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Browsing named entities in a specific section of H. Wager Halleck , A. M. , Lieut. of Engineers, U. S. Army ., Elements of Military Art and Science; or, Course of Instruction in Strategy, Fortification, Tactis of Battles &c., Embracing the Duties of Staff, Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery and Engineers. Adapted to the Use of Volunteers and Militia.. Search the whole document.

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er, for hulls, masts, and yards, in building an English 74 gun ship, is £ 61,382. Let us now compare this cost of timber for building, with that of the same item for repairs, for the following fifteen ships, between 1800 and 1820, The list would have been still farther enlarged, but the returns for other ships during some portion of the above period are imperfect: Name of Ship.No. of Guns.When built.Repaired fromCost. Vengeance,74--1800 to 1807£84,720 Ildefonso,74--1807 to 180885,195 Scipio,74--1807 to 180960,785 Tremendous,74--1807 to 1810135,397 Elephant,74--1808 to 181167,007 Spencer,7418001809 to 1813124,186 Romulus,74--1810 to 181273,141 Albion,7418021810 to 1813102,295 Donegal,74--1812 to 1815101,367 Implacable,74--1813 to 181559,865 Illustrious,7418031813 to 181674,184 Northumberland,74--1814 to 181559,795 Kent,74--1814 to 181888,357 Sultan,7418071816 to 181861,518 Sterling Castle,74 1816 to 181865,280 This table, although incomplete, gives for the above
ith that of the same item for repairs, for the following fifteen ships, between 1800 and 1820, The list would have been still farther enlarged, but the returns for other ships during some portion of the above period are imperfect: Name of Ship.No. of Guns.When built.Repaired fromCost. Vengeance,74--1800 to 1807£84,720 Ildefonso,74--1807 to 180885,195 Scipio,74--1807 to 180960,785 Tremendous,74--1807 to 1810135,397 Elephant,74--1808 to 181167,007 Spencer,7418001809 to 1813124,186 Romulus,74--1810 to 181273,141 Albion,7418021810 to 1813102,295 Donegal,74--1812 to 1815101,367 Implacable,74--1813 to 181559,865 Illustrious,7418031813 to 181674,184 Northumberland,74--1814 to 181559,795 Kent,74--1814 to 181888,357 Sultan,7418071816 to 181861,518 Sterling Castle,74 1816 to 181865,280 This table, although incomplete, gives for the above fifteen ships, during a period of less than twenty years, the cost of timber alone used in their repair, an average of about $400,000
27130,015 431828 and 1837 John Adams,20110,670 691829119,641 931834 and 1837 Boston,2091,973 191825189,264 371826 and 1840 St. Louis,20102,461 951828135,458 751834 and 1839 Vincennes,20111,512 791826178,094 811830 and 1838 Vandalia,2090,977 88182859,181 341832 and 1834 Lexington,20?114,622 35182683,386 521827 and 1837 Warren,20?99,410 011826152,596 031830 and 1838 Fairfield,20100,490 35182665,918 261831 and 1837 Natches, Broken up in 1840.20?106,232 191827129,969 801829 and 1836 Boxer,1030,697 88183128,780 481834 and 1840 Enterprise,1027,938 63183120,716 591834 and 1840 Grampus,1023,627 42182196,086 361825 and 1840 Dolphin,1038,522 62183615,013 351839 and 1840 Shark,1023,627 42182193,395 841824 and 1839 It appears from the above table, that the cost of constructing ships of the line is about $6,600 per gun; of frigates, $6,500 per gun; of smaller vessels of war, a little less than $5,000 per gun: making an average cost of vessels of war to be more than six thousa
returns are also so imperfect that it is impossible to form any very accurate estimate of the relative cost of construction and repairs of our men-of-war. The following table, compiled from a report of the Secretary of the Navy, in 1841, (Senate Doc. No. 223, 26th Congress), will afford data for an approximate calculation:-- Name of Ship.No. of Guns.Total Cost of building, exclusive of armament, stores, &c. &c.When completed.Cost of Repairs, exclusive of ordnance, &c. &c.Repaired between r the other. Each has its own sphere of action, and each will contribute, in its own way, to the national defence; and any undue increase of one, at the expense of the other, will be attended by a corresponding diminution of national power. For further information concerning our system of sea-coast defences, the reader is referred to House Doc. 206, twenty-sixth Congress, second session; Senate Doc. 85, twenty-eighth Congress, second session; and to the annual reports of the Chief Engineer.
