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Browsing named entities in a specific section of Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.). Search the whole document.

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Waterloo (Belgium) (search for this): chapter 7
gainst a line in good order, could not be attempted with success unless sustained by infantry and much artillery, at least at a certain distance. It was seen at Waterloo how much it cost the French cavalry for having acted against this rule, and the cavalry of Frederick experienced the same fate at Kunersdorf. We may, neverthelery disunited. The fine charge of the French upon Gosa, at the battle of Leipsic, 16th of October, is a great example of this kind. Those which they executed at Waterloo with the same object, were admirable, but without results, for want of support. In the same manner the audacious charge of the feeble cavalry of Ney upon the ars, and cause the destruction of an adversary shaken and disunited even by its first successes; a fine charge of the Russians at Eylau, and the English cavalry at Waterloo proved this. Finally, the especial cavalry of the army corps make timely charges, either for favoring an attack, or for profiting from a false movement of the e
Hohenlinden (Bavaria, Germany) (search for this): chapter 7
of the two parties which is the master of them. They shelter the troops, conceal their movements, protect those of the cavalry, and hinder that of the enemy from acting in their proximity. The skeptic Clausewitz was not afraid to sustain the contrary maxim, and under the singular pretext that he who occupies a wood acts blindly, and discovers nothing of what the enemy is doing, he presents their defense as a fault of tactics. Blinded himself, probably, by the results of the battle of Hohenlinden, the author is too prone to confound here the occupation of a wood in the line of battle with the fault of throwing a whole army in a vast forest without being master of the issues, either of the front or of the flanks; but he must never have seen a combat who denies the incontestable importance of the possession of a wood situated in proximity with a line that he wishes to defend or attack. The part which the park Hougeumont played in the battle of Waterloo is a great example of the inf
Austria (Austria) (search for this): chapter 7
h it is not able to sustain. For the rest, I believe that hussars or volunteer lancers, raised or organized at the moment of the war, well conducted, and moving where bold chiefs conduct them at their will, would accomplish nearly the same object; but it is necessary to regard them as independent, for if they were to receive orders from the headquarters, they would no longer be partizans. They would not, perhaps, have all the qualities of good Cossacks, but they might approach them. Austria has also in the Hungarians, the Transyivanians and the Croats, resources which other States have not; however, the services rendered by the mounted landwehr prove that we can draw also upon this species of cavalry, were it only for relieving the regular cavalry in the accessory services which abound in all armies, as escorts, despatches, detachments for conducting convoys, flankers, &c. Mixed corps of regular and irregular cavalry can often render more real services than if they were compos
Marengo, Iowa (Iowa, United States) (search for this): chapter 7
by infantry and much artillery, at least at a certain distance. It was seen at Waterloo how much it cost the French cavalry for having acted against this rule, and the cavalry of Frederick experienced the same fate at Kunersdorf. We may, nevertheless, find ourselves called upon to engage the cavalry alone; but, in general, a charge upon a line of infantry which should already be found engaged with the adverse infantry, is that from which we could expect the most advantages; the battles of Marengo, of Eylau, of Borodino, and ten others, have proved this. Meanwhile there is a case in which the cavalry has a decided superiority over infantry; it is when there falls a beating rain or snow, which wets the arms and deprives the infantry of its fire; the corps of Augereau had a cruel proof of it at Eylau, and the left of the Austrians experienced the same fate at Dresden. Great charges are also executed with success against infantry, when we should have already succeeded in shaking i
Wallachia (Romania) (search for this): chapter 7
or into long squares, in order to present a greater front, and obtain more fire on the side from whence the enemy is expected to come, (see fig. 8 and 9.) A regiment of three battalions would easily form a long square by breaking the middle battalion and causing each half battalion to move, the one to the right, and the other to the left. In the wars with Turkey, squares were almost exclusively employed, because hostilities took place in the vast plains of Bassarabia, of Moldavia and of Wallachia, and the Turks had an immense cavalry. But, if operations have place in the Balkan or beyond, and if their feudal cavalry give place to an arm organized in the European proportions, the importance of squares will diminish, and the Russian infantry will show all its superiority in Romelia. Be that as it may, the order in squares by regiments of battalions appears suitable to every kind of attack, whenever there is a superiority in cavalry, and we manoeuvre on even ground, favorable to t
