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Browsing named entities in a specific section of Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.). Search the whole document.

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Borodino (Russia) (search for this): chapter 4
and that of the extremity, having almost the whole of the assailing masses to combat,will be overwhelmed and probably destroyed. This was the manoeuvre which caused Napoleon to triumph at Wagram and at Ligny; it was what he wished to attempt at Borodino and which only succeeded imperfectly on account of the heroic defense of the troops of the left wing of the Russians, that of the division Paskevitch il the famous redoubt of the centre, then by the arrival of the corps of Baggavout upon the win, at Brienne, he presented a kind of convex order nearly like that in figure 7, at Wagram we see him adopt an order quite like that in figure 12, directing two masses upon his centre and his right, refusing his left, which he wished to repeat at Borodino, as well as at Waterloo before the arrival of the Prussians. At Eylau, although the encounter was almost unforeseen on account of the unlooked for offensive return of the Russian army, he outflanked the left almost perpendicularly, whilst upon
Marengo, Iowa (Iowa, United States) (search for this): chapter 4
camp; moreover, the attack of his left was combined with that of Vandamme upon the line of retreat of the Allies. At Marengo, if Napoleon himself is to be trusted, the oblique order which he took in resting his right upon Castel Ceriolo, saved hear all the more astonishing that Napoleon, as we have just said, has himself boasted of having applied with success, at Marengo, this same order the existence of which he denies. If we took the oblique system in the absolute sense which General f Engen with four companies of the 58th regiment, and it is known what the 9th Light and the cavalry of Kellerman did at Marengo. will be then, at the decisive moment of the battle, the problem which every skilfull general will apply himself to resoe difficult, for, in order to premeditate them, it is necessary to know precisely the situation of the hostile camp. At Marengo, at Lutzen, at Eylau, there were a kind of surprises, but these were in reality only unexpected attacks to which this na
Lutzen (Saxony-Anhalt, Germany) (search for this): chapter 4
is where we recognize the seal of the great captain. It is always possible to gain a battle with brave troops, without the chief of the army being able to ar-rogate to himself the least part in the success of the day, but a victory like those of Lutzen, of Luzzara, of Eylau, of Abensberg, can be the result only of a great character, joined to great presence of mind, and to wise combinations. There is too much of chance and too much of poetry in these kinds of rencounters, easily to give posiunter dispositions. Since armies no longer encamp in tents, surprises combined in advance are more rare and more difficult, for, in order to premeditate them, it is necessary to know precisely the situation of the hostile camp. At Marengo, at Lutzen, at Eylau, there were a kind of surprises, but these were in reality only unexpected attacks to which this name cannot be given. The only great surprise that we could cite, is that of Taroutin, in 1812, where Murat was assailed and beaten by Ben
Waterloo, Ala. (Alabama, United States) (search for this): chapter 4
rength consisted in his weight of fire, chose well the position of Waterloo, all the avenues of which he swept to a distance by a rasant fire.the position of the Albis was rather a strategic position, that of Waterloo a position for battle. The maxims which must ordinarily be observdvantageous for a defensive army, as the battles of Malplaquet and Waterloo have proved. To attain this object, immense obstacles are not necen. The retreat would be all the more sure if, as was the case at Waterloo, the forest formed a concave line in the rear of the centre, for tat Austerlitz, that of Wellington at Talavera, at Salamanca and at Waterloo, prove these truths. Article XXXII: offensive battles, and diing his left, which he wished to repeat at Borodino, as well as at Waterloo before the arrival of the Prussians. At Eylau, although the encou. Among the turning manoeuvres which have succeeded in our day, Waterloo and Hohenlinden were those which had the most brilliant results; b
Leipzig (Saxony, Germany) (search for this): chapter 4
orders of battle is neither chimerical nor useless. Indeed there is nothing even in the battles of Napoleon which does not prove this assertion, although they are less than all others susceptible of being figured by lines traced with the compass; we see, for example, that at Rivoli, Austerlitz, Ratisbon, he concentrated his forces upon the centre in order to watch the moment for falling upon that of the enemy. At the Pyramids he formed an oblique line in echelon squares; at Essling, at Leipsic, at Brienne, he presented a kind of convex order nearly like that in figure 7, at Wagram we see him adopt an order quite like that in figure 12, directing two masses upon his centre and his right, refusing his left, which he wished to repeat at Borodino, as well as at Waterloo before the arrival of the Prussians. At Eylau, although the encounter was almost unforeseen on account of the unlooked for offensive return of the Russian army, he outflanked the left almost perpendicularly, whilst u