and barbarous operation of burning the capitol and destroying the archives of the nation. Fort Washington was a very small and inefficient work, incorrectly planned by an incompetent French engineer; only a small part of the fort was then built, and it has not yet been completed. The portion constructed was never, until very recently, properly prepared for receiving its armament, and at the time of attack could not possibly have held out a long time. But no defence whatever was made. Capt. Gordon, with a squadron of eight sail, carrying one hundred and seventy-three guns, under orders 6 to ascend the river as high as Fort Washington, and try upon it the experiment of a bombardment, approached that fort, and, upon firing a single shell, which did no injury to either the fort or the garrison, the latter deserted the works, and rapidly retreated. The commanding officer was immediately dismissed for his cowardice. An English naval officer, who was one of the expedition, in speaking
gh sixty-one ships of the line were then stationed upon the coasts of England and France, and several of these were actually in pursuit. In 1796, when the French attempted to throw the army of Hoche into Ireland, the most strenuous efforts were made by the British navy to intercept the French fleet in its passage. The Channel fleet, of near thirty sail of the line, under Lord Bridport, was stationed at Spithead; Sir Roger Curtis, with a smaller force, was cruising to the westward; Vice-admiral Colpoys was stationed off Brest, with thirteen sail of the line; and Sir Edward Pellew (afterwards Lord Exmouth) watched the harbor, with a small squadron of frigates. Notwithstanding this triple floating bulwark, as it was called--one fleet on the enemy's coast, a second in the Downs, and a third close on their own shores — the French fleet of forty-four vessels, carrying a land force of twenty-five thousand men, reached Bantry Bay in safety! This fleet was eight days on the passage, and t
reat loss; while the garrison had but one man killed and three wounded. In 1801, the French, with three frigates and six thousand men, attacked the poorly-constructed works of Porto Ferrairo, whose defensive force was a motley garrison of fifteen hundred Corsicans, Tuscans, and English. Here the attacking force was four times as great as that of the garrison; nevertheless they were unsuccessful after several bombardments and a siege of five months. In July of the same year, 1801, Admiral Saumarez, with an English fleet of six ships of the line and two smaller vessels, carrying in all five hundred and two guns, attacked the Spanish and French defences of Algesiras. Supposing the floating forces of the contending parties to be equal, gun for gun, (which is certainly a very fair estimate for the attacking force, considering the circumstances of the case,) we have a French land-battery of only twelve guns opposed by an English floating force of one hundred and ninety-six guns. Not
ion. In 1808 a French land-battery of only three guns, near Fort Trinidad, drove off an English seventy-four-gun ship, and a bomb-vessel. In 1813 Leghorn, whose defences were of a very mediocre character, and whose garrison at that time was exceedingly weak, was attacked by an English squadron of six ships, carrying over three hundred guns, and a land force of one thousand troops. The whole attempt was a perfect failure. In 1814, when the English advanced against Antwerp, says Colonel Mitchell, an English historian, Fort Frederick, a small work of only two guns, was established in a bend of the Polder Dyke, at some distance below Lillo. The armament was a long eighteen-pounder and a five and a half inch howitzer. From this post the French determined to dislodge the English, and an eighty-gun ship dropped down with the tide and anchored near the Flanders shore, about six hundred yards from the British battery. By her position she was secured from the fire of the eighteen-po
ar off for the four-pounder gun to be of any use. Supposing the two eighteen-pounders to have been employed during the whole action, and also all the guns of the fleet, one eighteen-pounder on land must have been more than equivalent to sixty-seven guns afloat, for the ships were so much injured as to render it necessary for them to withdraw. The British loss was twenty killed, and more than fifty wounded. Ours was only two killed and six wounded. Perkins says two killed and six wounded. Holmes says six wounded, but makes no mention of any killed. The fleet sent to the attack of Baltimore, in 1814, consisted of forty sail, the largest of which were ships of the line, carrying an army of over six thousand combatants. The troops were landed at North Point, while sixteen of the bomb-vessels and frigates approached within reach of Fort McHenry, and commenced a bombardment which lasted twenty-five hours. During this attack, the enemy threw fifteen hundred shells, four hundred of wh
Matuszewiez (search for this): chapter 8
attack on St. Jean d'acre; now, however, the principal facts connected with this attack are fully authenticated. For the amount of the fleet we quote from the British officials papers, a(nd for that of the fort, from the pamphlet of Lieutenant-colonel Matuszewiez. These statements are mainly confirmed by the narratives, more recently published, of several English and French eye-witnesses. The fortifications were built of poor materials, antiquated in their plans, and much decayed. Their els. Only five of their guns, says Napier, placed in a flanking battery, were well served, and never missed; but they were pointed too high, and damaged our spars and rigging only. The stone was of so poor a quality, says the narrative of Colonel Matuszewiez, that the walls fired upon presented on the exterior a shattered appearance, but they were nowhere seriously injured. In the words of Napier, they were not breached, and a determined enemy might have remained secure under the breast-works
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