hide Sorting

You can sort these results in two ways:

By entity
Chronological order for dates, alphabetical order for places and people.
By position (current method)
As the entities appear in the document.

You are currently sorting in ascending order. Sort in descending order.

hide Most Frequent Entities

The entities that appear most frequently in this document are shown below.

Entity Max. Freq Min. Freq
Napoleon 378 0 Browse Search
France (France) 164 0 Browse Search
Austria (Austria) 120 0 Browse Search
Europe 90 0 Browse Search
England (United Kingdom) 64 0 Browse Search
Ulm 52 0 Browse Search
Moreau 50 4 Browse Search
Preussen 46 0 Browse Search
Dresden (Saxony, Germany) 42 0 Browse Search
Ney 39 3 Browse Search
View all entities in this document...

Browsing named entities in a specific section of Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.). Search the whole document.

Found 363 total hits in 110 results.

1 2 3 4 5 6 ...
Toulouse (France) (search for this): chapter 5
it is proper to make them perpendicularly, departing from the frontier towards the centre of the country, or to direct them parallelly to the frontier. Those parallel retreats, if the defenders of Bulow must be believed, could be none other than those he has, it is said, recommended under the name excentric. For example, Marshal Soult, abandoning the Pyrenees in 1814, had to choose between tween a retreat upon Bordeaux, which would have led him to the centre of France, or a retreat upon Toulouse by moving along the frontier of the Pyrenees. In the same manner Frederick, in retiring from Moravia, marched upon Bohemia, instead of regaining Silesia. These parallel retreats are often preferable, inasmuch as they turn the enemy from a march upon the capitol of the State and upon the centre of its power; the configuration of the frontiers, the fortresses which are found there, the greater or less space which an army would find for moving, and re-establishing its direct communications
Pyrenees (search for this): chapter 5
o direct them parallelly to the frontier. Those parallel retreats, if the defenders of Bulow must be believed, could be none other than those he has, it is said, recommended under the name excentric. For example, Marshal Soult, abandoning the Pyrenees in 1814, had to choose between tween a retreat upon Bordeaux, which would have led him to the centre of France, or a retreat upon Toulouse by moving along the frontier of the Pyrenees. In the same manner Frederick, in retiring from Moravia, marPyrenees. In the same manner Frederick, in retiring from Moravia, marched upon Bohemia, instead of regaining Silesia. These parallel retreats are often preferable, inasmuch as they turn the enemy from a march upon the capitol of the State and upon the centre of its power; the configuration of the frontiers, the fortresses which are found there, the greater or less space which an army would find for moving, and re-establishing its direct communications with the centre of the State, are so many considerations which influence the opportuneness of these operations
Holland (Netherlands) (search for this): chapter 5
e north to England, to France, and even to Italy? Since the invention of cannon, the too celebrated Armada of Philip II was the only colossal enterprise until that which Napoleon formed against England in 1803. All the other expeditions beyond the sea were partial operations; those of Charles V, and of Sebastian of Portugal, upon the Coast of Africa; several descents, like those of the French upon the United States of America, upon Egypt and St. Domingo; those of the English upon Egypt, Holland, Copenhagen, Antwerp, Philadelphia, all enter into the same category. I do not speak of the project of Hoche against Ireland, for it did not succeed, and it shows all the difficulty of these kinds of enterprises. The large armies which the great States keep up at this day, does not admit of their being attacked by descents of thirty or forty thousand men. We can then only form similar enterprises against secondary States, for it is very difficult to embark a hundred or a hundred and fif
Magdeburg (Saxony-Anhalt, Germany) (search for this): chapter 5
his columns, then the retreat must recommence in the night, in order to regain ground. The third method of retreat, that of following several parallel routes, is very suitable when those routes are sufficiently near to each other. But if they are too far removed apart, each of the wings of the army, separated from the others, might be separately compromised, if the enemy, directing the weight of his forces upon it, obliged it to receive battle. The Prussian army, coming in 1806, from Magdeburg to gain the Oder, furnishes proof of this. The fourth system, which consists in following two concentric routes, is without doubt the most suitable, when the troops are found removed from each other at the moment when the retreat is ordered; nothing is then better than the rallying of one's forces, and the concentric retreat is the only means of succeeding in it. The fifth mode indicated, is nothing else than the famous system of excentric lines, which I have attributed to Bulow, and
Kehl (Baden-Wurttemberg, Germany) (search for this): chapter 5
