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Adairsville (Georgia, United States) (search for this): chapter 21
nd fifty-six infantry and artillery, and ten thousand two hundred and seventy-six cavalry-fifty thousand nine hundred and thirty-two-say fifty-one thousand. Deduct this from sixty-four thousand and it leaves thirteen thousand loss in artillery, infantry, and cavalry, instead of twenty-two thousand seven hundred, as alleged by General Hood. General Johnston does not give the losses of his cavalry, for want of reports. He had four thousand at Dalton, and received four thousand (Polk's) at Adairsville on the 17th of May-eight thousand. At Atlanta he had ten thousand two hundred and seventy-six, showing that he had recruited his cavalry twenty-two hundred and seventy-six over and above his losses. Leaving out his cavalry, he had at Atlanta, 10th of July, forty thousand six hundred and fifty-six infantry and artillery. At New Hope he had of all arms sixty-four thousand. Of these, eight thousand were cavalry, supposing it not to have increased by recruiting up to that time. That give
Macon (Georgia, United States) (search for this): chapter 21
mmand, if he did not intend to defend it, in the event of his failing to crush the enemy at Peach-tree Creek? Why was he strengthening it at the very moment of his removal a If the position was as weak as described by General Hood, why did Sherman not attempt to carry it by assault? The place, in my judgment, could not have been taken either by assault or investment. What are the facts General Sherman first seized the Augusta road, and held it for six weeks to no purpose. To seize the Macon road he had to let go that to Augusta, which could have supplied our army. In making that movement, he exposed his flank to attack, which blunder was not taken advantage of. His movement was concealed by a curtain of cavalry, and was probably not known to General Hood in time. A large portion of his cavalry under Wheeler was in Sherman's rear, operating on his line of communications. To avoid any such contre-temps, General Johnston kept his cavalry in hand to watch the movement of the ene
Blue Mountain (Alabama, United States) (search for this): chapter 21
e, Georgia, and thence unite with General Johnston. On the 6th, the day on which General Hood says this army lay at and near Dalton, waiting the advance of the enemy, General Polk telegraphs to General Cooper from Demopolis: My troops are concentrating and moving as directed. On the 10th, at Rome, he telegraphs the President: The first of Loring's brigade arrived and sent forward to Resaca; the second just in; the third will arrive to-morrow morning. . . . French's brigade was to leave Blue Mountain this morning. The others will follow in succession; Ferguson will be in supporting distance day after to-morrow; Jackson's division is thirty-six hours after. Yet General Hood asserts that, four days before this, the army was assembled at and near Dalton, and within the easy direction of a single commander. The last of these reenforcements joined General Johnston at New Hope Church the 26th of May, nearly three weeks after they were alleged to be at and near Dalton, and amounted to l
Missionary Ridge, Tenn. (Tennessee, United States) (search for this): chapter 21
refore, that a part, or even the whole, of the seven thousand prisoners may have been lost when the army was under the command of General Bragg. The rout at Missionary Ridge had occurred before General Johnston took command. This is a matter, however, which especially concerns General Hood. The field return of the 10th of July inferior in spirit and confidence. The army which is described as inferior in spirit and confidence to Johnston's was the one which had lately routed it at Missionary Ridge, under Bragg. An army flushed with victory is not usually wanting in spirit and confidence. Did the presence of Johnston cause them to doubt their future snemy was but little superior to us in numbers? He relies upon Sherman's statement that he was as strong at Atlanta as when the campaign opened. His army at Missionary Ridge was estimated at eighty thousand. He was afterward reinforced by the army from Knoxville and the troops from North Alabama, besides other. Our scouts repor
Jonesboro (Georgia, United States) (search for this): chapter 21
the Torres Vedras, he says: It is unquestionable that a retreating army should fight as little as possible. General Hood also insists that the army at Atlanta was greatly demoralized by the loss of men and officers, and by constant falling back. I do not recollect any general officer, except General Polk, who was killed while Johnston was in command; there may have been others, but certainly not many. What were his losses in general officers from Atlanta to Nashville? His march from Jonesboro to the Tennessee line was a retreat, and from Nashville to Tupelo; yet he lost by desertion but three hundred, and left the army in fine spirits. The demoralization of Johnston's army cannot be accounted for on this theory. But was it demoralized? It fought well when he first took command. His disasters around Atlanta are not attributed by him to a want of spirit in the men, but to incompetency in the officers. He could not have his orders executed. I incline to the opinion that he
Mississippi (Mississippi, United States) (search for this): chapter 21
