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Browsing named entities in a specific section of H. Wager Halleck , A. M. , Lieut. of Engineers, U. S. Army ., Elements of Military Art and Science; or, Course of Instruction in Strategy, Fortification, Tactis of Battles &c., Embracing the Duties of Staff, Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery and Engineers. Adapted to the Use of Volunteers and Militia.. Search the whole document.

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Wellington (search for this): chapter 3
sive operations. There are numerous instances of this kind of war, the defensive-offensive, as it is sometimes called, to be found in history. The last four campaigns of Frederick the Great of Prussia, are examples which may serve as models. Wellington played a similar part in the Spanish peninsula. To merely remain in a defensive attitude, yielding gradually to the advances of the enemy, without any effort to regain such positions or provinces as may have fallen into his power, or to inflating their forces on a single point. Wurmser and Quasdanowich attempted to concentrate their forces on the Mincio, by moving on the opposite shores of Lake Garda; but Napoleon took an interior position and destroyed them. In 1815 Blucher and Wellington, from their interior position, prevented the junction of Napoleon and Grouchy. Diverging lines may be employed with advantage against an enemy immediately after a successful battle or strategic manoeuvre; for by this means we separate the en
Mortier (search for this): chapter 3
orce. We have examples of accidental lines in the operations of the king of Prussia, after the battle of Hohenkirchen, and of Washington, in New-Jersey, after the action of Princeton. This is one of the finest in military history. Napoleon had projected a change in his line of operations, in case he lost the battle of Austerlitz; but victory rendered its execution unnecessary. Again in 1814 he had planned an entire change of operations; but the want of co-operation of the forces under Mortier and Marmont forced him to abandon a plan which, if properly executed, had probably defeated the allies. Jomini pronounced it one of the most brilliant of his military career. Having explained the principal terms used in strategy, let us trace out the successive operations of war in their usual strategic relations. We will suppose war to be declared, and the army to be just entering upon a campaign. The political and military authorities of the state determine upon the nature of the
Campagnes Suwarrow (search for this): chapter 3
the multitude. Essai geńeral de Tactique, par Guibert. A work very popular in its day, but now far less valuable than the writings already mentioned. Ausfuhrliche Beschreibung der Schlacht des Pirmasens, von Gravert. Regarded by military men as a valuable historical fragment. Memoires sur les Campagnes en Espagne. Souchet. Memoires de Gouvion St. Cyr. Statistique de la Guerre, par Reveroni St. Cyr. Premiere Campagnes de la Revolution, par Grimoard. Victoires et Conquetes. Beauvais. Campagnes de Suwarrow. Laverne. Histoire de la Guerre de la Peninsule. Foy. Precis des Evenements Militaires. Mathieu Dumas. Histoire de Napoleon et de la Grande Armee en 1812. Segur Memoirs sur la Guerre de 1809, Pelet. La Campagne de 1814. Koch. Vom Kriege — Die Feldzugge, &c. Clausewitz. La Revolution, le Consulat et l'empire. Thiers. Memoirs sur la Guerre de 1812 Vaudoncourt. Sur la Campagne du Vice-roi en Italie, en 1813 et 1814 Vaudoncourt. Histoire de la Guerre en Allemagne en 1814 Vaudoncourt. H
Cours Elementaire (search for this): chapter 3
unders. We subjoin the titles of a few of the best works that treat of strategy, either directly or in connection with military history. Principes de la Strategie, &c., par le Prince Charles, traduit de l'allemand, 3 vols. in 8vo. This is a work of great merit. The technical terms, however, are very loosely employed. Precis de l'art de la Guerre, par le Baron Jomini. His chapter on strategy embodies the principles of this branch of the art. Grundsatze der Strategie, Von Wagner. Cours Elementaire d'art et d'histoire Militaire, par Rocquancourt. This work contains much valuable information connected with the history of the art of war; but it is far too diffuse and ill-arranged for an elementary book. Gours d'art et d'histoire Militaire, par Jacquinot de Presle. This work is especially designed for cavalry officers, and the other branches of military service are but very briefly discussed. De Vernon's Treatise on the Science of War and Fortification contains much valuable inform
Lloyd (search for this): chapter 3
quinot de Presle, and Gay de Vernon. The last of these has been translated into English, but the translation is exceedingly inaccurate. The military histories of Lloyd, Templehoff, Jomini, the Archduke Charles, Grimoard, Gravert, Souchet, St. Cyr, Beauvais, Laverne, Stutterheim, Wagner, Kausler, Gourgaud and Montholon, Foy, Mathiortification contains much valuable information; but, as an elementary book, it has the same objections as that of Rocquancourt. History of the Seven years war, by Lloyd and Templehoff. The military writings of Lloyd and Templehoff are valuable as connected with the history of strategy; but many of the principles laid down by theseLloyd and Templehoff are valuable as connected with the history of strategy; but many of the principles laid down by these writers are now regarded as erroneous. Memoires de Napoleon. The Memoirs of Napoleon, as dictated by himself to Gourgaud and Montholon, have been translated into English. It is hardly necessary to remark that they contain all the general principles of military art and science. No military man should fail to study them thoroughl
Jomini (search for this): chapter 3
ont forced him to abandon a plan which, if properly executed, had probably defeated the allies. Jomini pronounced it one of the most brilliant of his military career. Having explained the principan, (the former has been translated into French,) are considered as the best. The discussions of Jomini on this subject in his great work on the military art, are exceedingly valuable; also the writinsh, but the translation is exceedingly inaccurate. The military histories of Lloyd, Templehoff, Jomini, the Archduke Charles, Grimoard, Gravert, Souchet, St. Cyr, Beauvais, Laverne, Stutterheim, WagnThe technical terms, however, are very loosely employed. Precis de l'art de la Guerre, par le Baron Jomini. His chapter on strategy embodies the principles of this branch of the art. Grundsatze der St of 1812. Armstrong. All the above are works of merit; but none are more valuable to the military man than the military histories of Jomini and Kausler, with their splendid diagrams and maps.
