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Browsing named entities in Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.).

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1809 AD (search for this): chapter 1
ndred thousand French wishing to march upon Vienna, or any other capital, there to dictate peace (1809); and they would not do the guerillas of Mina the honor to combat them in the same manner that thtervention may arrest the most brilliant career of success. The invasions of Austria in 1805 and 1809, would probably have taken another turn if Prussia had intervened in them; that of the north of G the Swiss against Austria and against the Duke of Burgundy; those of the Catalans in 1712 and in 1809; the difficulties which the Russians experience in subduing the people of Caucasus; finally, the of war. This system is nothing else than that employed by France in 1792, imitated by Austria in 1809, and by all Germany in 1813. In view of this I should not have expected the misplaced attacks of him who should have menaced them. For instance, the double hand to hand struggle of Napoleon in 1809, with Austria and Spain, sus tained by England, was much more grave for him, than if he had had t
1793 AD (search for this): chapter 1
se; the war of Napoleon in Spain, plainly proves this; the wars of the French Revolution in 1792, 1793 and 1794, demonstrate it still better; for if this last power was taken, less unprovided than Spare a hundred thousand Vendeans and a hundred thousand federalists able to do for the coalition of 1793? History offers but a single example of a struggle like that of the French revolution, and it army would have taken. The problem then presents two equally grave hypotheses; the campaign of 1793 has resolved it but in one sense: it would be difficult to resolve it in the other; it is to expequestion of leading on rapidly to the end. Its conduct, very different from that of the allies in 1793, merits the reflection of all those who should have like expeditions to direct. It was, thereforeror Alexander in 1812, were almost impossible to avoid. France had all Europe on her hands in 1793, in consequence of the extravagant provocations of the Jacobins, of the exaltation of the two par
1807 AD (search for this): chapter 1
ll have importance relatively to the positions of the two armies already at war. Let us cite an example. In the winter of 1807, Napoleon crossed the Vistula, and ventured under the walls of Konigsberg, having Austria in his rear, and the whole mass ity with his frontiers, is more favorable than the others. It is the situation in which Austria would leave been found in 1807, had she known how to profit from her position; it is also that in which she was found in 1813. Adjacent to Saxony, wheren 1805 and 1809, would probably have taken another turn if Prussia had intervened in them; that of the north of Germany in 1807, depended equally as much upon the cabinet of Vienna. Finally, that of Romelia in 1829, assured by measures of a wise andat least, rendered the struggle long and bloody, by rousing the national pride with the idea of an occupation like that of 1807. But, emboldened by the good reception of all the population, it comprehended that it was an operation more political tha
1823 AD (search for this): chapter 1
usceptible of excuses, if not even of approbation. The invasion of Spain, executed in 1808, and that which had place in 1823, differ certainly as much in their object as in their results; the first, dictated by a spirit of invasion, and. conductedhun whatever could alarm the nation as to its independence and the integrity of its territory. The war made in Spain in 1823, and of which we have spoken in the preceding article, is an example to cite in favor of those truths, and in opposition ta war of opinion, a national and civil war, whilst, if the first war with Spain, in 1808, was altogether national, that of 1823 was a partial struggle of opinions without nationality: hence the enormous difference in the results. The expedition ofble to calm and to bring together in course of time. Those camps have come anew to blows, as I had predicted at Verona in 1823; a great lesson, from which it appears for the rest, that no person is disposed to profit in this beautiful and too unhapp
1792 AD (search for this): chapter 1
ighbor, is a hazardous enterprise; the war of Napoleon in Spain, plainly proves this; the wars of the French Revolution in 1792, 1793 and 1794, demonstrate it still better; for if this last power was taken, less unprovided than Spain, neither had it uggles of Islamism and the Crusades. Wars of political opinions present nearly the same categories. It is true that in 1792, extravagant societies were seen who really thought to spread the famous declaration of the rights of man over all Europe, in opposition to that of the French Revolution. Doubtless the conditions were somewhat different, for the French army of 1792, was composed of elements more solid than that of the radicals of the island of Leon. The war of the Revolution was at once, and of assuring the defense of the country in case of war. This system is nothing else than that employed by France in 1792, imitated by Austria in 1809, and by all Germany in 1813. In view of this I should not have expected the misplaced attack
