap marked the beginning of the long retreat. Including the corps of General Polk, then under orders to join him, General Johnston had under his command, available for strategic purposes, between 65,000 and 70,000 men of all arms. It was a superb army of veterans, with implicit confidence in its general, and capable of great achievements. Deficient to a certain extent in supplies, it had enough for any possible movement its commander might order. Being a Confederate army, it necessarily was inferior to the army before it in numbers, equipment, and supplies. This wa
James Cantey (search for this): chapter 5.37
r Opposing Sherman's advance to Atlanta, General Joseph E. Johnston--clarum et venerabile nomen--writes [see p. 263]: Cantey with his division arrived at Resaca that evening (7th), and was charged with the defense of the place. During the day ouion had been received of the arrival of the Army of the Tennessee in Snake Creek Gap on the 8th. At night on the 9th General Cantey reported that he had been engaged with those troops until dark. Lieutenant-General Hood was dispatched to Resaca witng perhaps 250, while Snake Creek Gap was left wholly unprotected. At Resaca, where the railroad crosses the Oostenaula, Cantey's brigade was held on the evening of the 7th of May, on its way from Rome to Dalton. General Sherman had in hand for awas done. It was late in the afternoon when McPherson drove us into the works before Resaca, which were defended only by Cantey's brigade and ours. It was a gloomy prospect. We knew that McPherson had a force of from 15,000 to 20,000, and that the
J. Q. Chenowith (search for this): chapter 5.37
ping up a brisk fire as they ran. Behind the skirmish-line was developed a line of infantry. For a moment the fire staggered the head of the column, and the order to fall back and form could not be executed. The 9th Kentucky was in front, and very quickly its front companies were dismounted and a dash made for the cabins. Fortunately our men reached them first and drove the Federal skirmishers back. This gave breathing time, of which immediate and brilliant advantage was taken by Major J. Q. Chenowith, who led a portion of the 1st Kentucky, on horseback, on a detour to the right through the woods until he reached the fringe of willows, when at full run he charged the skirmish-line on the left, and the dismounted men of the 9th Kentucky charged on foot through the open field. The audacity of this sudden and unexpected dash caused the skirmish-line to run at breakneck speed, and the line of infantry to halt and to await reenforcements. This gave ample time to form the brigade for
John M. Schofield (search for this): chapter 5.37
erman had in hand for attack nearly 100,000 men and 254 guns, divided into three armies — the Army of the Cumberland, commanded by General Thomas, numbering 60,773; the Army of the Tennessee, General McPherson, 24,465; the Army of the Ohio, General Schofield, 13,559. It was a superb army, admirably equipped, abundantly supplied, excellently led. It was veteran, and had known victory. It had pushed its antagonist out of Kentucky with the surrender of Donelson; had captured Tennessee; captured remely hazardous, and completely protect McPherson from attack on his left flank . With Hooker descending from Rocky-face on our left flank and rear, McPherson holding Resaca, Thomas, with the corps of Howard and Palmer, pushing to D)alton, and Schofield to his left, our army would have been in a perilous situation. The march of Hooker and McPherson was discovered early on the morning of May 8th by the scouts of the 9th Kentucky Cavalry, and timely information was given that at least an atta
William T. Sherman (search for this): chapter 5.37
campaign. by W. P. C. Breckinridge, Colonel, C. S. A. In his paper Opposing Sherman's advance to Atlanta, General Joseph E. Johnston--clarum et venerabile nomen-- held on the evening of the 7th of May, on its way from Rome to Dalton. General Sherman had in hand for attack nearly 100,000 men and 254 guns, divided into three nor do I offer any criticism. That they were not guarded, and that this gave Sherman the easy means of causing the evacuation of Dalton and the retreat to Resaca, is undoubtedly true. That we could have held Dalton or made an attack on Sherman if these gaps had been held is a problem over which military men may differ. Whate, and able. In our ranks he was accounted the equal, perhaps the superior, of Sherman. Here was an opportunity that Sherman might well say does not occur twice in Sherman might well say does not occur twice in a single life ; and not for a moment did we doubt that such a soldier, with such an army, would seize such an opportunity. I recall the scene, as a group stood on
William J. Hardee (search for this): chapter 5.37
ade who were guarding Dug Gap, and who were soon joined by Grigsby's brigade on foot. The increased sound of musketry indicated so sharp a conflict that Lieutenant-General Hardee was requested to send Granbury's Texan brigade to the help of our people, and to take command there himself. These accessions soon decided the contest, assault was over. Hooker had failed in his part of the mission. That flank of our army was safe. The importance of holding that gap was so manifest that Generals Hardee and Cleburne, with their staffs, galloped to the scene to encourage us by their presence and to aid Colonel Grigsby by their suggestions; and though the fight any Confederate column moving on him. The intrenchments at Resaca were formidable, and when McPherson felt the lines, the response was resolute and spirited. As Hardee came to reinforce us at Dug Gap, so here Hood joined us. He and part of his staff came to share our fate. Calmly we waited for the inevitable assault. We did no
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