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ome days made demonstrations down the Rappahannock, opposite Lee's right, in order to deceive his enemy,) began his movements in earnest. Three corps--Eleventh, Twelfth and Fifth--were moved up the river to Kelly's Ford. Here they crossed on the 29th, and proceeded towards Germanna and Ely's fords, on the Rapidan. Stoneman, with the mass of his cavalry, set out on the same day from Kelly's, on his way to the Confederate rear. By 2 P. M., on Thursday, April 30th, the three infantry corps had xth corps, and Gibbons's division of the Second, had been left at Fredericksburg under Sedgwick, to make demonstrations and distract the enemy. Pontoons had been laid down at Burnside's old crossing places, and troops thrown over the river on the 29th, and the First and Sixth corps, comprising over forty thousand men, there threatened the Confederate lines in front. Lee's situation was one of great difficulty and danger. With but little over fifty thousand men, he had in front over forty th
f the Confederate army. He had then attempted to carry Lee's lines in his front by main force, and had met with disastrous repulse. But it was easy to turn the Confederate position by crossing above or below it, thus forcing Lee to a battle outside of his lines, or to a retreat, to cover his communications. Hooker decided to turn the Confederate left flank by crossing the Rapidan and Rappahannock above their junction. He first sent forward his splendid body of cavalry about the middle of April, intending that they should cross in advance of the infantry, and, sweeping round to the Confederate rear, do all the damage possible to Lee's depots, and the railroads on which he depended for supplies. Stoneman, with the cavalry, reached the Upper Rappahannock, met with a rain-storm, and some opposition from the Confederates, and then went deliberately into camp near the Rappahannock, and along the Orange and Alexandria railroad. The river was past fording for some time, and Stoneman was
h the cavalry, reached the Upper Rappahannock, met with a rain-storm, and some opposition from the Confederates, and then went deliberately into camp near the Rappahannock, and along the Orange and Alexandria railroad. The river was past fording for some time, and Stoneman was allowed to waste two weeks in looking at it, when a day's march would have placed him high enough up the stream to have crossed without difficulty, where only scouts and pickets could have opposed him. At length, on April 27th, Hooker (after having for some days made demonstrations down the Rappahannock, opposite Lee's right, in order to deceive his enemy,) began his movements in earnest. Three corps--Eleventh, Twelfth and Fifth--were moved up the river to Kelly's Ford. Here they crossed on the 29th, and proceeded towards Germanna and Ely's fords, on the Rapidan. Stoneman, with the mass of his cavalry, set out on the same day from Kelly's, on his way to the Confederate rear. By 2 P. M., on Thursday, April 30
on April 27th, Hooker (after having for some days made demonstrations down the Rappahannock, opposite Lee's right, in order to deceive his enemy,) began his movements in earnest. Three corps--Eleventh, Twelfth and Fifth--were moved up the river to Kelly's Ford. Here they crossed on the 29th, and proceeded towards Germanna and Ely's fords, on the Rapidan. Stoneman, with the mass of his cavalry, set out on the same day from Kelly's, on his way to the Confederate rear. By 2 P. M., on Thursday, April 30th, the three infantry corps had reached Chancellorsville, where they were joined the same evening by two-thirds of the Second corps, which had crossed at United States ford. The Third corps was next ordered up from Fredericksburg, and reached Chancellorsville before midday on Friday, May 1st. Thus Hooker was rapidly concentrating over seventy thousand men at Chancellorsville, on Lee's flank. Meantime, the First and Sixth corps, and Gibbons's division of the Second, had been left at F
and proceeded towards Germanna and Ely's fords, on the Rapidan. Stoneman, with the mass of his cavalry, set out on the same day from Kelly's, on his way to the Confederate rear. By 2 P. M., on Thursday, April 30th, the three infantry corps had reached Chancellorsville, where they were joined the same evening by two-thirds of the Second corps, which had crossed at United States ford. The Third corps was next ordered up from Fredericksburg, and reached Chancellorsville before midday on Friday, May 1st. Thus Hooker was rapidly concentrating over seventy thousand men at Chancellorsville, on Lee's flank. Meantime, the First and Sixth corps, and Gibbons's division of the Second, had been left at Fredericksburg under Sedgwick, to make demonstrations and distract the enemy. Pontoons had been laid down at Burnside's old crossing places, and troops thrown over the river on the 29th, and the First and Sixth corps, comprising over forty thousand men, there threatened the Confederate lines i