Gay Vernon (search for this): chapter 3
ary art. Strategy may be learned from didactic works or from general military histories. There are very few good elementary works on this branch of the military art. The general treatises of the Archduke Charles, and of General Wagner, in German, (the former has been translated into French,) are considered as the best. The discussions of Jomini on this subject in his great work on the military art, are exceedingly valuable; also the writings of Rocquancourt, Jacquinot de Presle, and Gay de Vernon. The last of these has been translated into English, but the translation is exceedingly inaccurate. The military histories of Lloyd, Templehoff, Jomini, the Archduke Charles, Grimoard, Gravert, Souchet, St. Cyr, Beauvais, Laverne, Stutterheim, Wagner, Kausler, Gourgaud and Montholon, Foy, Mathieu Dumas, Segur, Pelet, Koch, Clausewitz, and Thiers, may be read with great advantage. Napier's History of the Peninsular War is the only English History that is of any value as a military work
Guibert (search for this): chapter 3
oirs of Napoleon, as dictated by himself to Gourgaud and Montholon, have been translated into English. It is hardly necessary to remark that they contain all the general principles of military art and science. No military man should fail to study them thoroughly. The matter is so condensed, and important principles are embodied in so few words, that they are not easily understood by the ordinary reader, and probably will never be popular with the multitude. Essai geńeral de Tactique, par Guibert. A work very popular in its day, but now far less valuable than the writings already mentioned. Ausfuhrliche Beschreibung der Schlacht des Pirmasens, von Gravert. Regarded by military men as a valuable historical fragment. Memoires sur les Campagnes en Espagne. Souchet. Memoires de Gouvion St. Cyr. Statistique de la Guerre, par Reveroni St. Cyr. Premiere Campagnes de la Revolution, par Grimoard. Victoires et Conquetes. Beauvais. Campagnes de Suwarrow. Laverne. Histoire de la Guerre de la
Kray (search for this): chapter 3
tle not disastrous; whereas, if selected without reference to the principles of the science, the victory, if gained, might be barren, and defeat, if suffered, totally fatal: thus demonstrating the truth of Napoleon's maxim, that success is oftener due to the genius of the general, and to the nature of the theatre of war, than to the number and bravery of the soldiers. (Maxim 17, 18.) We have a striking illustration of this in the French army of the Danube, which, from the left wing of General Kray, marched rapidly through Switzerland to the right extremity of the Austrian line, and by this movement alone conquered all the country between the Rhine and Danube without pulling a trigger. Again, in 1805, the army of Mack was completely paralyzed, and the main body forced to surrender, at Ulm, without a single important battle. In 1806, the Prussians were essentially defeated even before the battle of Jena. The operations about Heilesberg, in 1807, the advance upon Madrid, in 1808,
Weyrother (search for this): chapter 3
qually accessible on all sides, especially with its flanks exposed to attack. Sempronius at Trebbia and Varro at Cannae, so placed their armies that the Carthagenians attacked them, at the same time, in front, on the flanks, and in rear; the Roman consuls were defeated: but the central strategic position of Napoleon at Rivoli was eminently successful. At the battle of Austerlitz the allies had projected a strategic movement to their left, in order to cut off Napoleon's right from Vienna; Weyrother afterwards changed his plans, and executed a corresponding tactical movement. By the former there had been some chance of success, but the latter exposed him to inevitable destruction. The little fort of Koenigsten, from its advantageous position, was more useful to the French, in 1813, than the vast works of Dresden. The little fort of Bard, with its handful of men, was near defeating the operations of Napoleon in 1800, by holding in check his entire army; whereas, on the other hand, t
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