Talavera (Spain) (search for this): chapter 7
fire, will hold out long against deployed troops having twenty thousand musket shots to send it, and able to deliver it two or three hundred thousand in five minutes. In the late wars, we have often seen Russian, French and Prussian columns, carry positions at the support arms, without firing a shot; it is the triumph of impulsion and of the moral effect which it produces, but against the murderous fire and the sang froid of the English infantry, columns have not had the same success at Talavera, at Busaco, at Fuente di Onor, at Albuera, and still less at Waterloo. Meanwhile, it would be imprudent to conclude from thence that this result should cause the balance to incline decidedly in favor of the shallow order and of fire; for, if the French were accumulated in all these affairs into masses too profound, as I have more than once seen with my own eyes, it is not astonishing that enormous columns, formed into deployed and wavering battalions, battered in front and flank by a mur
Borodino (Russia) (search for this): chapter 7
rtillery, at least at a certain distance. It was seen at Waterloo how much it cost the French cavalry for having acted against this rule, and the cavalry of Frederick experienced the same fate at Kunersdorf. We may, nevertheless, find ourselves called upon to engage the cavalry alone; but, in general, a charge upon a line of infantry which should already be found engaged with the adverse infantry, is that from which we could expect the most advantages; the battles of Marengo, of Eylau, of Borodino, and ten others, have proved this. Meanwhile there is a case in which the cavalry has a decided superiority over infantry; it is when there falls a beating rain or snow, which wets the arms and deprives the infantry of its fire; the corps of Augereau had a cruel proof of it at Eylau, and the left of the Austrians experienced the same fate at Dresden. Great charges are also executed with success against infantry, when we should have already succeeded in shaking it by a fearful fire of
Marlboro, Mass. (Massachusetts, United States) (search for this): chapter 7
he batteries. When we have arrived under the fire of musketry, then shelters are not to be calculated upon; if we be in condition to assail, we must do so; shelters are suitable only, in this case, for skirmishers and for defensive troops. It is sufficiently important, generally, to defend villages which are upon the front, or to seek to carry them if we be the assailant; but it is equally necessary not to attach an undue importance thereto, forgetting the famous battle of Hochstaedt: Marlborough and Eugene seeing the bulk of the French infantry buried in the villages, forced the centre and took twenty-four battalions, sacrificed to guard those posts. For the same reason it is useful to occupy clumps of trees or copses, which may give a support to that one of the two parties which is the master of them. They shelter the troops, conceal their movements, protect those of the cavalry, and hinder that of the enemy from acting in their proximity. The skeptic Clausewitz was not a
Hungary (Hungary) (search for this): chapter 7
since that one of the most difficult problems of the tactics of war was the best mode of forming troops for going to combat, I have found out also that to resolve this great problem in an absolute manner, and by an exclusive system, is a thing impossible. In the first place, the nature of countries differ essentially. There are those where we can manoeuvre two hundred thousand men deployed, as in Champagne; there are others, like Italy, Switzerland, the valley of the Rhine, the half of Hungary, where we could scarcely deploy a division of ten battalions. The degree of instruction of the troops in all kinds of manoeuvres, their armament and their national character, could also have an influence upon formations. By favor of the great discipline of the Russian infantry, and of its instruction in manoeuvres of every species, it is possible that they may succeed in moving it in great lines with sufficient order and harmony for causing it to adopt a system which would, I think, be
Preussen (search for this): chapter 7
e mobility and the accessory embarrassments of these calibres, For the rest, one of the most notable proofs which can be cited for appreciating the influence of the proportions of the armament upon the success of armies, was given by Napoleon after the battle of Eylau; the cruel losses which his troops sustained by the fire of the numerous artil lery of the Russians, made him feel the necessity of increasing his own. With an activity difficult to conceive, he set all the arsenals at work in Prussia, on the line of the Rhine, and even at Metz, to increase the number of his pieces, and to cast new ones, for turning to account the munitions which he had captured in the campaign. In three months he doubled, at four hundred leagues from his frontiers, the personel and the materiel of his artillery, a thing unheard — of in the annals of war. 13. One of the most suitable means for obtaining the best possible employment of the artillery, would be always to give the superior command of thi
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