hide Sorting

You can sort these results in two ways:

By entity
Chronological order for dates, alphabetical order for places and people.
By position (current method)
As the entities appear in the document.

You are currently sorting in ascending order. Sort in descending order.

hide Most Frequent Entities

The entities that appear most frequently in this document are shown below.

Entity Max. Freq Min. Freq
Napoleon 104 0 Browse Search
Wellington 38 0 Browse Search
Ney 36 2 Browse Search
Napoleon (Ohio, United States) 24 0 Browse Search
Jena (Thuringia, Germany) 22 0 Browse Search
Moreau 22 0 Browse Search
Washington (United States) 22 0 Browse Search
Austria (Austria) 20 0 Browse Search
Blucher 20 0 Browse Search
Zurich (Switzerland) 18 0 Browse Search
View all entities in this document...

Browsing named entities in Emil Schalk, A. O., The Art of War written expressly for and dedicated to the U.S. Volunteer Army..

Found 1,260 total hits in 315 results.

1 2 3 4 5 6 ...
Preface. few nations, if any, in the world, would have been able to accomplish what the people of this great country have done. Within three or four months, an army larger than that possessed by any of the great powers of Europe has been raised, armed, equipped, drilled, and put in the field. Men of all classes, rich and poor, have entered the ranks; and there is scarcely any quiet occupation which has not furnished its share of officers and privates. The merchant and the lawyer, yesterday at their desks, to-day command regiments and armies. If we can only admire this great national movement and the patriotism which has caused it, we may perhaps be allowed to make a few observations the importance of which every intelligent officer will admit. Bravery is a national virtue of the American, and we certainly do not doubt that of the officers of the great army; but bravery is not sufficient to gain victories. War is a science, and a difficult one. History is full of example
's communications, we close his line of retreat; to return to his base, he is obliged to force his way with the bayonet; if he fails in this attempt and is defeated, he will be forced to surrender. Examples of such operations are the campaigns of 1800, 1805, and 1806. In 1805, Mack, with an Austrian army, near Ulm, was turned by Napoleon, and obliged to capitulate. This result was obtained in consequence of the position and extension of the two bases of operation. Fig. 2 will explain this,place our armies between those of the enemy, and transport our main body alternately from one army to the other. The enemy's armies, being isolated, cannot unite, and must fall under the blows of our superior force. The plan of the campaign of 1800, as devised by Napoleon, is the finest example that can be offered for a similar operation. Melas, with a large army in Italy, had arrived at a short distance from the French frontier; Kray, with another army, threatened the Rhine. Moreau, nea
, or that he holds a concentrated position. In the first case, the most advantageous point to act on, is the center, which we should break with our whole force, and then defeat each of the two wings separately. In 1796, Napoleon, when opposed to Beaulieu, whose line was extended from Genoa to Ceva, broke through the center of the Austrian army at Montenotte with his entire army, and then defeated, one after the other, the two wings, in the engagements of Milesimo Dego and Mondovi. In 1809, when opposed to the Archduke Charles, whose army also formed a very extended line, he acted in a similar way, and defeated, successively, the Austrian forces in the battles of Abensberg, Eckmuhl, Landshut, and Ratisbon. In the second case, if the enemy keeps his forces concentrated, the manoeuvre against his center is rendered impossible, or at least not advantageous, and we should see if the attack on one of the three zones does not present the chance of our acting at once on the enemy's
arrangements are, in the engagements, as superior as the strategical were in the directions, one battle and the fate of a state is decided. The battle of Jena, in 1806, is an example of this. Or, if a b is our base, c d that of the enemy, we might advance from m to c without fear of being driven from our communications, while ay with the bayonet; if he fails in this attempt and is defeated, he will be forced to surrender. Examples of such operations are the campaigns of 1800, 1805, and 1806. In 1805, Mack, with an Austrian army, near Ulm, was turned by Napoleon, and obliged to capitulate. This result was obtained in consequence of the position and base of the French, (the Rhine,) and that they advance from a to n, and cut the Austrian army, which has advanced in the direction of m, from its base, c d. In 1806, the Prussians were also cut from their communications, obliged to fight at Jena and Auerstadt, front against Prussia; they were defeated, and the remainder of the
zburg, and a third time on the Lahn; he then left a corps to continue the pursuit, while he himself turned against Moreau, and marched to cut him from his line of retreat. The news that the archduke had left the army opposed to him reached Moreau only after Jordan's defeat; he then commenced to retreat, but was overtaken by the duke, and defeated at Emmendingen and Schlingen, and forced again to cross the Rhine — an operation which had already been executed by Jordan. In the years 1758 to 1762, Frederick the Great was attacked by a Russian, Austrian, and German Imperial army. lie resisted those three armies by disposing his own exactly as shown in Fig. 7; he always transported the mass of his force to the most endangered point by means of the interior lines which he held, and defeated the different armies one after the other, and came victorious out of a war unequaled in history. In the years 1813 and 1814, Napoleon, in his defense also acted on interior lines. This short ex