1829 AD (search for this): chapter 1
icant as to be disdained with impunity by a never so formidable State; a truth which, for the rest, could not be called in question without denying all the teachings of history. Article V: wars of intervention. this Article was written in 1829. Of all wars that a State can undertake, the most suitable, the most advantageous for it, is certainly the war of intervention in a struggle already engaged. The cause for it will easily be comprehended: a State which thus intervenes, puts in success. The invasions of Austria in 1805 and 1809, would probably have taken another turn if Prussia had intervened in them; that of the north of Germany in 1807, depended equally as much upon the cabinet of Vienna. Finally, that of Romelia in 1829, assured by measures of a wise and moderate policy, could have had fatal results if care had not been taken to remove every chance of an intervention by those negociations. Article VII: wars of opinion. Although wars of opinion, national
1712 AD (search for this): chapter 1
n, of alarming the enemy on all points of the country which he occupies, but still by the difficulties which will be interposed to its supplies by the maritime route. The nature of the country contributes also a great deal to the facility of a national defense; mountainous countries are always those in which a people is most formidable. After those come countries cut up by vast forests. The struggle of the Swiss against Austria and against the Duke of Burgundy; those of the Catalans in 1712 and in 1809; the difficulties which the Russians experience in subduing the people of Caucasus; finally, the reiterated efforts of the Tyroleans, demonstrated sufficiently that mountain people have always resisted longer than those of the plains, as much through their character and manners, as from the nature of those countries. Defiles and great forests favor, as well as cliffs, this kind of partial defense; and the Bocage of La Vendee, become so justly celebrated, proves that every difficu
1552 AD (search for this): chapter 1
say, sufficiently contiguous to her frontiers to permit the greatest possible development of her strength, but because still she intervened in a struggle already commenced, in which she entered with all the weight of her means, and at the instant which suited her. This double advantage is so decisive that we have seen, not only the great monarchies, but even very small States, become preponderant, by knowing how to seize this fitness of time. Two examples will suffice to prove this. In 1552, the Elector Maurice, of Saxony, dared to declare himself openly against Charles Fifth, master of Spain, of Italy, and of the Germanic empire; against Charles, victorious over Francis First, and pressing France in his firm grasp. This movement, which transported the war to the heart of the Tyrol, arrested the great man who menaced to swallow up everything. In 1706, the Duke of Savoy, Victor Amedius, declaring against Louis XIV, changes the face of affairs in Italy, and brings back the Frenc
1799 AD (search for this): chapter 1
ity, an auxiliary of Austria and France; it was, however, a principal party in the north, until the occupation of Old Prussia by its troops; but when Generals Fermor and Soltikoff conducted the army into Brandenburg, then it no longer acted but in the Austrian interest; those troops, thrown far from their base, were at the mercy of a good or bad manoeuvre of their allies. Such remote excursions expose to dangers, and are ordinarily very delicate for the general of an army. The campaign of 1799, and of 1805, furnished sad proofs of this, which we shall recall in treating of those expeditions under the military aspect, (art. 30.) It results from these examples, that those remote interventions often compromise the armies which are charged with them; but on the other hand, one has the advantage that his own country at least could not be so easily invaded, since the theatre of war is carried far from his frontiers; what makes the misfortune of a general, is here a benefit for the Stat
1808 AD (search for this): chapter 1
t plausible motives, is an outrage against humanity, like those of Zingis Khan; but when it can be justified by a great interest and a laudable motive, it is susceptible of excuses, if not even of approbation. The invasion of Spain, executed in 1808, and that which had place in 1823, differ certainly as much in their object as in their results; the first, dictated by a spirit of invasion, and. conducted with cunning, menaced the existence of the Spanish Nation, and was fatal to its author; thdifferent, for the French army of 1792, was composed of elements more solid than that of the radicals of the island of Leon. The war of the Revolution was at once a war of opinion, a national and civil war, whilst, if the first war with Spain, in 1808, was altogether national, that of 1823 was a partial struggle of opinions without nationality: hence the enormous difference in the results. The expedition of the Duke d'angouleme was, moreover, well conducted in regard to execution. There w
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