p waste and needless consumption. Want of forage compelled General Lee to send most of his cavalry to the rear to recruit, so that he had but 2,700 cavalry present to protect his flanks and guard his communications, against the 10,000 or 12,000 Federal cavalry which Gen. Hooker had ready to use. The Rappahannock formed but a slight barrier to the advance of the Federal army. Commanding the river with his artillery, Burnside had, with no great difficulty, forced a crossing the preceding December in the face of the Confederate army. He had then attempted to carry Lee's lines in his front by main force, and had met with disastrous repulse. But it was easy to turn the Confederate position by crossing above or below it, thus forcing Lee to a battle outside of his lines, or to a retreat, to cover his communications. Hooker decided to turn the Confederate left flank by crossing the Rapidan and Rappahannock above their junction. He first sent forward his splendid body of cavalry about
ooker's subsequent defeat. General Hooker's outlook, at the beginning of the Chancellorsville campaign, was highly favorable. He had over 130,000 well-drilled and well-equipped soldiers, the mass of them trained to war in the great struggle of 1862. He lay on the north side of the Rappahannock, opposite Fredericksburg, within a dozen miles by railroad of the Potomac and his depots of supply. In his front, on the south side of the river, was General Lee, with less than 55,000 men (see officy to short rations, and the want of food sufficient in quantity and variety was already telling on the health of the Confederate troops. The supply of arms and ammunition in the Confederacy had never been adequate, and it was found in the fall of 1862 that the consumption greatly exceeded the capacity of the Confederate arsenals to supply. Hence much anxiety was felt in regard to the approaching campaign, and the most stringent measures had to be taken to stop waste and needless consumption.
October, 1879 AD (search for this): chapter 11.99
within his reach. He retreated under cover of the night and the storm, across the Rappahannock. The raid of Stoneman's cavalry was a failure. It accomplished, if possible, less in proportion than the main army. Colonel Dodge has been misled by many Confederate authorities into giving Jackson the entire credit of the flank movement on Saturday. This movement was suggested, as well as ordered, by General Lee. (See, General Fitz. Lee's address before The Army of Northern Virginia, October, 1879.) Colonel Dodge criticizes the rashness of the manoeurvre, but no Captain ever won victories against great odds without exposing himself to criticism of this kind. Jackson executed the movement, and too much praise cannot be given for the splendid manner of its execution. No breath of rivalry or jealousy ever came between Lee and Jackson. Said Jackson of Lee, He is the only man I would follow blindfold. Said Lee, on hearing of Jackson's wound, He has lost his left arm, but I have l
William Allan (search for this): chapter 11.99
The campaign of Chancellorsville — by Theodore A. Dodge, United States army. A Review by Colonel William Allan, Late of Jackson's Staff. Colonel Dodge has given us a most excellent book. Amidst the mass of rubbish yearly printed about the war, it is refreshing to find an author more anxious to get at the truth than to glorify comrades, or vilify his foes; an author with the honesty, intelligence and patience to pick out the facts from the confused and often conflicting testimony, and the ability to state them clearly and fairly. Colonel Dodge is entitled to the thanks of all fair-minded men belonging to both sides in the late war, for an intelligent and comprehensive discussion of the Chancellorsville campaign, in which the merits and failures of the respective combatants are stated with impartiality, the plans of the opposing leaders criticized in a fair spirit, and the skill and gallantry of Confederate and Federal alike recognized. This book is a valuable contribution to hi
Robert H. Anderson (search for this): chapter 11.99
o hold the lines in front of Fredericksburg, and keep Sedgwick in check, he decided to move out at once with the remainder of his army and give Hooker battle. Anderson's division was already on Hooker's front. McLaws was ordered to move to Anderson's support, followed by Jackson. The troops were moving during the night of ThuAnderson's support, followed by Jackson. The troops were moving during the night of Thursday, and by 8 A. M. Friday Jackson had reached the Confederate front near Chancellors-ville, and assumed command until General Lee, at a later hour, reached the field. As soon as the Confederates met the advancing Federals they were formed in line and ordered forward. The Federal skirmishers were driven in, and the heads of thhe Federal army, and attack its right flank and rear. Jackson began this manoeuvre in the early morning, taking some 26,000 infantry, while General Lee retained Anderson's and McLaw's divisions, amounting to 16,000 or 17,000 men, opposite Hooker's center and left wing. All day was consumed by Jackson in moving around the front o
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