Placentia (Canada) (search for this): chapter 4
g, which we have reported in the history of the wars of the Revolution, (Chap. 21, and 52,) that of the lines of Turin, by Prince Eugene of Savoy, in 1706, are great lessons to study. This famous event of Turin, which we have already often cited, is too well known for us to recall its circumstances, but we could not dispense with observing that never was a triumph bought so cheaply, nor more difficult to conceive. In truth, the strategic plan was admirable; the march from the Adige by Placentia upon Asti by the right of the Po, leaving the French upon the Mincio, was perfectly combined; but as for the operations under Turin, it must be owned that the conquerors were more fortunate than wise. The Prince Eugene had no need of a great effort of genius to draw up the order which he gave his army, and he must have cruelly despised his adversaries to execute the march which was to direct thirty-five thousand allies of ten different nations, between eighty thousand French and the Alps,
Berlin (Berlin, Germany) (search for this): chapter 4
oblique order is a modern conception an inapplicable utopia, which I equally deny, for the oblique order is as ancient as Thebes and Sparta, and I have seen it applied under my own eyes; those assertions will appear all the more astonishing that Napoleon, as we have just said, has himself boasted of having applied with success, at Marengo, this same order the existence of which he denies. If we took the oblique system in the absolute sense which General Ruchel gave to it in the Academy of Berlin, certainly Napoleon would be right in regarding it as an hyperbole: but I repeat, a line of battle was never a perfect geometrical figure; and if we have used such figures in tactical discussions, it was in order to put in force an idea and to explain it by a symbol. It is certain nevertheless that every line of battle which should neither be parallel nor perpendicular to that of the enemy, would of necessity be oblique. Now if an army attacks an extremity of the enemy, by reinforcing the
Frederick, Md. (Maryland, United States) (search for this): chapter 4
for rendering these truths more sensible, and cause to be appreciated the difference which exists in the results of like movements, according to the army and the general with which we are to be measured. We have seen in the Seven Years War, Frederick gain the battle of Prague, because the Austrians had left a feeble interval of from a thousand to twelve hundred yards between their right and the rest of their army, and because this remainder of the army continued immoveable whilst that the rlmed; this inaction was all the more extraordinary as the left of the imperialists had much less distance to make in order to succor their own, than Frederick to attain the right, which, formed in crotchet, compelled a semi-circular movement Frederick came near on the contrary losing the battle of Torgau for having made with his left, a movement too extended and loose, (near two leagues), to the end of turning the right of Marshal Daun. See for these two battles, Chapts. 2 and 25, of the
France (France) (search for this): chapter 4
nation of the formation and the employment of the three arms, which will make the subject of Chapter 7. With regard to details of application and execution of the various orders of battle, nothing more complete could. be recommended than the work of the Marquis de Tiernay; it is the remarkable part of his book. Without believing that all which he indicates can be practiced in presence of an enemy, yet it is just to acknowledge that it is the best tactical work that has been published in France up to this day. Article XXXIII: turning manoeuvres, and too extended movements in battles. We have spoken, in the preceding article, of manoeuvres undertaken for turning the enemy in the day of battle, and of the advantage that might be expected from it. It remains for us to say a few words upon the too extended movements to which those manoeuvres often give place, and which have caused the failure of so many projects in appearance well concerted. In principle, every movement suf
Jena (Thuringia, Germany) (search for this): chapter 4
actively engaged upon the left until towards one o'clock. At Dresden he attacked by the two wings, for the first time perhaps in his life, because his center was sheltered by a fort and an intrenched camp; moreover, the attack of his left was combined with that of Vandamme upon the line of retreat of the Allies. At Marengo, if Napoleon himself is to be trusted, the oblique order which he took in resting his right upon Castel Ceriolo, saved him from an almost inevitable defeat. Ulm and Jena were battles gained strategically, before being delivered even, and tactics had but little part in them; at Ulm there was not even a battle. I think then I can conclude that, if it be absurd to expect to draw upon the ground rectilinear orders of battle such as are traced upon a plan, a skillful general can nevertheless have recourse to dispositions which would produce a distribution of the acting masses, similar very nearly to what it would have been in one or another of the orders of bat
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