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Browsing named entities in a specific section of Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.). Search the whole document.

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Arcola, Douglas County, Illinois (Illinois, United States) (search for this): chapter 2
and no one perhaps can better than myself appreciate it at its just value. It is especially in the midst of a council of war that this part must be absurd, and the more numerous,the council, and the higher the military dignitaries of which it shall be composed, the more difficult it will be to cause truth and reason to triumph in it if there be ever so little dissidence. What would a council of war have done in which Napoleon, in quality of counselor, should have proposed the movement of Arcola, the plan of Rivoli, the march by the St. Bernard, the movement of Ulm, and that upon Gera and Jena? The timid would have found those operations rash even to folly; others would have seen a thousand difficulties of execution; all would have rejected them. If, on the contrary, the council should have accepted them, and another than Napoleon should have conducted them, would they not certainly have failed? Therefore, in my opinion, councils of war are a deplorable resource; it can only ha
Department de Ville de Paris (France) (search for this): chapter 2
time, have borne their fruits; the maps recently published at Vienna, Berlin, Munich, Stuttgard, Paris, as well as those of the interesting institute of Herder, at Friburg in Brisgau, assure to futurils of war established in the capitol near the government. Louvois, directed a long time from Paris, the armies of Louis XIV, and did it with success. Carnot directed also from Paris the armies oParis the armies of the Republic; in 1793 he did very well, and saved France; in 1794 he did at first very badly, then repaired his faults by chance; in 1796 he did decidedly very badly. But Louvois and Carnot directouncil, for if it has the pretention to tell the generalissimo not only to march to Vienna or to Paris, but still to indicate to him the manner in which he must manoeuvre in order to arrive there, th a continental nation, which should adopt the manners of the city of London, or of the bourse of Paris, would sooner or later be the prey of its neighbors. It was to the assemblage of civic virtues
Wagram (Niederosterreich, Austria) (search for this): chapter 2
in this category. The remedy is in strong institutions and skillful chiefs alone. The French even, whose military virtues have never been questioned when they have been well conducted, have often witnessed those alarms which it is permitted to call rediculous. Who does not recall the inconceivable panic terror with which the infantry of Marshal Villars was seized after having gained the battle of Friedlingen (1704)? The same thing had place in the infantry of Napoleon after the victory of Wagram, when the enemy was in full retreat. And, what is more extraordinary still, is the rout of the 97th demi-brigade at the seige of Genoa, where fifteen hundred men fled before a platoon of hussars, whilst that those same men took two days after the Diamond Fort by one of the most vigorous coups-de-main of modern history. It would seem, nevertheless, very easy to convince brave soldiers that death strikes more quickly and more surely men flying in disorder, than those who remian united to p
Eylau (Russia) (search for this): chapter 2
ces. Superiority of armament may augment the chances of success in war; it does not of itself gain battles, but it contributes to it. Every one recollects how the great inferiority of the French in artillery came near becoming fatal to them at Eylau, and at Marengo. It is recollected also, what the French heavy cavalry have gained in adopting the cuirass, which it had so long repulsed; each one knows finally, of what advantage is the lance; doubtless lancers as foragers are no better than h direction; the schrapnell shells, which launch floods of grape to the range of the ball; steam guns of Perkins, which vomit as many balls as a battalion, are going to centuple perhaps the chances of carnage, as if the hecatombs of the species of Eylau, of Borodino, of Leipzig, and of Waterloo, were not sufficient for desolating the European populations. If sovereigns do not unite in congress to proscribe those inventions of death and destruction, there will remain no other course to take th
Waterloo (Belgium) (search for this): chapter 2
he organization of troops. The means of destruction are being perfected with a frightful progression; the congreve rockets, of which the Austrians have succeeded, it is said, in regulating the effect and the direction; the schrapnell shells, which launch floods of grape to the range of the ball; steam guns of Perkins, which vomit as many balls as a battalion, are going to centuple perhaps the chances of carnage, as if the hecatombs of the species of Eylau, of Borodino, of Leipzig, and of Waterloo, were not sufficient for desolating the European populations. If sovereigns do not unite in congress to proscribe those inventions of death and destruction, there will remain no other course to take than to compose the half of armies of cuirassed cavalry, to be able to capture with the greatest rapidity all the machines; and the infantry even will be compelled to retake its iron armour of the middle ages, without which a battalion could be struck down before approaching the enemy. We ma