e at Wurzburg, and a third time on the Lahn; he then left a corps to continue the pursuit, while he himself turned against Moreau, and marched to cut him from his line of retreat. The news that the archduke had left the army opposed to him reached Moreau only after Jordan's defeat; he then commenced to retreat, but was overtaken by the duke, and defeated at Emmendingen and Schlingen, and forced again to cross the Rhine — an operation which had already been executed by Jordan. In the years 1758 to 1762, Frederick the Great was attacked by a Russian, Austrian, and German Imperial army. lie resisted those three armies by disposing his own exactly as shown in Fig. 7; he always transported the mass of his force to the most endangered point by means of the interior lines which he held, and defeated the different armies one after the other, and came victorious out of a war unequaled in history. In the years 1813 and 1814, Napoleon, in his defense also acted on interior lines. This
ays transported the mass of his force to the most endangered point by means of the interior lines which he held, and defeated the different armies one after the other, and came victorious out of a war unequaled in history. In the years 1813 and 1814, Napoleon, in his defense also acted on interior lines. This short expos of strategy will be sufficient to give a general idea of this science, and to make the following example understood. Those who wish to obtain an entire knowledge of strng any ground on Union territory, and increases the distance between it and the great Northern capitals, centers of industry and wealth which would have been endangered if it had effected a retreat to the North. (Frederick, in 1757, and Soult, in 1814, executed similar retreats.) A might, perhaps, have done even better in retreating from Manassas to Winchester, instead of to Washington, if such a course was possible, after the first engagements, forcing it to the retreat, as by such a step i
ents to cover them. In making those detachments, the invading army becomes smaller the more it advances, while, on the other hand, the defending army generally gets stronger the nearer it approaches the center of its country. If by this the difference in force is decreased, and the chances more equal, the army for the defense should pass to a vigorous offensive, either by unexpectedly attacking the enemy or by awaiting him in a well-chosen, strong, and fortified position. The campaign of 1812 is a fine example of such a defense. Napoleon entered Russia with 450,000 men. The Russian army retreated, defending only the town of Smolensk; by the many detachments Napoleon was obliged to make, and the losses already sustained, he arrived at Borodino with only 132,000 men. The Russians awaited him there, in a partly fortified position, with 117,000 men. What was impossible to do against an army of 450,000 men could be tried against one of 132,000. When the enemy has chosen two lines
each of the two wings separately. In 1796, Napoleon, when opposed to Beaulieu, whose line was extith an Austrian army, near Ulm, was turned by Napoleon, and obliged to capitulate. This result was e plan of the campaign of 1800, as devised by Napoleon, is the finest example that can be offered foications, and thereby destroy his army, while Napoleon crossed the Alps by the Passages of the Greattly compelled to enter into a convention with Napoleon, by which the latter obtained the western por 1812 is a fine example of such a defense. Napoleon entered Russia with 450,000 men. The Russian the town of Smolensk; by the many detachments Napoleon was obliged to make, and the losses already se others. At the siege of Mantua, in 1796, Napoleon, being informed that Wurmser, who had advanceed in history. In the years 1813 and 1814, Napoleon, in his defense also acted on interior lines.n, which would be similar to the movements of Napoleon at Marengo, Ulm, and Jena, the rebels would h
munications, we close his line of retreat; to return to his base, he is obliged to force his way with the bayonet; if he fails in this attempt and is defeated, he will be forced to surrender. Examples of such operations are the campaigns of 1800, 1805, and 1806. In 1805, Mack, with an Austrian army, near Ulm, was turned by Napoleon, and obliged to capitulate. This result was obtained in consequence of the position and extension of the two bases of operation. Fig. 2 will explain this, by su1805, Mack, with an Austrian army, near Ulm, was turned by Napoleon, and obliged to capitulate. This result was obtained in consequence of the position and extension of the two bases of operation. Fig. 2 will explain this, by supposing that a b forms the base of the French, (the Rhine,) and that they advance from a to n, and cut the Austrian army, which has advanced in the direction of m, from its base, c d. In 1806, the Prussians were also cut from their communications, obliged to fight at Jena and Auerstadt, front against Prussia; they were defeated, and the remainder of their army obliged to lay down arms, as they found their line of retreat continually closed by Napoleon's division advancing parallel with them i
1 2 3 4 5 6 ...