it is time to speak of their execution. History is the best school for studying the measures proper for securing their success. The ancients have made a marvel of that of the Granicus, which is but a rivulet. In this respect the moderns have greater actions to cite. The passage of the Rhine at Tolhuys, by Louis XIV, is not the one which has made the least noise, and it must be owned that it is worthy of remark. In our day, General Dedon has celebrated the two passages of the Rhine at Kehl, and that of the Danube at Hochstaedt in 1800: his work should be consulted as classic for details; now, precision in details is everything for these kinds of operations. Finally, three other passages of the Danube, and the ever-celebrated one of the Beresina, surpassed all that had been seen until then of this kind. The first two were those which Napoleon executed at Essling and at Wagram, in presence of an army of a hundred and twenty thousand men, provided with four hundred pieces of a
Biberach (Baden-Wurttemberg, Germany) (search for this): chapter 5
in proportion, then it may well remain a march in rear; that depends on its strength, the nature of the country, and on the enemy with whom we have to do. If the latter becomes too pressing, it would be important not to allow ourselves to be crowded too close, especially if the army were yet in tolerably good order. It is proper in this case to halt from time to time and to fall unexpectedly upon the advanced guards of the enemy, as the Arch-Duke Charles did in 1796 at Neresheim, Moreau at Biberach and Kleber at Ukerath. Such a manoeuvre almost always succeeds by the surprise which this offensive return causes in a troop which expects only to gather easy trophies. Passages of rivers in retreat also offer combinations which are not without interest: if it be a small stream with permanent bridges, it is only a passage of an ordinary defile; but if it be a river which has to be crossed upon bridges of boats, it is a more delicate manoeuvre. All the precautions which can be prescribe
Strasburg, Va. (Virginia, United States) (search for this): chapter 5
nt themselves after the passages, is to cover the bridges against the enemy without meanwhile con straining too much the enterprises which the army might wish to undertake. When they have place, with a great numerical superiority, or at the end of great victories already gained, the thing is not so embarrassing; but when they are executed at the beginning of a campaign, in presence of an enemy almost equal in forces, the case is different. If a hundred thousand French pass the Rhine at Strasburg, or at Manheim, in presence of a hundred thousand Germans, the first thing they will have to do will be to push the enemy in three directions, the first to the front of them, even to the mountains of the Black Forest; the second to the right, for covering the bridges on the side of the Upper Rhine; and the third to the left, to cover those on the side of Mayence and of the Lower Rhine. This necessity leads to a deplorable parceling of forces; but in order to diminish its inconvenience it
Turin (Italy) (search for this): chapter 5
nemy, to turning his extreme left, the tactical advantage appeared to him more sure than all the strategical; he preferred a certain half success to the chance of a victory which would have been decisive, but exposed to greater hazards. In the same campaign, the passage of the Po by Napoleon offered another example of the strategic importance which is attached to the choice of the point of passage; the army of reserve, after the combat of the ,Chiusella, could march by the left of the Po to Turin, or pass the river at Crescentino and march direct to Genoa; Napoleon preferred to pass the Ticino, to enter Milan, to unite there with Moncey, who came with twenty thousand men by the St. Gothard, then to pass the Po at Placentia, persuaded that he would more surely precede Melas upon that point, than if he changed direction too soon upon his line of retreat. The passage of the Danube at Donanwerth and Ingolstadt, in 1805, was an operation nearly of the same kind; the direction chosen beca
British Isles (search for this): chapter 5
n. We can then only form similar enterprises against secondary States, for it is very difficult to embark a hundred or a hundred and fifty thousand men, with the immense equipment of artillery, munitions, cavalry, &c. Meanwhile, we have been on the point of seeing resolved in our day this immense problem of grand descents, if it be true that Napoleon ever really entertained the serious project of transporting his hundred and sixty thousand veterans from Boulogne into the bosom of the British Islands; unfortunately, the non-execution of that colossal project has left an impenetrable veil over this grave question. It was not impossible to unite fifty French vessels-of-the-line in La Manche, deceiving the English; this reunion was on the eve of being effected, hence it was not then impossible, if the wind favored the enterprise, for the flotilla to pass in two days, and to effect the debarkation. But what would have become of the army if a gale of wind dispersed the fleet of war v
Russia (Russia) (search for this): chapter 5
ctly they may be made, it is always difficult to have them sufficiently so not to be exposed to the enemy. A country where there is an abundance of large cities, like Lombardy, Saxony, the low countries, Arabia, old Prussia, presents more facilities for establishing quarters therein than countries where cities are rare. Not only are resources there found for the subsistence of troops, but shelters are found near to each other, which permit the maintaining divisions together. In Poland, in Russia, in a part of Austria and France, in Spain, in Southern Italy, it is more difficult to establish ourselves in winter quarters. Formerly, each party entered them respectively at the end of October, and contented themselves with taking reciprocally a few battalions too isolated at advanced posts; it was a partisan warfare. The surprise of the Austrian winter quarters by Turenne, in Upper Alsace, in 1674, is one of the operations which best indicate what can be undertaken against hostile
1 2 3 4 5 6 ...