Soult's plan of the campaign of Talavcea, to which the Duke of Dalmatia replied: Under present circumstances, we cannot avoid the sacrifices of some territory. . . . This will not be distressing as it may appear, because the moment we have beaten and dispersed the enemy's masses we shall recover all our ground. .. . . I conceive it impossible to finish this war by detachments. It is large masses only, the strongest that you can form, that will succeed. Had all the scattered forces in Mississippi and Alabama been concentrated upon Sherman's rear when he was one hundred and forty miles in the interior, and his communications been thoroughly cut, what to-day would have been our condition? All our ground recovered, Sherman's army destroyed, and Johnston's ready to raise the siege of Richmond or cross the Ohio. Again, it is alleged that the mountainous country of Northern Georgia offered great advantages, which were abandoned. Napier says: Here it may be well to notice an error
Edgefield (Tennessee, United States) (search for this): chapter 21
by constant falling back. I do not recollect any general officer, except General Polk, who was killed while Johnston was in command; there may have been others, but certainly not many. What were his losses in general officers from Atlanta to Nashville? His march from Jonesboro to the Tennessee line was a retreat, and from Nashville to Tupelo; yet he lost by desertion but three hundred, and left the army in fine spirits. The demoralization of Johnston's army cannot be accounted for on thisNashville to Tupelo; yet he lost by desertion but three hundred, and left the army in fine spirits. The demoralization of Johnston's army cannot be accounted for on this theory. But was it demoralized? It fought well when he first took command. His disasters around Atlanta are not attributed by him to a want of spirit in the men, but to incompetency in the officers. He could not have his orders executed. I incline to the opinion that he is mistaken as much as to his facts as he is in his theory. General Hood insinuates that General Johnston attempts to dodge an acknowledgment of his full losses by excluding the idea of prisoners, and charges that his
Resaca (Georgia, United States) (search for this): chapter 21
hat General Polk was ordered to move with Loring's division and other available force at your command, to Rome, Georgia, and thence unite with General Johnston. On the 6th, the day on which General Hood says this army lay at and near Dalton, waiting the advance of the enemy, General Polk telegraphs to General Cooper from Demopolis: My troops are concentrating and moving as directed. On the 10th, at Rome, he telegraphs the President: The first of Loring's brigade arrived and sent forward to Resaca; the second just in; the third will arrive to-morrow morning. . . . French's brigade was to leave Blue Mountain this morning. The others will follow in succession; Ferguson will be in supporting distance day after to-morrow; Jackson's division is thirty-six hours after. Yet General Hood asserts that, four days before this, the army was assembled at and near Dalton, and within the easy direction of a single commander. The last of these reenforcements joined General Johnston at New Hope Chu
Atlanta (Georgia, United States) (search for this): chapter 21
le the army were under his command, shows, at Atlanta: forty thousand six hundred and fifty-six infsville on the 17th of May-eight thousand. At Atlanta he had ten thousand two hundred and seventy-ss losses. Leaving out his cavalry, he had at Atlanta, 10th of July, forty thousand six hundred andifty-six thousand infantry and artillery. At Atlanta he had, of these arms, forty thousand six hun General Hood also insists that the army at Atlanta was greatly demoralized by the loss of men anWhat were his losses in general officers from Atlanta to Nashville? His march from Jonesboro to th he first took command. His disasters around Atlanta are not attributed by him to a want of spiritfficial returns that General Johnston had, at Atlanta, on the 10th of July, leaving out his killed his intrenchments, Sherman had got nearer to Atlanta by several miles than we were. In all the firy to consider somewhat the operations around Atlanta. If he did, as he supposes, really commit no[2 more...]
Knoxville (Tennessee, United States) (search for this): chapter 21
ieved? If the discipline and organization of the army were as perfect as described, who produced it? For four months it had been under the control of Johnston. What evidence has General Hood to sustain his assertion that at Dalton the enemy was but little superior to us in numbers? He relies upon Sherman's statement that he was as strong at Atlanta as when the campaign opened. His army at Missionary Ridge was estimated at eighty thousand. He was afterward reinforced by the army from Knoxville and the troops from North Alabama, besides other. Our scouts reported that he had been reenforced with at least thirty thousand men. General Sherman told General Govan, or said in his presence, that he commenced the campaign with one hundred and ten thousand. I have never heard it estimated at less than ninety thousand infantry and artillery. In July General Wheeler estimated it between sixty-five and seventy thousand. The Northern papers, about that time, admitted his losses to be for
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