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ghts and running very slowly until she had passed the Union vessels. The writer of this sketch has never been able to understand why the Morgan and the boats belonging to the Gaines were not destroyed during the afternoon following the fight, as might have been done with ease and safety by any one of the monitors. This was supposed to have been the object of a little excursion of the Winnebago in the afternoon, which, however, aside from firing a few harmless and unnecessary shots at Fort Morgan, accomplished nothing. The Chickasaw (Lieutenant-Commander Perkins) at the same time shelled Fort Powell, which was evacuated about 10 P. M. that night, the officers and men escaping to the mainland. The Chickasaw also tackled Fort Gaines on the 6th, and speedily convinced the commanding officer that it would be folly to attempt to withstand a siege. The result was a surrender to the army and navy the next morning. Fort Morgan was at once invested, and surrendered on the 23d of August.
ion more perilous. With the necessary cooperation he would run inside the bay, prevent any iron-clads from crossing Dog River bar (over which they had to be floated with camels ), put a stop to the planting of torpedoes, effectually prevent blockade-running, and easily capture the garrisons of the forts. But, much to his regret, the army under General Banks started up the Red River, and he was left alone with his little fleet to watch the operations he could not prevent. At last, about May 20th, the great ram Tennessee made her appearance in the lower bay. Just before she arrived, and when it was known that Admiral Buchanan was engaged in efforts to float the ram over the bar, eight miles up the bay, Farragut wrote to Secretary Welles: I fully understand and appreciate my situation. The experience I had of the fight between the Arkansas and Admiral Davis's vessels on the Mississippi showed plainly how unequal the contest is between iron-clads and wooden vessels, in loss of li
reatly deceived. A few days later. the Tennessee came down and anchored near Fort Morgan. From that time until the battle was fought, Farragut never left the Hartford except when making inspections. It was expected that the rebel admiral would attack the blockading fleet before the iron-clads arrived, and Farragut made his preparations accordingly, even arranging extemporized torpedoes to place himself in this respect on a par with the enemy. This he did very reluctantly, writing on May 25th: Torpedoes are not so agreeable when used on both sides; therefore, I have reluctantly brought myself to it. I have always deemed it unworthy a chivalrous nation, but it does not do to give your enemy such a decided superiority over you. In the same letter he speaks of the discouraging news just received of Banks's defeat, and adds: I see by the rebel papers Buchanan is advertised to raise the blockade as soon as he is ready. As I have before informed the department, if I had t
ot go on without passing them. The reply was sent at once from the admiral, Order the monitors ahead and go on. But still the Brooklyn halted, while, to add to the horror of the situation, the monitor Tecumseh, a few hundred yards in the advance, suddenly careened to one side and almost instantly sank to the bottom, carrying with her Captain Tunis A. M. Craven and the greater part of his crew, numbering in all 114 officers and men. In Farragut's Supplementary General Order (No. 11) of July 29th, occurs the following: There are certain black buoys placed by the enemy from the piles on the west side of the channel across it towards Fort Morgan. It being understood that there are torpedoes and other obstructions between the buoys, the vessels will take care to pass eastward of the easternmost buoy, which is clear of all obstructions. The easternmost buoy was the famous red buoy which figures in all accounts of the battle. As the fleet approached, the Tennessee was lying in
call for the iron-clads in the Mississippi. After the Red River disaster, General Grant decided that the majority of the fighting men of the army could be used to better advantage in Virginia, and the force in the Department of the Gulf was largely reduced. It was not The Richmond and the Lackawanna stripped for the fight. From a War-time sketch. until the latter part of July, 1864, that General Canby could make his arrangements to cooperate with Farragut at Mobile Bay. On the 3d of August a division of troops, under General Gordon Granger, landed on the west end of Dauphine Island and began preparations for a siege of Fort Gaines. Meantime, also, three monitors had arrived and a fourth was daily expected, and at last the time, for which Admiral Farragut had so long been praying, arrived. On the morning of August 4th a detachment of army signal officers, under command of the late Major Frank W. Marston, arrived by tug from New Orleans. They were distributed among the p
