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Browsing named entities in a specific section of H. Wager Halleck , A. M. , Lieut. of Engineers, U. S. Army ., Elements of Military Art and Science; or, Course of Instruction in Strategy, Fortification, Tactis of Battles &c., Embracing the Duties of Staff, Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery and Engineers. Adapted to the Use of Volunteers and Militia.. Search the whole document.

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Weimar (Thuringia, Germany) (search for this): chapter 3
n on Alexandria and received battle at Marengo, without having first secured Lombardy and the left of the Po, his own line of retreat would have been completely cut off by Melas; whereas, by the direction which he gave to his line of operations he had, in case of reverse, every means for reaching either the Var or the Valois. (Fig. 6.) Again, in 1806, if he had marched directly from Gera to Leipsic, he would have been cut off from his base on the Rhine; whereas, by turning from Gera towards Weimar, he not only cut off the Prussians from the Elbe, but at the same time secured to himself the roads of Saalfield, Schleitz, and Hoff, thus rendering perfectly safe his communications in his rear. (Fig. 7.) We have said that the configuration of the ground and the position of the hostile forces may sometimes render it advisable to direct our line of operations against the extremity of the enemy's line of defence; but, as a general rule, a central direction will lead to more important result
Poland (Poland) (search for this): chapter 3
numerous others, such as-- Wars of intervention, in which one state interferes in favor of another. This intervention may either have respect to the internal or to the external affairs of a nation The interference of Russia in the affairs of Poland, of England in the government of India, Austria and the allied powers in the affairs of France during the Revolution and under the empire, are examples under the first head. The intervention of the Elector Maurice of Saxony against Charles V., oadvocates of the old monarchies of Europe. Wars of insurrection to gain or to regain liberty; as was the case with the Americans in 1776, and the modern Greeks in 1821. Wars of independence from foreign dictation and control, as the wars of Poland against Russia, of the Netherlands against Spain, of France against the several coalitions of the allied powers, of the Spanish Peninsula against France, and of China and. India against England. The American war of 1812 partook largely of this c
Russia (Russia) (search for this): chapter 3
internal or to the external affairs of a nation The interference of Russia in the affairs of Poland, of England in the government of India, Auagainst Charles V., of King William against Louis XIV., in 1688, of Russia and France in the seven years war, of Russia again between France aRussia again between France and Austria, in 1805, and between France and Prussia, in 1806, are examples under the second head Most liberal publicists consider interventione from foreign dictation and control, as the wars of Poland against Russia, of the Netherlands against Spain, of France against the several coDutch against Phillip II., and of the Poles and Circassians against Russia. Civil wars, where one portion of the state fights against the o, on Mezieres and Sedan. If acting offensively against Prussia and Russia, the Rhine and the Main would form the first base, the Elbe and the and 1809 against Austria, and of 1806 and 1807 against Prussia and Russia, of 1808 in Spain, his manoeuvres in 1814, between the battle of Br
Bayonne (France) (search for this): chapter 3
to wash the blot from our national escutcheon. Lines of defence in strategy are either permanent or temporary. The great military frontiers of a state, especially when strengthened by natural and artificial obstacles, such as chains of mountains, rivers, lines of fortresses, &c., are regarded as permanent lines of defence. The Alpine range between France and Piedmont, with its fortified passes; the Rhine, the Oder, and the Elbe, with their strongly-fortified places; the Pyrenees, with Bayonne at one extremity and Perpignon at the other; the triple range of fortresses on the Belgian frontier — are all permanent lines of defence. The St. Lawrence river is a permanent line of defence for Canada; and the line of lake Champlain, the upper St. Lawrence, and the lakes, for the United States. Temporary lines of defence are such as are taken up merely for the campaign. Napoleon's position in Saxony, in 1813; the line of the allies in Belgium, in 1815; the line of the Marne, in 1814,
New England (United States) (search for this): chapter 3
que or nearly parallel to this base. They had pursued the same plan of operations in the Seven Years War. The Russians, in 1812, based perpendicularly on the Oka and the Kalouga, and extended their flank march on Wiozma and Krasnoi; in 1813, the allies, based perpendicularly on Bohemia, succeeded in paralyzing Napoleon's on the Elbe. An American army moving by Lake Champlain, would be based perpendicular on the great line of communication between Boston and Buffalo; if moving from the New England states on Quebec and Montreal, the line of operations would be oblique; and if moving from the Niagara frontier by Lake Ontario and the St. Lawrence, the line would be nearly parallel both to our base and to the enemy's line of defence — an operation, under the circumstances, exceedingly objectionable. Any point in the theatre of operations which gives to the possessor an advantage over his opponent, is regarded as strategic. Their geographical position and political and military chara