Frederick, Md. (Maryland, United States) (search for this): chapter 2
ld have the least part therein. The question has often been agitated whether the command should be given in preference to the general habituated from long experience to the conduct of troops, or to generals of the staff or scientific arms, little habituated, themselves to managing troops. It is incontestable that grand warfare is a science altogether separate, and that one may very well combine operations without having himself led a regiment to the enemy; Peter the Great, Conda,acute; Frederick and Napoleon are in point to prove it. It cannot be denied then that a man come from the staff may become a great captain as well as any other; but it will not be for having grown old in the functions of quarter-master that he will have the capacity for supreme command, it will be because he possesses in himself the natural genius for war and the requisite character. In the same manner, a general from the ranks of the infantry or of the cavalry, will be as fit as a learned tactician to co
Silesia (search for this): chapter 2
himself necessary for directing every thing according to his own will, the best system which he can adopt, will be to imitate precisely what the Prussian government did with Blucher; that is to say, to call to his assistance two generals the most famed for their capacity, the one taken from among men of acknowledged executive qualities, the other taken from among the best instructed chiefs of the staff. This trinity, if it agree well, can give excellent results, as had place in the army of Silesia in 1813. The same system would be suitable also in the case where the monarch should judge it proper to confide the command to a prince of his house, as has frequently been seen since the time of Louis XIV. The prince was often decorated only with the titular command, whilst a counselor was imposed upon him who commanded in reality. This was the case with the Duke of Orleans and Marsin, at the famous battle of Turin, then with the Duke of Burgundy and Vendome, at the battle of Oudenard.
Borodino (Russia) (search for this): chapter 2
t of the nature of arms, or the organization of troops. The means of destruction are being perfected with a frightful progression; the congreve rockets, of which the Austrians have succeeded, it is said, in regulating the effect and the direction; the schrapnell shells, which launch floods of grape to the range of the ball; steam guns of Perkins, which vomit as many balls as a battalion, are going to centuple perhaps the chances of carnage, as if the hecatombs of the species of Eylau, of Borodino, of Leipzig, and of Waterloo, were not sufficient for desolating the European populations. If sovereigns do not unite in congress to proscribe those inventions of death and destruction, there will remain no other course to take than to compose the half of armies of cuirassed cavalry, to be able to capture with the greatest rapidity all the machines; and the infantry even will be compelled to retake its iron armour of the middle ages, without which a battalion could be struck down before
Leipzig (Saxony, Germany) (search for this): chapter 2
re of arms, or the organization of troops. The means of destruction are being perfected with a frightful progression; the congreve rockets, of which the Austrians have succeeded, it is said, in regulating the effect and the direction; the schrapnell shells, which launch floods of grape to the range of the ball; steam guns of Perkins, which vomit as many balls as a battalion, are going to centuple perhaps the chances of carnage, as if the hecatombs of the species of Eylau, of Borodino, of Leipzig, and of Waterloo, were not sufficient for desolating the European populations. If sovereigns do not unite in congress to proscribe those inventions of death and destruction, there will remain no other course to take than to compose the half of armies of cuirassed cavalry, to be able to capture with the greatest rapidity all the machines; and the infantry even will be compelled to retake its iron armour of the middle ages, without which a battalion could be struck down before approaching
Charles (search for this): chapter 2
s deplorable, for then, in fact, no person is responsible. Every one knows that at Turin, the Duke of Orleans judged with more sagacity than Marshal Marsin, and the exhibition of full secret powers from the king was necessary, to cause the battle to be lost against the advice of the prince who commanded. In the same manner at Ulm, the Arch-Duke Ferdinand displayed more courage and skill than Mack, who was to serve him as mentor. If the prince have the genius and experience of an Arch-Duke Charles, he should be given the command with carte-blanche, and with the choice of his instruments. If he have not yet required the same titles, he may be sur rounded like Blucher, with an instructed chief of staff, and with a counselor taken from among men of tried execution. But in no case would it be wise to give those counselors other power than a consultative voice. We have said above, that if the prince does not himself conduct his armies, the most important of his duties will be that
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