hine Island and began preparations for a siege of Fort Gaines. Meantime, also, three monitors had arrived and a fourth was daily expected, and at last the time, for which Admiral Farragut had so long been praying, arrived. On the morning of August 4th a detachment of army signal officers, under command of the late Major Frank W. Marston, arrived by tug from New Orleans. They were distributed among the principal vessels of the fleet, for the purpose of communicating with General Granger's foas the confidence reposed in him, the recollection that he had not failed in his former attempts, and his manifest faith in the success of the projected movement, that inspired all around him. The scene on the Cowslip that afternoon of the 4th of August was a notable one, as she steamed within range of the forts. The central figure was the grand old admiral, his plans all completed, affable with all, evidently not thinking of failure as among the possibilities of the morrow, and filling eve
August 23rd (search for this): chapter 7.51
ghts and running very slowly until she had passed the Union vessels. The writer of this sketch has never been able to understand why the Morgan and the boats belonging to the Gaines were not destroyed during the afternoon following the fight, as might have been done with ease and safety by any one of the monitors. This was supposed to have been the object of a little excursion of the Winnebago in the afternoon, which, however, aside from firing a few harmless and unnecessary shots at Fort Morgan, accomplished nothing. The Chickasaw (Lieutenant-Commander Perkins) at the same time shelled Fort Powell, which was evacuated about 10 P. M. that night, the officers and men escaping to the mainland. The Chickasaw also tackled Fort Gaines on the 6th, and speedily convinced the commanding officer that it would be folly to attempt to withstand a siege. The result was a surrender to the army and navy the next morning. Fort Morgan was at once invested, and surrendered on the 23d of August.
sland, came to anchor. Let us now return to the other vessels of the fleet, which we left massed in front of Fort Morgan by the remarkable action of the Brooklyn in stopping and refusing to move ahead. When the ram Tennessee turned away from the Hartford, as narrated, she made for the fleet, and in their crowded and confused condition it seemed to be a matter of no difficulty to pick out whatever victims the Confederate commander (Admiral Franklin Buchanan) might desire, as he had done in 1861 when commanding the Merrimac in Hampton Roads. Before he could reach them the line had become straightened, and the leading vessels had passed the fort. Admiral Jenkins, who commanded the Richmond during the fight, writing of this part of the fight, for the use of the present writer, says: During the delay under the guns of Fort Morgan and the water-battery by the backing of the Brooklyn, the vessels astern had remained apparently stationary, so that the nearest one to the Richmond was
July, 1863 AD (search for this): chapter 7.51
Farragut at Mobile Bay. based upon the author's paper in the century for May, 1881, entitled an August morning with Farragut, revised and extended for the present work.--editors. by John Coddington Kinney, first Lieutenant, 13TH Connecticut infantry, and Acting signal officer, U. S. A. After the Mississippi was opened in July, 1863, by the capture of Vicksburg and the consequent surrender of Port Hudson, Admiral Farragut devoted a large share of his attention to the operations against Mobile Bay. He was aware that the Confederates were actively engaged in the construction of rains and iron-clads at Mobile and above, and it was his earnest desire to force the entrance into Mobile Bay and capture the forts that guarded it, before the more powerful of the new vessels could be finished and brought down to aid in the defense. In January, 1864, he made a reconnoissance of Forts Gaines and Morgan, at which time no Confederate vessels were in the lower bay, except one transport. In
for the cooperation of a brigade of five thousand soldiers to enable him, after running into the bay, to reduce the forts at his leisure. It is easy to see now the wisdom of his plan. Had the operations against Mobile been undertaken promptly, as he desired, the entrance into the bay would have been effected with much less cost of men and materials, Mobile would have been captured a year earlier than it was, and the Union cause would have been saved the disaster of the Red River campaign of 1864. At this late day it is but justice to Farragut to admit the truth. His position at the time was one of great anxiety. He saw the ease with which the forts could be captured if a few thousand troops could be obtained to cooperate with his fleet. He knew that the Confederates were bending all their energies to the construction of three or more powerful rams, to meet which he had until late in the summer nothing but wooden vessels. Every day was strengthening the Confederate situation an
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