Leipzig (Saxony, Germany) (search for this): chapter 3
he Mouse, as this position would give them a decided advantage in any ulterior operations. In attacking southern Germany, the course of the Danube offers a series of points which exercise an important influence on the war. For northern Germany, Leipsic and the country bordering on the Saale and the Elbe, are objects often fiercely contested by the French and other belligerent powers. In a war between this country and England, Montreal and the points on the St. Lawrence between Montreal and Qu completely cut off by Melas; whereas, by the direction which he gave to his line of operations he had, in case of reverse, every means for reaching either the Var or the Valois. (Fig. 6.) Again, in 1806, if he had marched directly from Gera to Leipsic, he would have been cut off from his base on the Rhine; whereas, by turning from Gera towards Weimar, he not only cut off the Prussians from the Elbe, but at the same time secured to himself the roads of Saalfield, Schleitz, and Hoff, thus rende
Gascony (France) (search for this): chapter 3
pendicular to the front of defence, either to the right, on Befort and Besancon, or to the left, on Mezieres and Sedan. If acting offensively against Prussia and Russia, the Rhine and the Main would form the first base, the Elbe and the Oder the second, the Vistula the third, the Nieman the fourth, and the Dwina and the Dnieper the fifth. A French army operating against Spain would have the Pyrenees for its first base; the line of the Ebro for a second, resting its wings on the gulf of Gascony and the Mediterranean. If from this position it advance its left, possessing itself of the kingdom of Valencia, the line of the Sierra d'estellas becomes its third base of operations against the centre of Spain. A base may be parallel, oblique, or perpendicular to our line of operations, or to the enemy's line of defence. Some prefer one plan and some another; the best authorities, however, think the oblique or perpendicular more advantageous than the parallel; but we are not often at
Lacus Benacus (Italy) (search for this): chapter 3
hree separate lines, intending to concentrate at Rivoli, and then attack the French in mass; but Napoleon took his strategic position at Rivoli, and overthrew the enemy's corps as they successively appeared. In the same way the Archduke Charles took an interior position, between Moreau and Jourdan, in 1796, and prevented them from concentrating their forces on a single point. Wurmser and Quasdanowich attempted to concentrate their forces on the Mincio, by moving on the opposite shores of Lake Garda; but Napoleon took an interior position and destroyed them. In 1815 Blucher and Wellington, from their interior position, prevented the junction of Napoleon and Grouchy. Diverging lines may be employed with advantage against an enemy immediately after a successful battle or strategic manoeuvre; for by this means we separate the enemy's forces, and disperse them; and if occasion should require it, may again concentrate our forces by converging lines. Such was the manoeuvre of Frederick
Valencia (Spain) (search for this): chapter 3
d Sedan. If acting offensively against Prussia and Russia, the Rhine and the Main would form the first base, the Elbe and the Oder the second, the Vistula the third, the Nieman the fourth, and the Dwina and the Dnieper the fifth. A French army operating against Spain would have the Pyrenees for its first base; the line of the Ebro for a second, resting its wings on the gulf of Gascony and the Mediterranean. If from this position it advance its left, possessing itself of the kingdom of Valencia, the line of the Sierra d'estellas becomes its third base of operations against the centre of Spain. A base may be parallel, oblique, or perpendicular to our line of operations, or to the enemy's line of defence. Some prefer one plan and some another; the best authorities, however, think the oblique or perpendicular more advantageous than the parallel; but we are not often at liberty to choose between these, for other considerations usually determine the selection. In 1806, the Frenc
Ratisbon (Bavaria, Germany) (search for this): chapter 3
ay again concentrate our forces by converging lines. Such was the manoeuvre of Frederick the Great, in 1757, which produced the battles of Rosbach and Leuthen; such also was the manoeuvre of Napoleon at Donawert in 1805, at Jena in 1806, and at Ratisbon in 1809. Interior lines of operations, when properly conducted, have almost invariably led to success: indeed every instance of failure may be clearly traced to great unskilfulness in their execution, or to other extraneous circumstances of ty forced to surrender, at Ulm, without a single important battle. In 1806, the Prussians were essentially defeated even before the battle of Jena. The operations about Heilesberg, in 1807, the advance upon Madrid, in 1808, the manoeuvres about Ratisbon, in 1809, the operations of the French in 1814, and the first part of the campaign of 1815, against vastly superior numbers, are all familiar proofs of the truth of the maxim. Strategy may therefore be regarded as the most important, though l
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